Dynamic Volunteer's Dilemmas, Unique Bid Auctions, and Discrete Bottleneck Games: Theory and Experiments Item Type text; Electronic Dissertation Authors Otsubo, Hironori Publisher The University of Arizona. Rights Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. Download date 23/09/2021 17:28:27 Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/194255 DYNAMIC VOLUNTEER’S DILEMMAS, UNIQUE BID AUCTIONS, AND DISCRETE BOTTLENECK GAMES: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTS by Hironori Otsubo ________________________ Copyright © Hironori Otsubo 2008 A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY In the Graduate College THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA 2008 2 THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA GRADUATE COLLEGE As members of the Dissertation Committee, we certify that we have read the dissertation prepared by Hironori Otsubo entitled Dynamic Volunteer’s Dilemmas, Unique Bid Auctions, and Discrete Bottleneck Games: Theory and Experiments and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy _____________________________________________________________Date:6/23/08 Amnon Rapoport _____________________________________________________________Date:6/23/08 Martin Dufwenberg _____________________________________________________________Date:6/23/08 John Wooders Final approval and acceptance of this dissertation is contingent upon the candidate’s submission of the final copies of the dissertation to the Graduate College. I hereby certify that I have read this dissertation prepared under my direction and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement. _____________________________________________________________Date:6/23/08 Dissertation Director: Amnon Rapoport 3 STATEMENT BY AUTHOR This dissertation has been submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for an advanced degree at the University of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be made available to borrowers under rules of the Library. Brief quotations from this dissertation are allowable without special permission, provided that accurate acknowledgement of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the copyright holder. SIGNED: Hironori Otsubo 4 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS In reflecting on all the people whom I wish to thank, I just realize how fortunate I am to have them shaping my life. I could not have come this far without their generous support. First and foremost, I express my deepest appreciation to my dissertation advisor who is the co-author of three essays extracted from my dissertation. In his guidance, patience, genuine caring and concern, and unconditional trust in me, Amnon Rapoport has served not only as a mentor but also as a friend over the past four years. His office door has always been open to me not only for discussing new ideas but also for sharing personal experiences. My education would have been seriously incomplete without his unwavering support. I wish to repay my debt of gratitude to him by becoming a full- fledged experimental economist in the future. I am also deeply indebted to the two other dissertation committee members, namely Martin Dufwenberg and John Wooders, for their excellent guidance and invaluable inputs into earlier drafts of my dissertation. Martin has exhibited a boundless enthusiasm as a teacher, researcher, and dissertation committee member. John’s first-year game theory course has lured me in the direction of my current research interests. Conversations with Martin and John have always been beneficial and enjoyable. My special gratitude goes to William E. Stein and Bora Kim for their assistance as co-authors of the second essay in my dissertation, Eyran Gisches for software development, and Maya Rosenblatt for her outstanding assistance in data collection. It has been a great privilege to spend the past six years at the Department of Economics. Its faculty members, administrative staff, and graduate students have always been supportive and caring. I’d like to express my sincere gratitude to all of them. I have been blessed to cross paths with many dedicated teachers throughout my life. In particular, I am sincerely grateful to Ichiro Takahashi, professor of Soka University in Japan, who is greatly responsible for my determined decision to pursue a Ph.D. in Economics in the United States. No matter how serious my situation was, he has always remained my biggest supporter. I cannot thank him enough. I gratefully acknowledge the financial support for the research projects examined in my dissertation: the project in Chapter 1 was financially supported by the Economic Science Laboratory at the University of Arizona, and the other two projects in Chapters 2 and 3 by a contract F49620-03-1-0377 from the AFSOR/MURI to the University of Arizona. Finally, and most importantly, I would like to express my sincere appreciation and thanks to my parents, Kazue and Hiroyuki, for their unfailing support. Their unconditional love and boundless devotion to me was the reason why I have never given up. 5 DEDICATION To my lifelong mentor, Dr. Daisaku Ikeda . 6 TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT .....................................................................................................................8 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................10 CHAPTER 1: DYNAMIC VOLUNTEER’S DILEMMAS...............................16 1.1 Introduction ............................................................................................16 1.2 Dynamic Volunteer’s Dilemma Game .............................................19 1.2.1 Model .............................................................................................19 1.2.2 Equilibrium Analysis .....................................................................21 1.3 Research Questions and Experimental Design ..............................23 1.3.1 Research Questions........................................................................23 1.3.2 Experimental Design......................................................................25 1.4 Results ......................................................................................................28 1.4.1 Four Major Findings ......................................................................28 1.4.2 Other Findings ...............................................................................34 1.5 Conclusion ..............................................................................................35 CHAPTER 2: UNIQUE BID AUCTIONS ............................................................39 2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................39 2.2 Previous Literature ................................................................................41 2.3 Equilibrium Solutions ..........................................................................44 2.3.1 LUBA and HUBA..........................................................................45 2.3.2 Asymmetric Pure-strategy Equilibria ............................................45 2.3.3 Symmetric Mixed-strategy Equilibrium ........................................46 2.4 Alternative Implementations ..............................................................51 2.5 Experimental Design ............................................................................53 2.6 Results ......................................................................................................55 2.6.1 Aggregate/Group Level Results.....................................................55 2.6.2 Individual Level Results ................................................................57 2.6.3 Discussion......................................................................................64 2.7 Conclusion ..............................................................................................65 CHAPTER 3: DISCRETE BOTTLENCK GAMES ............................................68 3.1 Introduction .............................................................................................68 3.2 Vickrey’s Continuous Bottleneck Model ........................................72 3.3 Review of Previous Literature ...........................................................75 3.4 Discrete Bottleneck Game ..................................................................77 7 TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued 3.4.1 Model .............................................................................................77 3.4.2 Computational Procedure...............................................................79 3.4.3 Comparison with Ziegelmeyer et al...............................................89 3.5 Comparison with Vickrey’s Continuous Model ............................91 3.5.1 Changing Service Capacity............................................................92 3.5.2 Changing the Number of Players...................................................93 3.6 Extensions ...............................................................................................94 3.6.1 Random Number of Players...........................................................94