A P hilosophical Investigation In t o T im e a n d T e n se Heather Louise Morland Dyke Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Ph.D. The University of Leeds. Department of Philosophy. October 1996 The candidate confirms that the work submitted is her own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work o f others. A b s t r a c t I defend and develop the new tenseless token-reflexive theory of time. I begin by charting the development of the debate between the tensed and the old tenseless theories of time. The tensed theory of time maintains that time exists and is intrinsically tensed. According to the old tenseless theory, time exists and is intrinsically tenseless, the notions of past, present and future being analytically reducible to tenseless temporal relations. The new tenseless theory of time concedes that tense is an irreducible feature of language and thought. However, it rejects the claim of the tensed theory that tense is an irreducible feature of temporal reality. Tensed sentences have truth conditions statable in entirely tenseless terms, so the irreducibility of tensed language and thought does not imply that the metaphysical nature of time is such that it is intrinsically tensed. The new tenseless theory of time must be defended on two fronts. It must be shown that the truth conditions of tensed sentences can indeed be stated in entirely tenseless terms. I consider and reject the date version of the new tenseless theory of time. I then consider and defend the token-reflexive version of this theory. It must also be shown that tense is not a feature of reality. I argue that the notion of tense has two essential features. It involves the ontological distinction between past, present and future, and the objective reality of temporal becoming. A careful examination of these two essential features reveals that they cannot, under any interpretation, be consistently held together. The supposition that tense is an objective feature of reality is thus logically unsustainable. I develop the new tenseless token-reflexive theory of time in three substantial areas. I argue that, despite appearances, there is no analogy between this theory of time and the theory of genuine modal realism, according to which all possible worlds, including the world we inhabit, are equally real. This comparative analysis between these two theories reveals that the new tenseless theory of time is on firmer ground than both its apparent modal counterpart and various tensed theories of time. I undertake a conceptual analysis of the notion of the direction of time. I argue that the tensed theory of time is singularly unable to account for this notion, while the new tenseless theory has the conceptual equipment necessary to provide a satisfactory and perspicuous account of it. Finally, I consider the notion of tensed meaning. I argue that the distinction between character and content can be combined with the token-reflexive account of the truth conditions of tensed sentences to yield a highly illuminating account of tensed meaning that is consistent with a tenseless ontology. C o n ten ts A b stract................................................................... K ey to N o tatio n ................................................................................. A cknow ledgem ents................................................................... v j Chapter 1 The Genesis of the Tensed/Tenseless Debate: From McTaggart to Mellor and B eyond..................................................................................................... j 1.1 Introduction..................................................................................... I 1.2 The A Series and the B Series............................................................. 2 1.3 A Formal Exposition of McTaggart's Argument.................................... 5 1.4 The Reality of Time Entails the Existence of Change............................6 1.5 The Existence of Change Requires the Existence of an A Series........ 7 1.6 It is Not Possible For a B Series to Exist Unless an A Series Also Exists..................................................................................... 25 1.7 The Notion of the A Series is Self-Contradictory.................................28 1.8 Time is Unreal............................................................................... 30 1.9 A N ew Direction Fo r the D ebate.................................................................. 3 1 1.10 The Way Forward....................................................................... 34 Chapter 2 A Tenseless Theory of Time: Two Rival Accounts?..................................................37 2.1 The Significance of Truth Conditions..................................................... 38 2.2 Tensed Truth Conditions...................................................................... 47 2.3 Tenseless Date-Involving Truth Conditions..................................... 49 2.4 Tenseless Token-Reflexive Truth Conditions................................... 58 2.5 Conclusion............................................................... 72 C h a p te r 3 An Investigation into the Coherence of the Tensed Theory of Tim e...................73 3.1 Core Components of a Tensed Theory........................................ 73 3.2 Tenseless Language is Inadequate to the Task of Providing a Complete Description of Reality........................................ 75 3.3 There is an Ontological Distinction Between Past, Present and Future......................................................................... 3.4 Temporal Becoming is an Objective Feature of the World, and an Essential Feature of Tim e............................................ 84 3.4.1 The Property Acquisition and Loss Hypothesis......................84 3.4.2 The Moving Now Hypothesis................................ 87 3.4.3 The Worldly Becoming Hypothesis...................................... 90 3.4.4 The Accretion of Facts Hypothesis............................................93 3.5 There is No Spatial Analogue of Any of the Features (1) - (3) which Uniquely Characterize the Nature of Time.................................96 3.6 Conclusion.......................................................................... 9-7 C h a p te r 4 The Tenseless Theory of Time and Modal Realism....................................................98 4.1 The New Tenseless Token-Reflexive Theory of Time.........................98 4.2 David Lewis' Theory of Genuine Modal Realism................................. 99 4.3 Tenseless Time and'Modeless'Modality......................................... 102 4.4 An Examination of Some Attempts to Undermine the Analogy 104 IV 4.5 A Modal Version of McTaggart's Paradox..........................................108 4.6 Token-Reflexivity and Real Worlds.......................................................1 io 4.7 Token-Reflexivity and Real Times......................................................... 115 4.8 Conclusion......................................................................................... 123 C h a p te r 5 Tenseless Temporal Asymmetry and the Direction of Time................................. 125 5.1 What Do We Mean By 'The Direction of Time'?................................125 5.2 A Conceptual Analysis............................................................ 127 5.2.1 Asymmetry.............................................................. 127 5.2.2 Anisotropy............................................................ 132 5.2.3 Direction............................................................................. 135 5.3 The Direction of Time: A Tensed Account..........................................143 5.4 The Direction of Time: A Tenseless Account.....................................147 5.5 Conclusion............................................................................ 149 C h a p te r 6 Time, Tense and Meaning: A Tenseless A ccount.....................................................151 6.1 A Problem for the New Tenseless Token-Reflexive Theory of Time?..............................................................................................................151 6.2 A Restatement of the Problem at Issue.................................................156 6.3 The Co-reporting Theory............................................................. 157 6.4 Can Frege's Distinction Between Sense and Reference Provide the Answer?............................................................................ 150 6.5 Some Analogies Between Senses and Roles.......................................163 6.6 Some Disanalogies Between Senses and Roles..................................166 6.7 A Tensed Solution to the Meaning Problem?......................................170 V 6.8 Kaplan's Distinction Between Character and Content.......................177 6.9 The Characters and Contents of Tensed and Tenseless Sentences.............................................................................................. 180 6.10 A Token-Reflexive Version of the Distinction Between Character and Content................................................................ 186 6.11 Conclusion.................................................................................... 190 Summary and Conclusions............................................................................ 192 Bibliography 196 K e y t o N o t a t io n The logical symbols used in this thesis are those