EuJAP | Vol. 9 | No. 2 | 2013 UDK 130.1 159.95.01 165 AN ARGUMENT AGAINST EPIPHENOMENALISM JASON MEGILL Carroll College ABSTRACT 1. Epiphenomenalism __________________________________________________ I formulate an argument against epiphenomenalism; the ar- Epiphenomenalism claims that although gument shows that epiphenomenalism is extremely improb- able. Moreover the argument suggests that qualia not only mental events are caused by physical events, have causal powers, but have their causal powers necessar- mental events do not causally affect the ily. I address possible objections and then conclude by con- physical in turn (e.g., see Heil 1998, 37-38 sidering some implications the argument has for dualism. or Robinson 2003). This paper concerns the Keywords: Epiphenomenalism; Dualism; Mind-Body Prob- causal efficacy of qualia; it will not address lem; Supervenience issues concerning the causal efficacy of be- liefs. So, for the remainder of this paper, ‘epiphenomenalism’ refers to the view that qualia specifically do not affect the physical. ‘Qualia’ is used in the usual sense; qualia are mental states “with a very distinctive sub- jective character…There is something it is like for me to undergo each state;” qualia are “introspectively accessible, phenomenal as- pects of our mental lives” (Tye 2013, intro- duction). In this section, I argue that qualia are not epiphenomena. It is clear that certain types of bodily states are associated with or paired with certain types of qualia. For example, there is a close connection between tissue damage and pain qualia: where there is tissue damage, there is often pain. Different views in philoso- phy of mind will offer different accounts of such regularities; e.g., the identity theory will claim that tissue damage causes brain states that the qualia are identical to in some sense, while dualism will claim that the bod- ily states cause brain states which in turn cause the qualia. But for now, simply note such regularities, whatever the true explana- tion of them might be. Likewise, there are close connections between certain types of 5 EuJAP | Vol. 9 | No. 2 | 2013 qualia and certain types of behavior. For example, there is a connection between pain and avoidance behavior: where there is pain, there is often avoidance behavior. It is this latter type of regularity, i.e., the connection between certain types of qualia and certain types of behavior, that is most relevant for our purposes. It is undeniable that such associations or pairings exist; and to be clear, when it is claimed that certain types of qualia are often “as- sociated with” or “paired with” certain types of behavior, this simply means that the two generally appear together. Of course, these associations only hold most of the time, e.g., pain medication might keep pain qualia away in the face of tissue damage, but this sort of example will not affect the argument. Given that such associations exist, there is one aspect of them in particular that will play a role in the argument. To be specific, these associations do not appear random. Rather, at least in some cases, given the subjective nature of a given type of qualia, the behavior that is associated with the qualia seems “appropriate.” That is, given the intrinsic natures of some types of qualia, the behavior that is associated with the qualia is precisely what one would expect. There is often a high degree of “fit” or “appropriateness” to these associa- tions. Qualia and behavior often seem to be “aligned” in the correct manner. To offer an example, again, pain qualia are generally associated with avoidance behavior. Pain qualia hurt, they are subjectively unpleasant. Given this, avoidance behavior is exactly the sort of behavior one would expect to be associated with pain qualia. To offer a different exam- ple: consider someone who displays avoidance behavior when they have blue qualia. This strikes us as extremely bizarre precisely because avoidance behavior is not an appropriate behavior given blue qualia. There is nothing about the intrinsic nature of a blue quale that would suggest that it should be paired with (or correlated with) avoidance behavior. In short, the claim is the following: qualia have intrinsic natures. Some qualia, such as pain, are intrinsically unpleasant; they are unpleasant in and of themselves; they are unpleasant even in isolation from anything else (such as any beliefs we might have). Other qualia, such as pleasure, are intrinsically pleasant; they are pleasant in and of themselves; they are pleasant even in isolation from anything else. Moreover, given the intrinsic nature of these qualia, we would expect them to be paired with certain behaviors and not paired with other behaviors. We would (and do) expect pain to be correlated with avoidance behavior (and it is). We would (and do) expect pleasure to not be correlated with avoidance behavior (and it is not). We are surprised when these expectations are violated, as they are in, e.g., cases of masochism (which is discussed below).1 I now formulate the argument. Of course, qualia either have causal powers or they do not; epiphenomenalism is either true or false. And again, there is a certain fit between the subjective natures of some types of qualia and the types of behavior that are associated with the qualia; given the nature of the qualia, the behavior seems appropriate. Suppose that qualia do not have causal powers, i.e., epiphenomenalism is true. But this is likely false for the following reason: if epiphenomenalism is true, then the “fit” between qualia and behavior is quite remarkable. Indeed, it would be nothing short of miraculous. For if 1 One might think that qualia do not have “intrinsic natures” or “subjective natures.” But note that dualists generally do think that qualia have intrinsic and/or subjective natures, and epiphenomenalism is a prominent form of dualism; so dualistic epiphenomenalism, at least, cannot and will not deny these claims to avoid the argument. 6 Jason Megill | An Argument Against Epiphenomenalism qualia are epiphenomena, they play no role in the production of behavior; after all, they do not causally influence the physical. But then any type of qualia could, in principle, be associated with any type of behavior. For example, happiness might as well be associated with avoidance behavior: it wouldn’t make any difference. Therefore, given this, the fit between qualia and behavior is indeed quite surprising, so surprising, in fact, that it calls our assumption, i.e., epiphenomenalism, into question. So, epiphenomenalism is very im- probable.2 Indeed, there is a far more plausible view: qualia and behavior show a high de- gree of “fit” because qualiacause behavior. The reason that pain qualia are associated with avoidance behavior is that pain hurts, pain is unpleasant, and it causes us to recoil. This is the common sense view, but it is a view that is not taken seriously enough in contemporary philosophy of mind.3 So, we seem to be faced with the following choice: we can endorse the common sense view, or we can endorse a view that is highly improbable; it seems we should opt for the former. In effect, we should make an “inference to the best explanation” (see Harman 1965). To offer a slight reformulation of the argument: there are various types of qualia and there are various types of behavior. Assume that epiphenomenalism is true. If so, there is no causal connection between qualia and behavior; the subjective nature of a given qualia type does not shape behavior in any way. But then, in theory, any given type of qualia could be associated with – or paired with – any given type of behavior: qualia and behavior are independent of one another, at least in the causal sense. Further, there are very many possi- ble pairings or associations when it comes to qualia and behavior. For example, avoidance behavior might have been associated with happiness, or blue, or pain, or any other type of qualia. Some of these pairings will exhibit a certain degree of appropriateness, e.g., those in which pain is associated with avoidance behavior, but a vast majority will not, e.g., those in which happiness, or blue, is associated with avoidance behavior. So, given epiphenomenal- ism, it is highly improbable that we would find ourselves in a world in which qualia and behavior show a high degree of “fit” (again, there are far more inappropriate associations than appropriate ones). But we are in such a world, so it is very likely that epiphenomenal- ism is false. 2. Further Implications The claims in section one suggest that two additional claims are true. First, the argument shows that, at least in some instances, different types of qualia have different causal pow- ers. Again, the argument claims that there is a certain degree of fit between qualia and behavior, and this fit suggests that qualia cause behavior (for otherwise this fit would be an incredible coincidence). Further, suppose that different types of qualia all have the same 2 This argument shares a premise with one offered by W. James (1879; 1890); both arguments appeal to the appropriate alignment between qualia and other factors such as behavior to call epiphenomenalism into question. There are significant differences between this argument and James’s argument as well, e.g., James made crucial appeal to natural selection in his argument (see Robinson (2003) for a brief discussion of James’s argument). (If the reader is unfamiliar with James’s argument, it was essentially the following: if qualia are epiphenomena, then we might as well enjoy harmful things and avoid things that aid our existence (but we do not). And if qualia are epiphenomena, natural selection cannot explain the appropriate alignments between beneficial things and what we enjoy, so we would have to take this alignment as a brute fact or a sort of pre-established harmony.) 3 To explain, many physicalists, at least, do not think that the subjective nature of a quale has causal powers.