Theories of CSCL Abstract There are many theories useful for framing CSCL research and they may in principle be irreducible to a single theory. CSCL research explores questions involving numerous distinct—though interacting—phenomena at multiple levels of description. The useful approach may be to clearly distinguish levels such as individual, small-group and community units of analysis, and to differentiate terminology for discussing these different levels. Theory in general has evolved dramatically over the ages, with a trend to extend the unit of cognition beyond the single idea or even the individual mind. Seminal theoretical works influential within CSCL suggest a post-cognitive approach to group cognition as a complement to analyzing cognition of individuals or of communities of practice. Keywords Learning * Collaboration * Computer support * Theory * Group cognition * Post-cognitive * Distributed cognition There is no one theory of CSCL. Research in CSCL is guided by and contributes to a diverse collection of theories. Even the word theory means different things to different researchers and plays various distinct roles within CSCL work. The reading of the history of theory presented here is itself reflective of one theoretical stance among many held, implicitly or explicitly, by CSCL researchers. The nature and use of theory have changed over history and continue to evolve. The theories most relevant to CSCL—in the view developed in this paper— concern the nature of cognition, specifically cognition in collaborating groups. Through history, the analysis of cognition has broadened, from a focus on single concepts (Platonic ideas) or isolated responses to stimulae (behaviorism), to a concern with mental models (cognitivism) and representational artifacts (post- cognitivism). More recent theories encompass cognition distributed across people and tools, situated in contexts, within small groups, involved in larger activities and across communities of practice. For CSCL, theory must take into account interaction in online environments, knowledge building in small groups and cognition at multiple units of analysis. 1 A brief history of theory CSCL is multi-disciplinary by its nature and because of its origins (see Stahl, Koschmann & Suthers, 2006, for a history of CSCL from a perspective similar to the one here). Consider the name, Computer-supported Collaborative Learning: it combines concerns with computer technology, collaborative social interaction and learning or education—very different sorts of scientific domains. CSCL grew out of work in fields like informatics and artificial intelligence, cognitive science and social psychology, the learning sciences and educational practice—domains that are themselves each fundamentally multidisciplinary. Theory in these fields may take the form of predictive mathematical laws, like Shannon’s (1949) mathematical theory of information or Turing’s (1937) theory of computation; of models of memory and cognition; or of conceptions of group interaction and social practice. They may have very different implications for research: favoring either laboratory experiments that establish statistical regularities or engaged case studies that contribute to an understanding of situated behaviors. In the European tradition, theory begins with the ancient Greeks—especially Socrates, Plato and Aristotle—and continues through the 2,500-year-long discourse of philosophy. In recent times, theory has veered into unexpected directions as it has morphed into sciences based more on empirical research than on intellectual reflection. For instance, the work of Freud, Darwin and Marx replaced traditional philosophic assumptions about fixed natures of minds, organisms and societies with much more dynamic views. Theory always transcended the opinions of common sense—so-called folk theories based on the everyday experience of individuals—to synthesize broader views. But folk theories have also changed over time as they adopt popularized pieces of past theories; thus, a trained ear can hear echoes of previous theories in the assumptions of common-sense perspectives, including in current CSCL research literature. After the dogmatic centuries of the medieval period, philosophy took some significant turns: the rationalism of Descartes, the empiricism of Hume, the Copernican revolution of Kant, the dialectical development of Hegel, the social situating of Marx, the existential grounding of Heidegger and the linguistic turn of Wittgenstein. These all eventually led to important influences on theory in CSCL. In particular, the field of educational research followed this sequence of philosophic perspectives. Empiricism and positivism in philosophy of science culminated in behaviorism in biology and the human sciences. The central metaphor was that of stimulus provoking response, all objectively observable and unambiguously measurable (as critiqued in Chomsky, 1959). The major theoretical move of the generation before ours was to assert the necessity of taking into account cognitive processes in studying human behavior, from Chomsky’s (1969) theories of language based on deep grammar and brain mechanisms to the mental models and internal representations modeled by artificial intelligence programs. Human-computer interaction, the part of computer science dealing with designing for usage, has gone through a similar sequence of behaviorist and cognitivist theories (see Carroll, 2003, for numerous examples). More recently, post-cognitive theories have been influential in CSCL, as will be discussed later. 2 The unit of analysis The history of theory can be tracked in terms of the following issue: At what unit of analysis should one study thought (cognition)? For Plato (340 BC/1941), in addition to the physical objects in the world, there are concepts that characterize those objects; philosophy is the analysis of such concepts, like goodness, truth, beauty or justice. Descartes (1633/1999) argued that if there is thought, then there must be a mind that thinks it, and that philosophy should analyze both the mental objects of the mind and the material objects to which they refer, as well as the relation between them. Following Descartes, rationalism focused on the logical nature of mental reasoning, while empiricism focused on the analysis of observable physical objects. Kant (1787/1999) re-centered this discussion by arguing that human understanding was the source of the apparent spatio-temporal nature of observed objects and that critical theory’s task was to analyze the mind’s structuring categories. Up to this point in the history of theory, cognition was assumed to be an innate function of the individual human. Hegel (1807/1967) changed that. He traced the logical/historical development of mind from the most primary instinct of a living organism through stages of consciousness, self-consciousness and historical consciousness to the most developed trans-national spirit of the times. To analyze cognition henceforth, it is necessary to follow its biological unfolding through to the ultimate cultural understanding of a society. Figure 1 identifies Hegel’s approach to theory as forming the dividing line between philosophies or theories oriented on the individual and those oriented to a larger unit of analysis. Figure 1. From (Stahl, 2006, p. 289, Fig 14-1). 3 Philosophy after Hegel can be viewed as forming three mainstreams of thought, following the seminal approaches of Marx (critical social theory), Heidegger (existential phenomenology) and Wittgenstein (linguistic analysis). As taken up within CSCL, one can say these approaches established expanded units of analysis. Marx (1867) applauded Hegel’s recognition of the historical self-generation of mankind and analyzed this historical process in terms of the dialectical development of the social relations of production and the forces of production. His analysis took the form of historical, political and economic studies of the world- historical processes by which human labor produces and reproduces social institutions. Here, the study of the human mind and its understanding of its objects becomes focused at the epochal unit of analysis of social movements, class conflicts and transformations of economic systems. Heidegger (1927/1996) radicalized the Hegelian dialectic between man and nature by starting the analysis of man from the unified experience of being-in-the- world. The problem of a distinction between an observing mind and an objective world was thereby reversed. Heidegger, instead, had to show how the appearance of isolated minds and an external world could arise through abstraction from the primary experience of being-there, human existence inseparable from the worldly objects that one cares for and that define one’s activity. The primordial unit of analysis of cognition is the involvement of people in their world. Wittgenstein (1953) focused increasingly on language as it is used to accomplish things in the world through interpersonal communication. He rejected his own early view (Wittgenstein, 1921/1974), which reduced a rationalist conception of propositional, logical language to a self-contradictory position. Now, linguistic meaning no longer dwelt in the heads of users or the definitions of the words, but in communicational usage. Echoing the lived world of phenomenology, Wittgenstein acknowledged the role of the human form of life. He also conceptualized language as the playing of language games, socially established forms of interaction. The unit of analysis