Playing with Fire.The Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian Leviathan Daniela Pioppi After the fall of Mubarak, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) decided to act as a stabilising force, to abandon the street and to lend democratic legiti- macy to the political process designed by the army. The outcome of this strategy was that the MB was first ‘burned’ politically and then harshly repressed after having exhausted its stabilising role. The main mistakes the Brothers made were, first, to turn their back on several opportunities to spearhead the revolt by leading popular forces and, second, to keep their strategy for change gradualist and conservative, seeking compromises with parts of the former regime even though the turmoil and expectations in the country required a much bolder strategy. Keywords: Egypt, Muslim Brotherhood, Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, Arab Spring This article aims to analyse and evaluate the post-Mubarak politics of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in an attempt to explain its swift political parable from the heights of power to one of the worst waves of repression in the movement’s history. In order to do so, the analysis will start with the period before the ‘25th of January Revolution’. This is because current events cannot be correctly under- stood without moving beyond formal politics to the structural evolution of the Egyptian system of power before and after the 2011 uprising. In the second and third parts of this article, Egypt’s still unfinished ‘post-revolutionary’ political tran- sition is then examined. It is divided into two parts: 1) the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF)-led phase from February 2011 up to the presidential elections in summer 2012; and 2) the MB-led phase that ended with the military takeover in July 2013 and the ensuing violent crackdown on the Brotherhood. The article will only sporadically refer to international policies and dynamics. This is not because they are not relevant to understanding today’s Egypt. On the Daniela Pioppi is Associate Senior Fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) in Rome and temporary Research Fellow at the University of Rome ‘La Sapienza’. Email: [email protected] This article, together with those by Laura Guazzone and Maria Cristina Paciello, is a part of the research project “Islam- ism and Transitions”, funded by La Sapienza. The International Spectator, Vol. 48, No. 4, December 2013, 51–68 ISSN 0393-2729 print/ISSN 1751-9721 online Ó 2013 Istituto Affari Internazionale http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2013.847680 52 D. Pioppi contrary, Egypt is a highly dependent and vulnerable country in terms of economics, security and also domestic dynamics. However, a full examination of these aspects would have required a much longer piece. Finally, many observations and hypotheses in this article should be taken as tentative and will have to be confirmed by further research. In fact, the highly volatile and polarised political situation seriously hampers any quest for a consolidated analysis. The Revolution’s background: an increasingly predatory regime with a poorly organised opposition Two ‘parallel’ phenomena were at play during the now famous eighteen days that led to the resignation of Hosni Mubarak in January–February 2011 after 30 years of unchallenged rule: a spontaneous and largely unorganised popular protest stirred by the example of the Tunisian revolution; and a military coup. Both phenomena had an impact on the way the ensuing political transition was shaped and they both can be explained by looking at the Egyptian regime’s transformations and at the weakness of organised opposition forces. Since the 1952 ‘Revolution’, the army has been the backbone of the Egyptian regime with a dominant political and economic role. However, like many other military regimes, the Egyptian one also typically evolved into a tripartite structure with a division of labour between its three component parts, each crystallizing into separate institutions: (1) the army; (2) the internal security forces under the control of the Ministry of the Interior and (3) the political apparatus (presidency and ruling party). Since the late 1970s, the army – while keeping a privileged position – was in political and economic decline to the advantage of the other two power poles.1 After the 1973 war with Israel, the Camp David agreement (1978-79) and the consolidation of the alliance with the United States, the likelihood of a war seemed more and more remote for Egypt while, on the contrary, the necessity of internal repression grew due to increasing social disparities and loss of regime consensus. As decades went by, the regime progressively turned to the internal security forces for support, as signified by the swelling of the Interior Ministry budget and personnel, while the army diminished in size and importance.2 After Mubarak’s deliberalisa- tion in the 1990s, Egypt began to look less like a ‘military state’ and more like a ‘police state’.3 1Droz-Vincent, “The Security Sector in Egypt”, 220-6; Kandil, Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen, 194-8; and Stacher, Adaptable Autocrats, 5-12. 2Just to give an example, at the end of the 2000s, internal security (or security-associated) personnel outnumbered the active military personnel by a factor of about 4-to-1 with almost 2 million in security. Kandil, Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen, 194. 3Ibid. and Kienle, A Grand Delusion. The Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian Leviathan 53 However, the final and most serious blow to the army’s position was the rise of Gamal Mubarak, Hosni’s son, and his preparation for the presidency and, even more so, the political and economic rise of the tiny group of state-nurtured and corrupt super-capitalists that surrounded him. At the beginning of the 2000s, the Egyptian economy was dominated by about 20-25 family-owned conglomerates, the last evolutionary stage of the upper echelon of the private sector encouraged by regime policies since Sadat. As they gradually became a stronger regime partner, they carved out an influential position for themselves in the regime’s political arm, the National Democratic Party (NDP), which they largely contributed to financing.4 In 2004, this tiny group of super-capitalists finally took a governing position with the Ahmed Nazif cabinet (2004-11) made up of internationally well connected business tycoons and neoliberal intellectuals, all in Gamal Mubarak’s entourage.5 The result was a marked acceleration of the regime’s predatory nature and neoliberal policies. International financial institutions praised Egypt’s neoliberal economic programme with its average growth of 7 percent between 2005 and 2008. Yet, beneath the international approval lay a country weighed down by dete- riorating infrastructure, abject poverty and a dwindling social safety net, unable to provide a decent future for its frustrated, young and mostly unemployed citizens. The social pact between the regime and its people, fraying since the 1970s, completely fell apart in the second half of the 2000s.6 Deepening neoliberalism affected not only the country’s population, but also the army’s economic interests as it introduced new competitors to its previously near- monopolistic ventures.7 Also, fast rising inequalities meant that the internal security services and riot police (Central Security Forces) required even more resources to keep citizens’ discontent under control.8 In sum, the 2000s saw the swift reinforcement of three trends that were at work since the 1970s and that slowly carried the Mubarak regime to its end destination in 2011: 1) the marginalisation of the army; 2) the empowerment of the security forces/Interior Ministry; 3) the increased reliance on a state-nurtured super-capitalist class to run the country at the expense of the vast majority of the population. 4Kandil, Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen, 208-16; El Amrani, “The National Democratic Party: The Battle- ground”. 5Tycoons such as Ahmed Ezz (steel), Mohamed Mansour (transportation), Zoheir Garraneh (tourism) and economists with links with international financial institutions, such as Investment Minister Mahmoud Mohieddin or Finance Minister Youssef Boutros-Ghali. 6Soleiman, The Autumn of Dictatorship; Paciello, “Egypt’s Last Decade”; Kandil, “Why did the Egyptian Middle Class March to Tahrir Square?”. 7Marshall-Stacher, “Egypt’s Generals and Transnational Capital”. 8Stacher, Adaptable Autocrats,6. 54 D. Pioppi After having been sidelined by the security and political apparatus for years, the military took full advantage of the 2011 revolt and of the temporary setback of the internal security forces to get rid of the Mubaraks and their business cronies and rebalance the power triangle in their favour. Had the military not taken action, it is doubtful that the revolt would have continued long enough to convince the political leadership that it had to step down. Indeed, despite the fact that perhaps up to 12 million people participated in the 18-day uprising, decades of police repression ruled out the possibility that an organised revolutionary movement or party could have emerged on its own to lead the way. To be sure, the decade before the revolution saw an increase in people’s mobilisation with, on the one hand, the rise of the largely urban and middle class Egyptian Movement for Change, or Kefaya9 and, on the other, the most intense period of industrial strikes in Egypt’s history.10 Both movements contributed to the delegitimation of the regime and the emergence of a ‘culture of protest’ that facilitated the unprompted 2011 uprising. However, they completely lacked the mass base, the political experience and the organisational structure able to seriously challenge the regime. More importantly, both Kefaya and the workers’ movement, as well as the youth movements acting as a catalyst of the 2011 revolution, largely grew up outside the traditional opposition circles, which – after decades of controlled liberalisation punctuated by a mix of repression and co-optation – were widely perceived as ineffective and, in the end, almost functional to the regime’s survival and legitimation.