SECURING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MATERIALS: SEVEN STEPS FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION Matthew Bunn John P. Holdren Anthony Wier May 2002 PROJECT ON MANAGING THE ATOM BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT HARVARD UNIVERSITY © 2002 Harvard University Printed in the United States of America The co-sponsors of this report invite liberal use of the information provided in it for educational purposes, requiring only that the reproduced material clearly state: Reproduced from Matthew Bunn, John Holdren, and Anthony Wier, Securing Nuclear Weapons and Materials: Seven Steps for Immediate Action, May 2002, co-published by the Project on Managing the Atom and the Nuclear Threat Initiative. Project on Managing the Atom Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs John F. Kennedy School of Government Harvard University 79 JFK Street Cambridge, MA 02138 Fax: (202) 495-8963 Email: [email protected] Web: http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/bcsia/atom Nuclear Threat Initiative 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, 7th Floor Washington D.C. 20006 Fax: (202) 296-4811 Email: [email protected] Web: http://www.nti.org This report is available on the Web at http://www.nti.org. TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................V 1. INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................................................1 NUCLEAR WEAPONS TERRORISM: WHY ACTION IS NEEDED NOW.....................................................................1 NUCLEAR SECURITY FIRST: THE FOCUS OF THIS REPORT ..................................................................................7 DISPELLING FIVE COMMON MYTHS ...................................................................................................................9 A TIME TO ACT ................................................................................................................................................13 2. THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2003 BUDGET FOR COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION....................................................................................................................................15 THE FY 2003 THREAT REDUCTION REQUEST ..................................................................................................16 THE BUDGET BY DEPARTMENT ........................................................................................................................20 CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................................................23 3. A GLOBAL COALITION TO SECURE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION..........................25 RUSSIA: FROM ASSISTANCE TO PARTNERSHIP..................................................................................................27 SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITY..............................................................................................................................30 4. SINGLE LEADERS FOR U.S. AND RUSSIAN EFFORTS TO SECURE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, MATERIALS, AND EXPERTISE....................................................................................................................31 A SINGLE LEADER FOR RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECURITY EFFORTS AS WELL.......................................................33 5. ACCELERATED AND STRENGTHENED SECURITY UPGRADES FOR WARHEADS AND MATERIALS IN RUSSIA.................................................................................................................................35 ACCELERATING THE PACE................................................................................................................................37 STRENGTHENING SECURITY .............................................................................................................................41 SUSTAINING SECURITY.....................................................................................................................................42 MOVING FORWARD ..........................................................................................................................................43 6. GLOBAL CLEANOUT AND SECURE: ELIMINATING OR SECURING STOCKPILES OF WEAPONS-USABLE MATERIAL..................................................................................................................45 ELIMINATING OR SECURING INSECURE WEAPONS MATERIAL STOCKPILES......................................................46 A CASE-BY-CASE APPROACH TO THE MOST SENSITIVE CASES........................................................................52 MOVING AHEAD...............................................................................................................................................55 7. LEADING TOWARD STRINGENT GLOBAL NUCLEAR SECURITY STANDARDS.................57 TIME FOR A NEW APPROACH............................................................................................................................59 THE NEED FOR STRINGENT STANDARDS ..........................................................................................................60 8. ACCELERATED BLEND-DOWN OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM ......................................65 THE HEU PURCHASE AGREEMENT ..................................................................................................................65 STRUCTURING AN HEU ACCELERATED BLEND-DOWN DEAL ..........................................................................66 COSTS OF AN ACCELERATED BLEND-DOWN DEAL...........................................................................................70 MOVING FORWARD ..........................................................................................................................................72 9. NEW REVENUE STREAMS FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY...............................................................73 A “DEBT FOR NONPROLIFERATION” SWAP ......................................................................................................74 SPENT FUEL STORAGE......................................................................................................................................77 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The possibility that terrorists could acquire a nuclear weapon and explode it in a U.S. city is real. This would be a more difficult feat than chemical or biological terrorism, but the massive, assured, instantaneous, and comprehensive destruction of life and property that would result may make this a priority for terrorists. While efforts to reduce the chances of this happening have been underway since long before last September 11 – and have recently been bolstered in some respects – the size and the speed of the U.S. and international response is not yet remotely commensurate with the magnitude of the threat. This report briefly reviews the dimensions of the danger and the efforts now underway to combat it, and then recommends seven sets of actions that ought to be undertaken immediately to bolster the barriers against this horrifying threat. Dimensions of the Danger The attacks of September 11 demonstrated that the threat from well-organized terrorist groups with global reach, bent on inflicting massive harm to the people of the United States, is not hypothetical but real. Terrorists have already tried chemical and biological weapons – nerve gas in the Tokyo subway, anthrax mailed to U.S. public figures. Their failure to use nuclear weapons so far must be assumed to be due to lack of means rather than lack of motivation. But they are trying. One route to terrorists’ acquiring a nuclear weapon would be for them to steal one intact from the stockpile of a country possessing such weapons, or to be sold or given one by such a country, or to buy or steal one from another subnational group that had obtained it in one of these ways. Another route to a terrorist bomb is via stealing the needed nuclear- explosive material (either plutonium or highly enriched uranium) – or buying it from someone else who has stolen it – and using this to fabricate a bomb from scratch. With enough nuclear material in hand (ranging from a few kilograms of plutonium for an implosion weapon to a few tens of kilograms of highly enriched uranium for the technically simpler gun-type design), it would likely be within the reach of a sophisticated and well- organized terrorist group to build at least a crude nuclear explosive. If stolen or built abroad, a nuclear bomb might be delivered to the United States, intact or in pieces, by ship or aircraft or truck, or the materials could be smuggled in and the bomb constructed at the site of its intended use. Intercepting a smuggled nuclear weapon or the materials for one at the U.S. border would not be easy. The length of the border, the diversity of means of transport, and the ease of shielding the radiation from plutonium or highly enriched uranium all operate in favor of the terrorists. The huge volume of drugs successfully smuggled into this country provides an alarming reference point. The detonation of such a bomb in a U.S. (or any other) city would be a catastrophe almost beyond imagination. A 10-kiloton nuclear explosion (from a “small” tactical nuclear weapon from an existing arsenal or a well-executed terrorist design) would create a circle of vi EXECUTIVE SUMMARY near-total destruction perhaps 2 miles in diameter. Even a 1-kiloton “fizzle” from a badly executed terrorist