Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal Volume 20 | Number 4 Article 3 1-1-1998 A Brief Return to the Digital Sampling Debate Matthew .G Passmore Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/ hastings_comm_ent_law_journal Part of the Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons Recommended Citation Matthew G. Passmore, A Brief Return to the Digital Sampling Debate, 20 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 833 (1998). Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol20/iss4/3 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. A Brief Return to the Digital Sampling Debate by MATrHEW G. PASSMORE* I. D igital Sam pling ................................................................................... 837 A. Background .................................. 837 1. Technical Aspects of Sampling .................................................. 837 2. Historical, Cultural and Creative A spects of Sam pling ........................................................................ 838 B. Substantial Similarity and "Transformative" D igital Sam ples .................................................................................... 839 C. Are Transformative Digital Samples Art? .................... .............. 840 1. The Postmodern Aesthetic-Pastiche ...................................... 840 2. The African-American Aesthetic-the "Second Sight". ................................................................................ 843 II. T he L aw ............................................................................................... 845 A . The G oals of Copyright Law ......................................................... 845 B. Case Law and the Current Fair Use Regime .............................. 846 1. Purpose and Character of the Use ............................................. 848 2. Nature of the Copyrighted Work ............................................... 849 3. Amount and Substantiality of the P ortion U sed .............................................................................. 850 4. Impact of Use on the Potential Market for the Copyrighted Work and Derivative W o rk s ................................................................................................851 III. An Expanded Conception of the F air U se D octrine .................................................................................... 852 A. The Balance of Competing Rights ............................................... 852 * J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 1998; B.A., Philosophy, UCLA, 1992. The author wishes to thank Rebecca Baird, Sara Shostak, Jed Olson, Jay Kim, Gene Lushtak and his family for all their support; Chalk Circle, DJ Noizmaker and Xandr for all the music; The executive board, editors, and staff of the Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal, particularly Katie Carlson, Chip Robertson, David Schnider, Esther Kim and Glenn Von Tersch; and Professor Margreth Barrett, who commented upon earlier drafts of this note. 834 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [VOL. 20:833 B . A N ew R egim e ................................................................................ 854 IV . Conclusion ......................................................................................... 856 19981 A BRIEF RETURN TO THE DIGITAL SAMPLING DEBATE Introduction In recent years, digital sound sampling has revolutionized the way music sounds,1 and has introduced new methods of composition, production, and performance.2 Concurrent with developing digital technology, copyright owners have clamored to maintain their rights in works of original authorship.3 On the one hand, artists who use digital sampling claim the need for fair access to previously recorded (and copyrighted) material; on the other, owners of copyright in the sampled material struggle to enforce their copyrights against 4 potentially infringing digital sampling. This tension has generated considerable discussion in legal scholarship, inspiring professors, students and practitioners to weigh in on both sides of the controversy.5 This note adds to the ongoing debate and controversy surrounding digital sampling in the context of contemporary popular music and copyright law. In particular, this note addresses the narrow question of whether, in light of normative American copyright principles, the fair use doctrine 6 should be extended to cover creative works that use "transformative" 7 digital samples. Courts have counseled against such an extension. In Rogers v. Koons,' the Second Circuit noted that "if an infringement of copyrightable expression could be justified as fair use solely on the basis of the infringer's claim to a higher or different artistic use- 1. See, e.g., David Sanjek, "Don't Have to DJ No More:" Sampling and the "Autonomous" Creator,10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 607, 608 (1992). 2. See id. at 608-09 (noting specifically that the relationship between composer and computer programmer has been substantially blurred by the advent of digital sampling technology). 3. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994) (granting rights to creators in their original works of authorship). 4. See Robert G. Sugarman & Joseph P. Salvo, Whose Rights? Sampling Gives Law a New Mix, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 11, 1991, at 21. 5. See, e.g., Randy S. Kravis, DigitalSampling and Copyright, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 231, 232 (1993) (noting that "[m]uch controversy has emerged over the new technology of digital sampling."); Carl Falstrom, Thou Shalt Not Steal: Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., and the Future of Digital Sound Sampling in PopularMusic, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 359 (1994); William S. Coats & David H. Kramer, Not As Clean As They Wanna Be: Intermediate Copying In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 16 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 607, 617 (1994); John Pareles, Digital Technology Changing Music, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16,1986, at C23. 6. See 17 U.S.C. § 107. 7. See infra Part I.B. 8. 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992). HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. (VOL. 20:833 without insuring the public awareness of the original work-there would be no practicable boundary to the fair use defense."9 The Supreme Court echoed this idea in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.1° In holding that a parody could be protected under the fair use doctrine, the Court warned that if "the commentary has no critical bearing on the substance or style of the original composition,... the claim to fairness in borrowing from another's work diminishes accordingly .... 11 This note argues against the notion that extensions of the fair use doctrine to "generally critical"' 2 expressive works would eliminate any practical boundary to the fair use defense. Part I begins with preliminary definitions and discussion of digital sound sampling, both as a technological process and a cultural development. Part I then argues that where a sample has been presented in a "transformative" artistic context, such use is a legitimate tool of artistic expression. I will support this argument by situating transformative samples within the ambit of two contemporary socio-artistic sensibilities: Postmodernism and a uniquely African-American aesthetic paradigm-the "second sight." Part II discusses the traditional normative goal of American copyright law: achieving an equitable balance between protection of original works of authorship and public policy considerations that urge wide public access to creative works. 13 Part II also addresses some uses of transformative digital samples in the context of relevant case law and the fair use defense of the 1976 Copyright Act.14 In Part III, I argue that the boundary of the fair use doctrine, as it currently exists in American jurisprudence, should be extended to include additional forms of artistic criticism. In certain circumstances, the goals of copyright law mandate permissive use of transformative samples because the policy goals favoring public access to creative expression outweigh the property interests of the copyright holder. I 9. Id. at 310. 10. 510 U.S.569 (1994). 11. Id. at 580. 12. By "generally critical" I mean a work that although possibly a parody, contains no parodic reference to another original composition. In a footnote to the Campbell opinion, the Court did note that a "parody that more loosely targets an original than the parody [in Campbell] may still be sufficiently aimed at an original work to come within our analysis of parody." 510 U.S. at 580 n. 14. 13. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 5 (Comm. Print 1961) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT REPORT]. 14. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). 19981 A BRIEF RETURN TO THE DIGITAL SAMPLING DEBATE conclude that, because of this balance in favor of wide distribution of creative works, the goals of American copyright jurisprudence compel the expansion of the fair use doctrine to include certain aesthetic frameworks that utilize transformative digital samples. I Digital Sampling A. Background 1. Technical Aspects of Sampling Digital sampling is the "practice of using a portion of a previous sound recording in the creation of a new recording."15 The process of creating