PIERRE LIENARD´ PASCAL BOYER Research Articles Whence Collective Rituals? A Cultural Selection Model of Ritualized Behavior ABSTRACT Ritualized behavior is a specific way of organizing the flow of action, characterized by stereotypy, rigidity in performance, a feeling of compulsion, and specific themes, in particular the potential danger from contamination, predation, and social hazard. We proposed elsewhere a neurocognitive model of ritualized behavior in human development and pathology, as based on the activation of a specific hazard-precaution system specialized in the detection of and response to potential threats. We show how certain features of collective rituals—by conveying information about potential danger and presenting appropriate reaction as a sequence of rigidly described precautionary measures—probably activate this neurocognitive system. This makes some collective ritual sequences highly attention-demanding and intuitively compelling and contributes to their transmission from place to place or generation to generation. The recurrence of ritualized behavior as a central feature of collective ceremonies may be explained as a consequence of this bias in selective transmission. [Keywords: ritual, cognition, evolution, epidemiology, cultural transmission] HY DO PEOPLE, the world over, seem compelled NO “THEORY OF RITUAL”: A MODEL OF RITUALIZED Wto engage in ritual practices? Why invest time and BEHAVIOR resources in such behaviors? We suggest here that we may According to the late Roy Rappaport, a proper account of have the rudiments of an answer. Rituals are compelling ritual should address the question why do human beings because specific aspects of human cognitive architecture engage in rituals at all?, which remains unanswered in an- make these behavioral sequences attention-grabbing, intu- thropological or psychological theories (Rappaport 1999). itively appropriate, and compelling. Specifically, we con- There are specific reasons for this failure but also a general sider that particular sequences of collective rituals activate problem with the very notion of a “theory of ritual.” a cognitive-emotional system focused on the detection of The problem lies with the concept of ritual itself. There and reaction to potential danger. This hazard-precaution sys- is no clear criterion by which cultural anthropologists or tem responds to a specific set of cues in people’s environ- other scholars of religion or classics determine that a par- ments and makes certain types of precautionary action seem ticular type of behavior is or is not an instance of a rit- intuitively appropriate. The system is manifest not just in ual. True, there seem to be many “definitions” of ritual reactions to potential danger but also in individual ritual- in anthropology (see, e.g., Gluckman 1975, among many ization, either normal or pathological (Boyer and Lienard´ others). But these so-called definitions are, in general, sum- in press). maries of causal theories (“ritual expresses symbolism,” “rit- We propose that instructions and actions typically ual is the manifestation of social status,” etc.) rather than found in collective rituals share core features with the infor- behaviorally precise criteria. “Ritual,” like “marriage” or “re- mation that normally activate the hazard-precaution sys- ligion,” is not a proper analytical category; instead it is more tem. This makes the ritual procedures attention-grabbing of what Rodney Needham described as a “polythetic” cat- and compelling, which in turns explains their good cultural egory, in which, typically, ritual types A and B may share transmission. features [m, n, p], types Y and Z may share [p, q, r ], Z and AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST, Vol. 108, Issue 4, pp. 814–827, ISSN 0002-7294, electronic ISSN 1548-1433. C 2006 by the American Anthropological Association. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Rights and Permissions website, at http://www.ucpress.edu/journals/rights.htm. Lienard´ and Boyer • Whence Collective Rituals? 815 W share [q, r, s] (Needham 1975). And although A and W the inferential construction of conceptual structures from apparently do not share any major feature, they are both available (and generally fragmentary) information (Sperber called “rituals.” That is why it is certainly futile to collect 1996). So the acquisition, storage, and communication many instances of what are commonly called “rituals” and of those representations we call “cultural” are crucially to tabulate their common features. This too often results affected by general features of human minds that should in very vague formulations that would potentially apply to and can be independently established. Inferential processes any social institution. are generally not accessible to conscious inspection, which In this project we focus on ritualized behavior, a con- is why experimental methods are required. Applied to the cept that we construe, in a manner directly inspired by Rap- problem at hand, this suggests the following: paport, as a specific way of organizing the flow of behavior, r There are collective rituals in human groups because characterized by compulsion (one must perform the partic- certain sets of actions are selected through cultural trans- ular sequence), rigidity (it must be performed the right way), mission as more compelling or “natural” than other pos- redundancy (the same actions are often repeated inside the sible sets of actions. We need not assume a specific hu- ritual) and goal demotion (the actions are divorced from man need or capacity to perform collective rituals. All we their usual goals; see Bloch 1974; Humphrey and Laidlaw have to assume is that, in given circumstances, these sets 1993; Rappaport 1999). Note that although ritualized be- of actions seem more appropriate than others—certain havior in this precise sense is typically the hallmark of cer- ritual sequences are found more attention grabbing or emonies we call “rituals,” it certainly is not found in all memorable than others. of those. Conversely, there may be many contexts outside “rituals” that include ritualized behavior. and Why should we abandon “rituals” and focus on ritual- r The selection can be explained in terms of specific fea- ized behavior? Because the latter is characterized in terms tures of human psychological architecture. Rituals are that make the identification of particular instances empir- not performed simply because “that’s the rule” and be- ically tractable. There may be ambiguous cases at some cause people absorb the conceptual schemata of their point, but this is nothing to worry about, as long as our cultures. Ritual performances produce specific effects in characterization lends itself to empirical investigation. participants that result in subsequent performance. So So we are effectively asking the question what are the we must document those cognitive systems most likely effects of ritualized behavior, such that individuals find col- to be activated by ritual performances and gather inde- lective rituals attention-grabbing and participation in such pendent evidence on the effect of such activation. ceremonies compelling? Obviously, there are many specific reasons (including coercion, commitment, habit, or belief) THE “OBVIOUS” FEATURES OF RITUALIZED BEHAVIOR justifying why a particular person should find a particu- lar ceremony of interest and participate in it. These factors An Example will vary enough between cultures, periods, and individuals Let us start with an example of the kind of behavior we con- that they cannot explain the general recurrence of ritual- sider here. This is taken from the ethnographic fieldwork of ized behavior. Some general features or effects of this kind one of us (Lienard)´ among the Turkana of Kenya. As this of scripted, rigid, and so forth behavior should explain why, vignette serves as illustration only, we deliberately omitted all else being equal, it appears with such frequency in hu- all the rich cultural background that is associated with this man cultures. particular sequence of actions (see Lienard´ in press for the We address this question in the framework of a cultural relevant information). selection framework. The main points of such a framework The ritual sequence partly described here is called ariwo. have been explained by others (Boyd and Richerson 1985; For this specific instance, it entails the sacrifice of an ox. Its Durham 1991; Sperber 1985), so we only mention two coat should be of a specific color and shine. The animal important points that impinge on our argument. First, should ideally be sacrificed by a left-handed twin. In the recurrent features of human cultures are the winners in sequence preceding the sacrifice, ritual participants circum- a constant process of generation and selection of new ambulate the ritual scene three more times and then gather variants. What we observe as cultural representations in a semicircle, facing East. The animal is made to go around and practices are the variants found in roughly similar the dancers three times counterclockwise. At some point in forms in a particular place (Boyd and Richerson 1985). the ritual, the members of the clan offering the ox approach Those particular sets of representations have resisted better one at a time the sacrificial ox and carefully rub their body than other changes and distortions through innumerable from forehead to loin on the animal’s forehead, in a gentle processes of acquisition,