Christine Straßmaier FOKUS | 2/2016 Turning the tide? Developments in the fifth year of the Syrian civil war The reporting on Syria in 2015 by European The first blow came in March 2015 when a regime is aware that such a step would create and American mainstream media has been coalition of Islamist rebels captured Idlib City panic and mass defection of its remaining dominated by the Islamic State and largely in the north and Bosra in the south of the popular base. Assad also publicly recognized neglected the developments of the genuine country. In the weeks after, further strategic for the first time Hezbollah’s “important” and Syrian civil war between the Syrian regime positions and towns in the north and the “effective” assistance3. Iran is believed to have and the rebel groups. Only the military south fell into rebel control as well as to the been pushing for this shift in strategy as their intervention of Russia raised international Islamic State in the northeast1. By June, the forces including Hezbollah had suffered most attention but its effects on the ground hardly Syrian regime had suffered major losses of from the spring and summer 2015. However, have been analyzed. Yet, the past year has territory. IT became clear that the regime after the public acknowledgement of these seen, in the shadow of the ISIS spectacle, was fighting on too many fronts with too few uncomfortable realities, another key ally some major changes on the battleground in forces. On 26 July, President Assad surpri- stepped in to turn the tide. Syria as well as on the international diplo- singly revealed the grim status of the Syrian matic scene that few had expected in 2014. regime in a speech on public television. In On September 30th 2015, Russian President These changes mean that 2016 could be front of a frenetically cheering loyalist crowd Putin announced that Russia would conduct the year that enables the Assad regime to he declare that “each part of Syria is precious air strikes in support of the regime’s fight end its international isolation and build the and invaluable and each spot equals in its against the Islamic State5. While Assad’s international framework and local conditions demographic and geographic importance forces hardly engaged in clashes with the to survive after five years of civil war. all other spots” but, relativizing the latter by Islamic State since the group took over vast stating that “war has its conditions, strategies, territory in Syria in 20146, also Russian air Turning the tide with Russian support and priorities.”3. Assad went on explaining raids hit primarily rebel strongholds7. While the recent setbacks by the armed forces and European and U.S. media has focused on In spring 2015 Assad’s forces and his key as a result that “vital areas that must be held Putin’s motivations, the interesting question allies Hezbollah and Iran seemed exhausted as to prevent other areas from falling”4. The is what effect Russian airstrikes had on the and overstretched1. The end of the past speech seemed as if the president was trying regime’s ground control. In general, the Rus- year had been marked by several offensives to prepare the Syrian assembled economic sian aid seemed to face the same challenges against the rebels, especially the recapture and political elite has been his economic and like the US-led airstrikes against ISIS: The of the country’s second largest city and political backbone throughout the war as airstrikes themselves are powerful and effec- economic hub Aleppo. The Syrian Arab well as his popular base in front of their TVs tive, but they will eventually remain useless Army has been diminished to a skeleton and that the current partition of Syria might be without a ground force that is capable of hol- hardly deployed to the battlefield’s frontline for good and the protection of “small Syria” ding the ground paved by the strikes8. Given due to the regime’s mistrust towards Sunni should be made priority. The small or useful the already described status of the ground recruits. Instead, locally recruited Syrians Syria solution focuses on preserving Dama- forces, this still remains to be seen. Almost organized into a variety of militias headed scus and its hinterland, the border area to four months after the start of the Russian by Assad-loyalists including businessmen, Lebanon as well as the central corridor to the intervention, the regime’s forces have not re- neighborhood strongmen, and tribal leaders coastal areas. In addition, Assad admitted for captured a single city that into rebel control dominate the battle field while army officers the first time publically that the armed forces in spring and summer 2015. That leads to seem to supervise the action to Damascus were facing manpower shortage and that sobering assessment of Russia intervention. though their influence and extent of control more participation of the Syrian population While the Russian airstrikes have prevented is diminishing2. In addition, Hezbollah as well was required. The Syrian government had a further and possible vital break of Assad’s as Iranian forces were largely responsible for already published an amnesty for deser- control, it has not improved the regime’s grim the gains in 2014. Assad’s infamous special ters4. While Assad again did not announce status compared to August 2015. forces have lost much of their influence and a general mobilization, he highlighted gradually recruited more ordinary Syrians that other “civilian resources” such as “cars, Yet, at the time of writing the Russian air sup- than regular soldiers. Yet, improved com- machinery and facilities” might be required port seems to gain momentum and enable mand and control structure as well as outside for the armed forces. The mobilization law, the regime to recapture territory in Aleppo. A support on the side of rebels amplified the qanoun al-taabia, issued in 2011 provides the successful assault would return the control of developments in spring and summer 2015. regime with such tools. However, total public Syria’s second largest city entirely back into mobilization remains highly unlikely as the the regime’s hands. In addition, the regime is 1 Developments in the fifth year of the Syrian civil war FOKUS | 2/2016 also making progress on the southern front the rebellion has also a broader effect but campaign to seize Daraa after the offensive in Daraa province another rebel stronghold. also a setback for the Syrian-Syrian negoti- on the provincial capital became bogged ations and the rebels’ leverage. Alloush was down in heavy back-and-forth fighting16. Dis- The rebels – dead leaders and disunity certainly to take one of the seats in the High cord between the MOC and the rebels as well Nego tiations Committee that was agreed as cuts in funding of the operation have been Even if it is unclear whether the regime can on during the Riyadh conference Decem- named as reasons behind the setback. In hold the ground that Russian airplanes will ber 2015 and meant to prepare the Syrian addition, rebels have claimed that the major prepare for them, the bombings will have a (not Kurdish) opposition for Syrian-Syrian successes have been due to Jabhat al-Nusra destructive effect on the armed opposition. negotiations by January 2016 as described and not the Southern Front. Russian airstrikes caused major destruction in the November 14 Vienna communiqué. A of civilian infrastructure, food and medical hand full of high-ranking rebel leaders is not Preserving the Syrian state while destroy- facilities and stroke military targets of the enough to run the entire rebellion, but they ing the Assad regime? rebels, such as ammunition and weapon have significant influence over the insurgen- storages and of course, rebel leaders9. On cy. Killing these leaders is unlikely to make Five years into civil war, the Syrian govern- Christmas day, an air strike killed, along with fighters suspend their battle and abandon mental and administrative system has fellow rebel heads, Zahran Alloush, comman- their weapons, but lead to further fracturing proven to be more stable than most analysts der of the Jaysh al-Islam and military chief of the opposition and support for more predicted in 2011. Until this day, the Syria of the rebel umbrella group Islamic Front, radical, but stable groups such as Al-Qaeda regime is apart from the area controlled by in Eastern Gouta10. The region has been the or Islamic State. the Islamic State the only stable provider of scene of the 2013 chemical attack11 and since salaries, public services, commodities and then developed into one of the regime’s most The infighting and lack of unity among the food17. Being this provider is vital for the sur- worrying rebel strongholds just kilo meters armed opposition had been a constant vival of the Syrian Regime in the civil war. The east from Damascus city center. The area obstacle since the beginning of the civil case of Aleppo has been the most prominent has been repeatedly under siege for months war14. Unstable and unstructured external example of failed attempts to create a strong, since 2013 and witnessed major airstrikes support has exacerbated the infighting civil administrative system in the vacuum left and barrel bombings12. among rebels. In late spring 2015, reports by the Assad regime. After Western parts of emerged that the U.S. was in the process of Aleppo had been liberated in early 2014 by Alloush has been defined as one of Syria vetting fighters in Syria to establish a group rebels, Opponents of the regime designed most influential rebel leader and would have of moderate rebels of 5,400 per year15.