DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY Office of Inspector General DHS CHALLENGES IN CONSOLIDATING TERRORIST WATCH LIST INFORMATION Notice: The Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, has redacted this report for public release based on input from relevant government entities. Those redactions are identifi ed as (b)(2), comparable to 5 U.S.C. section 552(b)(2). A review under the Freedom of Information Act will be conducted upon request. Offi ce of Information Technology OIG-04-31 August 2004 Offi ce of Inspector General U.S. Department of Homeland Security Washington, DC 20528 Preface The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector General Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, investigative, and special reports prepared by the OIG as part of its DHS oversight responsibility to identify and prevent fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. This report assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the program or operation under review. It is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct observations, and a review of applicable documents. The recommendations herein have been developed to the best knowledge available to the OIG, and have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is my hope that this report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. I express my appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report. Clark Kent Ervin Inspector General Contents Introduction.................................................................................................................................... 3 Results in Brief .............................................................................................................................. 3 Background.................................................................................................................................... 4 Findings ......................................................................................................................................... 6 DHS Is Not Overseeing Interagency Consolidation Activities ............................................. 6 Interagency Watch List Consolidation Could Be Improved ............................................... 12 Additional Issues Relating to Interagency Sharing of Terrorist Information Need to be Addressed .................................................................. 25 Recommendations………............................................................................................................ 30 Management Comments and OIG Evaluation ............................................................................. 31 Appendices Appendix A: Scope and Methodology..................................................................................... 39 Appendix B: Management Comments..................................................................................... 41 Appendix C: Major Contributors to This Report ..................................................................... 46 Appendix D: Report Distribution............................................................................................. 47 Abbreviations CAPPS II Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System CBP Customs and Border Protection DHS Department of Homeland Security FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation FTTTF Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force GAO Government Accountability Office, (formerly General Accounting Offi ce) HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive IAIP Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information Page 1 Contents IT information technology OIG Office of Inspector General TSC Terrorist Screening Center TTIC Terrorist Threat Integration Center Page 2 DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information OIG Department of Homeland Security Offi ce of Inspector General Introduction Terrorist and criminal “watch lists” are important tools for controlling and protecting U.S. borders. Traditionally, federal agencies have used various means, developed in response to their individual missions, to manage watch list information. The attacks of September 11, 2001, underscored the need for standardization and consolidation of the terrorist watch lists to help ensure homeland security. According to the Homeland Security Act of 2002,1 DHS is to play a major role in watch list consolidation activities. As part of its ongoing responsibilities to evaluate the effectiveness of DHS programs and activities, the OIG conducted a review of terrorist watch list consolidation efforts. The objectives of the review were to: (1) determine DHS’ role in working with other federal agencies to consolidate terrorist watch list systems and operations in response to recent legislation and executive branch direction; (2) evaluate the effectiveness of plans and activities to standardize and consolidate the watch lists to address the new requirements; and (3) identify any obstacles or challenges encountered and determine whether changes to the interagency systems integration approach are needed. The scope and methodology of this review are discussed in Appendix A. Results in Brief DHS is not playing a lead role in consolidating terrorist watch list information. Instead, these consolidation activities are generally administered by the entities that were responsible for collecting and disseminating terrorist information prior to DHS’ formation. DHS officials said that the new department lacked the resources and infrastructure to assume leadership for the consolidation. While this contention has merit, DHS can still play a more robust role than at present by overseeing and coordinating watch list consolidation activities across agency lines. Such oversight would help DHS fulfill the role required by the Homeland Security Act and better ensure that the past ad hoc approach to managing watch list consolidation is not continued. 1 Public Law 107-296 (Nov. 25, 2002), codified at 6 USC 101 et seq. DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information Page 3 Stronger DHS leadership and oversight would also help improve current watch list consolidation efforts. Although some progress toward streamlined processes and enhanced interagency information sharing has been made, the consolidation is hampered by a number of issues that have not been coordinated effectively among interagency participants. Specifically, in the absence of central leadership and oversight for the watch list consolidation, planning, budgeting, staffi ng, and requirements definition continue to be dealt with on an ad hoc basis, posing a risk to successful accomplishment of the goal. A number of additional challenges, such as i , privacy, , could be pursued in the context of a centrally coordinated approach to watch list management. Background Effective use of information technology (IT) is fundamental for the federal government to accomplish its counterterrorism mission. For example, compiling automated data on potential or known terrorists to check against the names of foreigners entering or already present in the U.S. is one critical means of protecting the homeland. In April 2003, the General Accounting Offi ce, recently renamed as the Government Accountability Office (GAO), reported that nine federal agencies used 12 separate systems and databases, each developed in response to the agencies’ individual legal, cultural, and systems environments, to support federal law enforcement and border security processes.2 Generally called “watch lists,” these systems actually serve a variety of purposes and contain different types of information. For example, the Department of State’s Consular Lookout and Support System was designed to support visa and passport issuance. U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Interagency Border Inspection System facilitates border crossing inspections and includes information on potential terrorists, as well as people suspected of narcotics trafficking or other law enforcement violations. The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File helps manage information on organized criminal activities, including domestic terrorism. Further, the Transportation Security Administration’s “no-fly” and selectee lists are used to determine whether a person may board an airplane. The Department of State’s TIPOFF database was the only one that can be considered purely a terrorist watch list. TIPOFF contained intelligence data that 2 Information Technology: Terrorist Watch Lists Should Be Consolidated to Promote Better Integration and Sharing, U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO-03-322, April 2003). Page 4 DHS Challenges In Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information was shared with other agencies responsible for ensuring that potential terrorists do not enter the U.S. For example, an unclassified subset of TIPOFF data was shared with the Consular Lookout and Support System, Interagency Border Inspection System, National Automated Immigration Lookout System, and the Canadian and Australian governments. Although TIPOFF data was being shared, the extent of sharing was inconsistent among other watch list systems. Where information was shared, it was not supported by common architectures because individual agencies developed and implemented interfaces with other federal