Taiwan Communiqué Published by: Formosan Association for Public Affairs 552 7th St. SE, Washington, D.C. 20003 Tel. (202) 547-3686 International edition, September/October 2008 Published 5 times a year 120 ISSN number: 1027-3999 Taiwan’s new political landscape As we have described in the previous two issues of Taiwan Communiqué, the political landscape in Taiwan has changed considerably during the past few months. The policies initiated by the new Ma Ying-jeou administration – and particularly his precipitous slide towards China — are worrying many Taiwanese. This became apparent when more than 150,000 Taiwanese rallied in Taipei on 30 August 2008. Below we present a brief summary of the event. We also present an analysis of the implications for US policy by Julian Baum, a veteran reporter on developments in Taiwan and China. August 30th rally in Taipei The rally was called on the occasion of the 100th day in office of President Ma Ying- jeou, and was coordinated by a group of civic organizations led by the Taiwan Society, formed by a group of promi- Photo: CNA nent scholars. The organiz- ers stated that they had called for the event because the economy has deteriorated significantly since Ma’s in- auguration on May 20th, while the new administra- tion has sacrificed Taiwan’s sovereignty in favor of closer ties with China. The rally started at 2:30 PM, when protesters braving the Crowd at August 30th rally in Taipei Taiwan Communiqué -2- September / October 2008 afternoon heat, and started walking from two points – Long-shan Temple and Chunghsiao East Rd – converging on the broad Ketagalan Boulevard in front of the Presidential Office. Foreign observers at the event estimated that some 150,000 people attended the rally. The high point of the rally was a speech by newly-elected DPP Chairwoman Tsai Ing- wen, who strongly criticized Ma for undermining Taiwan’s sovereignty, and for being responsible for the steep slide in Taiwan’s economy, where the stock index had lost some 30 percent since Mr. Ma took office. During the election campaign in January-March 2008, Mr. Ma also made his “6-3-3” pledge: after his election he would achieve 6% annual GDP growth, less than 3% unemployment, and a per capita GDP income of US30,000. Only a few weeks after the elections, the new administration in Taipei announced that the annual growth estimate for this year would be less than 5% and the unemployment well over 3%. During the past weeks it also became apparent that the benefits from Chinese tourism – trumpeted loudly in early July when charter flights were announced – were totally overblown: instead of the 3,000 tourists per day, only less than 300 per day have visited Taiwan since July. DPP Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen stated she was pleased that “today so many people wore smiles on their faces and cherished hope in their hearts … to declare to the government that we care about Taiwan’s sovereignty, economy and sunshine (clean government).” Taiwan Society Secretary-General Prof. Lo Chih-cheng – the main organizer of the event – closed the rally by calling on the Taiwan people to see themselves as “Taiwan citizens” and “take responsibility for protecting Taiwan.” Implications for US policy By Julian Baum The first 100 days of President Ma Ying-jeou’s administration have brought a radical shift in policies that are courting Beijing into a closer relationship and lowering the barriers to cross-strait integration. Stabilizing ties with Washington, Tokyo and other major trading partners is taking second place to the “total normalization” of economic and financial relations with the People’s Republic of China, as President Ma told the Wall Street Journal in June 2008. Taiwan Communiqué -3- September / October 2008 But what has most unnerved Taiwan’s friends and allies, and even many citizens who supported the KMT ticket in the March election, is the new president’s indifferent attitude toward his government’s sovereignty. Unlike former president Lee Teng-hui who practiced “pragmatic diplomacy,” Ma’s “flexible diplomacy” avoids the sover- eignty issue so casually that even the dignity of his own presidential office is in doubt, along with his government’s readiness to defend and protect the authority of the state. These sudden policy shifts have deepened concern among Taiwan’s supporters and allies over Ma’s priorities and ideological orientation. Under a more regressive “one China” ideology than espoused by the KMT under Lee in the 1990s, Ma’s government has tried to turn back the Copyright: Taipei Times clock to a time when the PRC was called the “Chinese main- land” and Taiwan was regarded as merely one province of China. Even within Taiwan, the government’s uncon- tested profile as the legal equal of Beijing has been low- ered. Ma’s “one China” clearly implies a shared iden- tity and common nation-hood with the People’s Republic of China, although he has dodged explicit discussion of Congratulations Mr. Ma, your approval ratings these issues for years. are going "up" Many voters were impressed with Ma’s vigorous defense of his commitment to Taiwan and his respect for its democratic institutions during a long election campaign. Ma acknowledged that he was running for president of a sovereign state. Yet the only reference to his government’s sovereign status in his inaugural speech on May 20th 2008 took no notice that this status that has been under open siege for more than half a century and profoundly deserved greater respect. Instead, Ma stated that “In resolving cross-strait issues, what matters is not sovereignty but core values and way of life.” In this context, what Ma means by the “total normalization” of cross-strait relations is a troubling question, since it includes obscuring the reality of Taiwan’s separate identity in a hugely asymmetrical rivalry with China. The government’s new approach is apparent in large as well as small ways. These include the unprecedented decision to Taiwan Communiqué -4- September / October 2008 take commercial flights on a state visit to Latin America in the name of saving money while lowering the profile of Taiwan’s head of state, and changing the name of the government postal service from Taiwan Post back to Chunghwa Post. Critics are alarmed at the implications of these actions. The government’s downgrading of its own status has brought on an “unprecedented crisis of sovereignty for Taiwan,” the Liberty Times fumed in July. More than 150,000 people took to the streets of Taipei on August 30th to protest Ma’s handling of cross-strait relations, among other grievances. Besides giving point to the KMT’s unpopular “one China” view, the government’s new direction is specially aimed at winning over Beijing’s goodwill and cooperation. So far, those efforts have not paid off, other than to attach signatures to agreements on direct flights and tourism that were worked out under former president Chen Shui-bian and the Democratic Progressive Party. In another high-profile lowering of the sovereignty flag, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not apply for full membership in the United Nations this year but asked instead for “meaningful participation” in UN-related agencies under the title of “Taiwan region.” Beijing rudely rejected even this modest proposal. In a lengthy letter to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon dated August 12, China’s UN ambassador Wang Guangya again Copyright: Taipei Times slammed the door in Taiwan’s face without a hint of flexibil- ity or concern for Taiwan’s legitimate needs. Beijing’s continued hard-line suggests that the road ahead may be as difficult for Ma as it has been for his predecessors. The new government says it is not discouraged. In an in- terview with Time magazine in early August, Ma said he believed that the two sides Ma Ying-jeou in transit in the US: "Look ... it's the were gradually developing president without a title from the country with no name" mutual trust and that Chinese president Hu Jin-tao had “demonstrated flexibility.” He told foreign visitors before the Olympics opened that he saw “goodwill” in Beijing’s reluctant return to using the name concocted for Taiwan’s Olympic team of “Chinese Taiwan Communiqué -5- September / October 2008 Taipei.” That name had been agreed upon two decades earlier, but the Chinese press had slipped into using an even more objectionable title, “Taipei, China.” Where this leaves Washington is a puzzle. In some respects, Ma is the man of their dreams — compliant with their wishes, solicitous of China, and ready to brush off any insults. He has won praise from President George W. Bush for his aggressively laissez- faire policies across the Strait and from the U.S. State Department for his low profile transits during an official visit to Latin America in August. Yet there are risks for Washington of a weak and compliant Taiwan. Already there are worries, privately expressed, that Ma and his ministers could mislead Beijing and compromise the sovereign territorial status of Taiwan, which according to the official U.S. position remains undetermined. Despite the contradictions of its own policies, the U.S. has a strong interest in maintaining the island-republic’s democratic institutions and separate political au- thority. Taiwan’s de facto sovereign status, even unrecognized, is a quiet testament to American credibility with other allies in East Asia, especially Japan. Taiwan’s ability to deter annexation by China is crucial to Japan’s security and to the credibility of Washington’s security guarantees to Tokyo. More than 800 ships pass through the Taiwan Strait daily, mostly bound for Japanese ports and providing Japan with more than 90% of its energy needs.