A Window on the Development of Modern Intelligence Claire Lee Chennault and the Problem of Intelligence in China Bob Bergin Claire Chennault went to China intelligence. Without a continu- in 1937 as a military adviser to ous stream of accurate informa- Chiang Kai-shek as Japan’s war tion keeping the fighters posted on China expanded. During late on exactly where the high-speed 1940–41 he would organize and bombers were, attempts at command the American Volun- interception were like hunting As an officer in the Army teer Group (AVG), popularly needles in a limitless “ known as the “Flying Tigers,” an 1 Air Corps, Claire haystack.” Chennault came to air unit supported covertly by the United States before Japan’s realize the importance of Fighter planes had domi- attack on Pearl Harbor. Chen- nated the skies and military intelligence in the early nault understood the value of thinking during World War I, 1930s. intelligence and wrestling with but that changed quickly when the problems of acquiring it dur- the war ended. In 1921, Billy ing most of his career. Most of Mitchell showed that airplanes what has been written about could sink captured German Chennault has focused on his battleships and “popularity ” leadership of the Flying Tigers, shifted from the fighter boys… his relationship with the Repub- to the lumbering bombers, even lic of China, and his service during World War II. This article then growing bigger and faster.” draws from his memoirs and Bomber advocates believed that other material to specifically the more powerful bombers address Chennault’s approach to would always get through and intelligence. that the fighter planes sent against them would be ineffec- As an officer in the Army Air tive. Advances in technology Corps, Claire Lee Chennault gave weight to their argu- came to realize the importance ments. When the B-10 bomber of intelligence in the early appeared, it was heavily armed 1930s, when he was the senior and capable of flying at 235 instructor in fighter tactics at mph, faster than the P-26 the Air Corps Tactical School at “Peashooter,” the standard Maxwell Field in Alabama. He fighter of the US Army Air had been trying to modernize Corps. Major air maneuvers fighter techniques and con- during the early 1930s seemed cluded that the “biggest prob- to prove that “due to increased lem of modern fighters was speeds and limitless space it is All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the authors. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US gov- ernment endorsement of an article’s factual statements and interpretations. Studies in Intelligence Vol. 54, No. 2 (June 2010) 1 Chennault and Intelligence impossible for fighters to inter- and won wide praise. Chen- China on a three-month con- cept bombers.”2 nault also tried to advance his tract to make a confidential ideas by writing articles, and by survey of the Chinese Air Force Chennault was convinced that exploring what was being done (CAF). He interrupted his jour- with modern tactics and timely elsewhere. He studied the air ney to make a side trip through information the bombers would warning net systems developed Japan that would illustrate his be intercepted and destroyed. in England and Germany and far-sightedness, his great inter- There was no question that looked for ways to improve est in intelligence, and the interception was difficult. At them. Among his writings was almost natural feel he had for that time, the only information The Role of Defensive Pur- its acquisition. on incoming bombers that suit,which defined the role of American air defense might get defensive aircraft and laid out Billy McDonald was waiting was from a haphazard warning the thinking that would be the on the dock at Kobe, Japan, net of observers whose primary basis for the famous air warn- when the liner President function was to alert civilians to ing net he would later estab- Garfield docked. McDonald was take cover. Chennault set out to lish in China. 3 one of the other two pilots on resolve the dual problems of the Flying Trapeze. Chennault tactics and intelligence. had recommended him and sev- Chennault as Collector eral others to the Chinese, and To develop new tactics and McDonald was now working at demonstrate the teamwork that The final performance of the CAF flight school at he believed was fundamental to Chennault’s Flying Trapeze Hangchow. Had the Japanese modern fighter tactics, Chen- was at the Miami Air Races in known that, they would not nault formed a three-aircraft December 1935. Among the have granted McDonald a visa acrobatic team that became spectators were representa- or, as Chennault put it, known as “Three Men on a Fly- tives from the Chinese Aero- “ensured the ubiquitous little ing Trapeze.” It represented the nautical Affairs Commission, fellows of the secret police on Air Corps all over the country who were looking for Ameri- our trail.” cans to help build China’s air force. Chennault was But McDonald somehow man- offered a job at the aged to get himself listed as an Chinese flying school. assistant manager of a troupe It was tempting. His of acrobats that was touring ideas were controver- Japan and passed through sial, his career passport formalities unnoticed. stalled, and his He stayed with the acrobats health not good. He while they appeared at several stayed in touch with theaters, then left them in the Chinese and Osaka to be on the dock when started to plan his the President Garfield arrived. retirement for 1937, In his passport, Chennault was when he would com- identified as a farmer. plete 20 years of ser- vice. What followed was like the excellent adventure of two On 30 April 1937 young operations officers on a Chennault retired field training exercise. They from the US Army hired an open car and tried to Air Corps; the next Chennault (middle) as a member of the Flying Trapeze look like tourists as they “set off in 1935. Photo © Bettmann/Corbis morning he sailed for to see the country through the 2 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 54, No. 2 (June 2010) Chennault and Intelligence They hid cameras and binoculars under their topcoats and, eyes of experienced airmen with “an unhealthy interest in harbors and airfields,” toured Ky- gauging potential targets.” oto, Osaka, and Kobe, then sailed the inland sea They hid cameras and binocu- lars under their topcoats and, with “an unhealthy interest in imagined how close it already tary establishment, “current harbors and airfields,” toured was. He arrived in China on 30 intelligence on the Orient just Kyoto, Osaka, and Kobe, then May 1937 and set off on a sur- didn’t exist,” he wrote. He sailed the inland sea where vey of the Chinese Air Force. looked for ways to learn about they tried to identify shipping He was at a flying school on 7 his enemy, and what he learned routes and islands where new July, when the Marco Polo he shared with the US embassy. war industries were being Bridge incident occurred. The From Japanese airplanes that established. Japanese, who had held parts of crashed during the first air bat- China since 1931, were on a tles he salvaged equipment and Chennault said nothing in his maneuver near the Marco Polo sent the best of the materiel to memoirs about planning for Bridge outside Peking. When the US naval attaché. With the this trip, but he must have done one of their soldiers disap- Japanese advancing on Nank- a good deal of it. There was the peared, the Japanese accused ing, the attaché secured it in matter of his identity and the Chinese of kidnapping him the safest place he knew, McDonald’s “cover,” and the and pressed demands that the aboard the US gunboat Panay. itinerary, which took the two Chinese could not meet. They Two days later the Panay was through industrial districts, used the Chinese refusal to attacked by the Japanese and near construction sites, and to occupy Peking. sent to the bottom of the “areas where industry seemed Yangtze. With it went Chen- to be expanding with the suspi- Chennault immediately sent a nault’s collection of Japanese cious speed of a military enter- cable to Chiang Kai-shek, offer- military equipment. 5 prise.” ing his services “in any capac- ity.” Chiang accepted, and sent Chennault continued to col- The trip was very successful, him to the CAF’s advanced lect everything he could about Chennault thought. They took flight school at Nan Chang to the Japanese Air Force, but his photos of potential targets and direct air combat training. But efforts made little impression “filled notebooks full of data.” Chiang also had more immedi- back in Washington. In 1939, “Much to my surprise,” he ate needs. On 13 August, Chen- the Chinese captured an intact wrote, “I found out four years nault was included in a meeting Japanese Type 97 “Nate” later that our notebooks and of Chiang’s war council. There fighter. Chennault had it flown pictures contained more infor- was no Chinese officer who in extensive tests against com- mation on Japanese targets could organize a large combat parable British, American and than the War Department mission, and Chennault spent Russian aircraft and compiled a Intelligence files.” 4 This Japa- the evening planning the first thick dossier on the Nate’s con- nese interlude gives an excel- Chinese air-strike on the Japa- struction and performance. He lent insight into Chennault’s nese warships that had shelled believed it was one of the best thinking at a time when Amer- Shanghai that day.