www.oeko.de Implications of MFE compliance with non-proliferation requirements Matthias Englert, Öko-Institut e.V. Germany BLUF – Bottom Line Up Front www.oeko.de Neutron producing fusion technology will very likely be faced with questions about its proliferation resistance while it matures from experiment to a full-fledged energy option It is very important to meet the concerns of all stakeholders in a constructive and respectful dialogue There are research opportunities 2 International Security and Disarmament www.oeko.de Why do states build nuclear weapons? (political science) How do states build nuclear weapons? (physics/technology) Can the spread (proliferation) be controlled? (arms control and safeguards - policy, politics and institutions) Can we get rid of nuclear weapons and how? (peace research) 3 Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons www.oeko.de Access to nuclear weapon relevant material existing stockpiles production technologies U235 Plutonium Tritium U233 US DoE Picturing the Bomb Highly enriched Uranium Size of plutonium pit used in Nagasaki Bomb 4 Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons www.oeko.de Access to nuclear weapon relevant material existing stockpiles production technologies U235 Plutonium Tritium U233 Significant Quantity/Mass Pu HEU Tritium IAEA 8 kg 25 kg Weapon 2-6 kg 3-16 kg 2 g 5 Tokamak Fusion www.oeko.de 6 Starting Point www.oeko.de Pure Fusion: Fusion-Fission Hybrid: -No nuclear material used - Nuclear material used under normal operating under normal operating conditions conditions “None of the materials required Safeguards under are subject to the provisions of Comprehensive Safeguards non-proliferation treaties” Agreement (CSA) EFDA 2005 Power Plant Conceptual Study 7 4 Technical Reasons a Tokamak Might be Attractive for a Proliferator www.oeko.de 4 8 1. Tritium www.oeko.de 9 1. Tritium Diversion www.oeko.de T necessary for miniaturization (yield to weight ratio) Daily T-consumption in commercial facility: ~150 g/GWth T-Reserves in facility: order of kg Yearly overproduction planned in facility: one to several kg T-amount in boosted weapon: 2-3 g (unclassified <20g) Huge amounts of T handled compared to current civil market (<1kg/y) Accountancy very difficult. Not “nuclear material” with regard to safeguards system yet. Change has to be considered in view of large scale use, driven by technological dynamic. 10 2. Plutonium Production Potential www.oeko.de 11 2. Very High Plutonium Production Potential www.oeko.de 5 GWth Uranium in Alloy (Pb-17Li) all numbers in kg Pu/y 10 % 1 % 0,1 % 0,01 % One Blanket close to Plasma 25-65 4-10 1-2 0.1-0.2 One Blanket far from Plasma 1-3 0.3-0.6 <0.1 <0.10 section 20 degree All Blankets 414 71 12,5 1,5 Complete Reactor 7450 1280 225 27 Limited by TBR and Heat MCNPX Model of PPCS-A Geometry adapted from (Chen et al. 2003) 12 3. Source Material Requirements www.oeko.de 13 3. Very Low Source Material Requirements www.oeko.de even depleted uranium Fusion vs. Fission Reactor 14 4. Excellent Material for Weapon Purposes www.oeko.de 15 4. Excellent Material for Weapon Purposes www.oeko.de 500d 98.6% Pu-239 1800d 95.9% Pu-239 16 Intermediate Conclusion Fusion vs. Fission www.oeko.de Attractive High to very high Pu-concentrations Low source material masses necessary, below “one effective kilogram“ Hard spectrum breeds weapon grade Pu even for high burnups Tritium Less attractive today Mostly international research facilities yet Clandestine operation unlikely High degree of technical sophistication High costs yet Many components not commercially available yet No broad global expertise, smaller community yet 17 Scenarios for Fissile Material Acquisition www.oeko.de Declared Clandestine Break Out Diversion Facility modified Facility modified optimized Facility as designed latent capabilities 18 Scenarios for Fissile Material Acquisition www.oeko.de Declared Clandestine Break Out Diversion Facility modified Facility modified optimized Facility as designed latent capabilities 19 Clarification Needed for Regulation www.oeko.de 20 Gaps in Regulation www.oeko.de Nearly every member state to the NPT has a comprehensive safeguards agreement (INFCIRC, 153) with the IAEA - Safeguard regime is build around the presence of nuclear material - Design flow and inventory of source or special fissionable material determines frequency of inspections Gaps in regulating fusion besides “no nuclear material in facility” Facility Fusion plant is not a facility as defined by the IAEA where nuclear material is costumarily used One effective kilogram 10 t in total of natural uranium can be exempt from safeguards. Depleted uranium usable: vast amounts available). Enough for a significant production (low source material requirement) 21 Verifying the Absence – The Additional Protocol www.oeko.de Many states ratified an Additional Protocol (AP) that explicitly allows to verify the absence of nuclear material (completeness of a declaration) Still the exact status of fusion has to be legally clarified Facility: - Fusion plant not a facility under the AP. - But AP makes explicit the fact that IAEA inspectors may visit, not only declared facilities, but also locations outside of facilities If the legal implementation of fusion into international verification regimes is not clarified early, it might be a point of contestation in the future. 22 Safeguards www.oeko.de Gedankenexperiment: How can I assure to you that there is no fissile material in a pure fusion plant? More specifically IAEA will ask the question: What is the needed frequency and intensity of inspections to timely detect a missing declaration? And how can efforts be minimized (win-win) What are the exact predefined procedures to come to a conclusive result? 23 Safeguards Research www.oeko.de Research recommended by participants of the IAEA consultancy meeting on “Non-Proliferation Challenges in Connection with Magnetic Fusion Power Plants”. Report, May 2014: - Verify the absence of source or special fissionable material in fresh fusion blanket modules, during operation and after exposure in a fusion power plant. - Investigate practicality of source material being mixed with coolant or purge flow - Evaluating the possibility to replace pure-fusion test blanket modules in a fusion power plant with blanket modules designed to breed special fissionable material - Possibility to misuse other internal components exposed to high neutron fluence. 24 ITER www.oeko.de ITER itself poses no proliferation risk “Test blanket modules will experience no more than 0.3 MWa/m2 of neutron fluence over ~10 years. If every 14.1 MeV neutron produced one 239Pu or 233U nucleus, each test blanket module (1.3 m2) would produce 2 kg = 1/4 SQ of fissile material in the whole lifetime of ITER.” (Rob Goldston, Princeton) But ITER could be perfect as test bed for verification (Fiss. Materials and Tritium): demonstrating „best practice“ preparing safeguards for next generation (DEMO) 25 More R&D www.oeko.de Investigate differences for Pure-Fusion vs. Fusion-Fission Hybrid How to implement safeguards by design in blanket development and into facility diagnostics? Investigate established safeguards methods and their implementation: ● Gamma and Neutron Spectra at different measurement positions ● Detection of fission products (gaseous, particle bound) by air filters and swipe samples ● Active neutron measurement ● Weighing of blankets ● Portal monitors ● … 26 Examples for Questions www.oeko.de ● Measurement and diagnostics community: where are measurements positions to detect fission products, fission gamma spectrum etc.? ● Blanket developers: how could absence of fissile material be verified in a blanket (neutron, gamma, etc.). What are the parameters to define inspection frequencies (blanket exchange, fissile material production potentials etc.) ● Remote handling and facility operation: how is blanket handled outside the reactor chamber (fabrication, transport, storage, accountancy, weighing etc.). What is necessary to minimize verification procedures? ● … More research needed to define question 27 Beyond Safeguards - Proliferation Resistance www.oeko.de Besides extrinsic institutional measures, intrinsic technical measures can enhance proliferation resistance of technology. - safeguards by design - proliferation resistance by design as early as possible Safeguards-by-Design: $ before concrete is poored $$ before radioactive contamination $$$$ after radioactive contamination Proliferation Resistance could be important for blanket design process and might influence design choices. 28 Self-Regulation and Code of Conducts www.oeko.de Code of conducts Pledge for civil use of fusion. Example: International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) Agreement. 2006 Article 20. Peaceful Uses and Non-Proliferation [...] shall use any material, equipment or technology generated or received pursuant to this agreement solely for peaceful purposes [...] shall take appropriate measures to implement this article in an effective and transparent manner. To this end, the council shall interface with appropriate international fora and establish a policy supporting peaceful uses and non- proliferation 29 IAEA Consultancy Results 2013 www.oeko.de Experts from Fusion Community, International Security, Safeguards ● Recommend that the IAEA considers means to achieve an inclusion into verification regime. ● a closer link between Safeguards/International Security and Fusion Community ● R&D opportunities to advance non-proliferation aspects of fusion. Recommended to report progress on DEMO Workshops