Discussion Paper May 2018 A final status vote for Nagorny Karabakh: Choosing politics? Logo using multiply on layers Logo drawn as seperate elements with overlaps coloured seperately Cover photo: Nagorny Karabakh. © Conciliation Resources A final status vote for Nagorny Karabakh: Choosing politics? • 3 Nagorny Karabakh © Conciliation Resources A vote to decide the final political status of This concern is central to the clash between “step- Nagorny Karabakh (NK), the territory at the heart by-step” (phased) or “package” (simultaneous) of Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, would mark the approaches to implementing a peace agreement culmination of the Minsk Process, mandated by that has complicated Armenian-Azerbaijani the Organisation of Security and Co-operation negotiations from the outset. in Europe (OSCE). A final status vote would, in In the current climate of militarisation, escalation theory, supersede NK’s preceding interim status, and the possible threat of all-out war, a NK final legitimate its final political identity and bring status vote appears not only an unlikely prospect the 30-year old Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict to but even an inflammatory one. The idea of an open- an end. ended vote on the status of NK strikes at the heart The idea of a final status vote is one of several of the Armenian and Azerbaijani narratives that principles comprising the current peace proposal focus on exclusively retaining or reclaiming control developed by the Minsk Group Co-Chairs for more of the territory respectively. But a final status vote than a decade, known as the Madrid Principles. also offers the only route to a popular mandate and It is the most vulnerable single principle as it is locally generated solution to the conflict, even if this envisaged as being chronologically the last to be looks a distant prospect today. enacted. Implementation of a final status vote This discussion paper is based on Armenian- is usually taken to assume prior, and politically Azerbaijani civil society discussions on a NK final extremely challenging, changes in territorial status vote held within the framework of Conciliation control, security arrangements, displaced Resources’ Karabakh Contact Group (KCG) dialogue community return and political institutions in and platform in Tbilisi in the spring of 2016 (and before around NK. This is a significant source of concern the escalation that took place in April of that year). to Karabakh Armenians, the population whose It is the last in a series of five papers based on KCG political status is the original source of conflict. discussions on the Madrid Principles. A final status vote for Nagorny Karabakh: Choosing politics? • 3 Questions of definition mechanism and timeframe of a referendum are agreed simultaneously to other principles and Ambiguity surrounds many aspects of a NK final are an inseparable part of the overall deal. The status vote. This applies first to the terminology risk with this approach is that the terms by which used in the Madrid Principles. They refer to a the referendum is to be held are so contested ‘legally-binding expression of popular will’, a that progress on all other issues is held hostage formulation that avoids both the terms ‘plebiscite’ to agreement on this issue. This is, in effect, the and ‘referendum’. Plebiscites have historically situation that obtains today. been held to confirm decisions previously taken by political leaders, while referendums have generally been more participatory and open- Where would the vote take place? ended. Negotiators across the world often frame A second ambiguity surrounds the boundaries of vagueness in the detail of peace agreements the territory in which a final status vote would take as “constructive ambiguity”. But under current place. The territory originally disputed between political conditions in the Armenian-Azerbaijani Armenians and Azerbaijanis was the Nagorno- context, ambiguity can feed consistent worst-case Karabakh Autonomous Oblast’ (NKAO). Placed scenario-building on each side. This has embedded under direct rule from Moscow in 1988-1989, the an atmosphere deeply hostile to the holding of any province was formally abolished in November 1991 final status vote. by the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet (parliament). These points underscore that intensive public Azerbaijan subsequently drew new administrative awareness work on the meaning of all the Madrid boundaries which cut across the boundaries of Principles, and especially a final status vote, needs the NKAO. to be carried out across the conflict to ensure that For its part, the unrecognised Nagorno-Karabakh mediators, leaders and societies have a similar Republic (NKR) set out in its 2006 constitution de understanding of the form and purpose of a final facto external and internal boundaries, which cut status vote. Otherwise, there is a danger that the across the boundaries of the former NKAO and do peace process could unravel just as it reaches not correspond to the de jure boundaries used by its culmination. Azerbaijan and the international community. The 2006 NKR constitution contains wording that leaves What kind of vote? some room for discussion about final boundaries. Ambiguity extends to the most basic questions. The Nonetheless, the common public Armenian only firm element in the formulation of a ‘legally understanding of NK is that it includes extensive binding expression of popular will’ is that it would territories outside the NKAO under Armenian be legally binding. It leaves open the form that the military control since the 1991-1994 war. It also expression of popular will would take. includes adjacent districts which previously had substantial ethnic Armenian populations but which If the final status vote is held to be a plebiscite, remained under Azerbaijani military control at the the purpose of the vote is framed as endorsing a end of the war and from which all Armenians had peace deal previously agreed by political leaders been forcibly displaced. from both sides. This approach assumes that leaders come to agreement on the final political The Madrid Principles stipulate, as an early step, status of NK, which is then endorsed by plebiscite. the withdrawal of Armenian forces from the The risk with this approach is that a rejection of territories under their control surrounding the the agreement by voters would derail the whole NKAO (with separate modalities applying to the peace process and could threaten a return to Lachin corridor with Armenia, and possibly also fighting. It leaves unclear the role of the population to the region of Kelbajar). This would effectively actually living in and displaced from NK in the re-establish the boundaries of the NKAO. For the determination of the territory’s final status. This Armenians, withdrawal would mean a dramatic approach also ignores the previous experience contraction (as much as half) in the territory under of the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process. Elite their control and in the security they take this deals behind closed doors have failed in the past control to represent. because of contrary societal reactions and are likely Given the Armenians held a demographic majority to do so again. in the NKAO before the conflict and now almost If the final status vote is held to be a referendum, exclusively populate its territory, however, its the purpose of the vote is to form one component reconstitution would mean that they would certainly of a wider package of indivisible principles. Other win a simple majority in a final status vote. For principles may be enacted earlier, but the format, Azerbaijanis, the return of the occupied territories 4 • Conciliation Resources A final status vote for Nagorny Karabakh: Choosing politics? • 5 surrounding the NKAO would be a major step territory. Meeting this challenge is complicated by forward in the peace process. Yet the concomitant the fact that the concept of interim status remains return to numerical minority status within the vague. There is little (and contested) public NKAO, and likely defeat in a simple majoritarian understanding of what rights and representation vote, makes the prospect of a final status vote it would confer on populations living in, and deeply ambivalent. displaced from, NK. Defining the electorate Is a new vote necessary? If the perceived boundaries of NK have changed A fourth ambiguity concerns the referendum since work on drafting the principles for a peace carried out on 10 December 1991 by the NKR to agreement began, so has the population. Four ratify its self-proclamation as a separate republic vectors of demographic change can be identified: in September the same year. The referendum recorded overwhelming support (99.9% with 3 First, the entire Azerbaijani population of NK a turnout of 82.2%) for independence among and the surrounding occupied territories has been forcibly displaced. Many, although not the territory’s Armenian population (Karabakh all, Karabakh Azerbaijanis remain formally Azerbaijanis did not participate). Armenians argue registered at their former homes in their identity for its legality according to Soviet legislation, that documents. However, over 20 years after the end Karabakh Azerbaijanis were able to participate, of the conflict many first-generation displaced even if they decided not to, and that no further people have died and, in many cases, it is their vote is needed other than as a face-saving device descendants who would have a right to return. for Baku. Furthermore, they highlight that the NKR’s referendum