Epistemological Prospects of Evolutionary Models o f the Growth of Knowledge Davide Vecchi The London School of Economics and Political Science Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method Ph.D. in Philosophy UMI Number: U218095 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U218095 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 rinses r 6 Abstract In the thesis I will argue that some models of evolutionary epistemology provide an extremely illuminating and original explanation of the workings of the scientific process. Evolutionary approaches to the growth of scientific knowledge have been criticised because of the putative existence of fundamental disanalogies between biological and scientific selective processes. I will show that these criticisms are largely misguided. I will distinguish two main kinds of evolutionary models. EEM models, which focus on the evolution of human cognitive mechanisms by natural selection (e.g. that developed by Ruse), do not provide a satisfactory basis on which to explain the nature of scientific selection processes, which are cultural rather than biological in origin. EET models, by contrast, focusing on the cultural and social origins of the selective systems operating in science, are better suited to this task. I will focus mainly on the EET models proposed by Donald Campbell and David Hull. Two general themes emerge from their analysis: the emphasis on the general validity of the variation-selection model of knowledge acquisition (i.e. trial-and- error), and the view that science is a socially adaptive and adapted system, governed by the action of peculiar selective mechanisms that partially lead to epistemic success. On the basis of the critical examination of these EET models I will argue for three main conclusions. First, EET approaches are correct in rejecting the methodological individualism so central to many alternative epistemologies. Second, EET models offer us genuinely normative epistemological insights, particularly where social epistemology is concerned. Third, EET provides a viable naturalistic alternative to social constructivism, by justifying epistemic standards as “evolutionary constructions” (i.e., products of selection processes). 2 Table of Contents Chapter 1: Evolutionary Epistemology as Naturalised Epistemology. 5 1.1 - A characterisation of Epistemic Naturalism, 7 1.2 - Epistemic Naturalism and its problems, 23 1.2.1 - Scientism or Dogmatism?, 24 1.2.2 - Naturalistic Normativity, 29 1.2.3 - Normative Cognitive Pluralism, 35 1.3 — The basic tenets of Evolutionary Epistemology, 40 Chapter 2: The Case against EEM. 48 2.1 - Ruse and the Sociobiology of Science, 48 2.2 - Innateness and Species-typicality, 52 2.3 - The Adaptive Hypothesis, 58 2.4. - Critical Assessment of the Normative Value of Ruse’s Sociobiology of Science: the Argument from Natural Selection, 62 2.5 - The Case against EEM: Concluding Remarks, 70 Chapter 3: The Universality of the Variation-Selection Model. 74 3.1 - Selective and Non-selective models of Cultural Evolution, 76 3.2 - Model III and its Significance for EET,85 3.3 - Campbell and the Thesis of the Universality of the Variation-selection model, 91 3.4 - Vicariousness and the Nature of Variation, 96 Chapter 4: Hull's Science of Science. 113 4.1 - A Theory of Socio-cultural Evolution, 113 4.2 - The Mechanism of Selection, 121 4.3 - The Nature of the Scientific Process: Competition and Cooperation, 128 4.4 - The Social and Evolutionary Character of Rationality, 142 4.5 - The Nature of Intellectual Variation, 146 4.6 - Science as a Social and Intentional Selective Process, 151 4.7 - The Analogical Agenda, 164 4.8 - EET as a Social Epistemology, 169 3 4.9 - The Normative Nature of Hull’s EET, 177 Chapter 5: The Epistemological Significance o f EET. 183 5.1 - Methodological Populationism, 185 5.2 - The normative Value of EET, 195 5.2.1 - Validation of the Norms of Science and the Naturalistic Fallacy, 197 5.2.2 - The logic of the variation-selection model, 205 5.2.3 - EET as a sociology of Scientific Validity, 215 5.3 - Evolutionary Constructivism, 233 5.4 - Hypothetical Realism, 241 Conclusion. 249 Bibliography. 250 4 Chapter 1: Evolutionary Epistemology as Naturalised Epistemology. “ Were we to rely on our current beliefs about nature in justifying the procedures of reasoning through which we arrived at those beliefs, there is a serious danger that the entire enterprise would be infected with error. Perhaps we are merely engaged in self-congratulation, when, all the while, faulty methods are being validated by the flawed conclusions to which they give rise. Naturalists have to insist that this is a genuine possibility, which cannot be excluded by invoking some aset priori of principles and rules of inference that are beyond criticism. We should know, in advance of skeptical embarrassments, that some forms of the problem of classical justification are solvable and others are not.” Philip Kitcher “The Advancement o f Science" (p.298) The history of epistemology of the twentieth century shows how the views of logical empiricism have been diluted, if not downright overturned. Attempts to salvage the legacy of the “received view” (cf. F. Suppe 1974) still have some prominence in some epistemological quarters.1 However, it seems to me that the epistemological systems devised by the defenders of the “received view” are either epicyclical, or simply lack the complete set of necessary resources to solve the vast array of epistemological problems we face. In the first instance, many of these systems are based on the postulation of some implausible auxiliary assumptions concerning the nature of rationality, of epistemic standards, and the notion of scientific progress. On the other, they seem to be incapable of defeating relativistic and anti­ science tendencies. What we gain is a largely unrealistic view of the practice of science, with, I believe, a consequential difficulty to fulfil the normative task so central to epistemological investigation. In order to avert such negative consequences, in this thesis I propose to look at science from the evolutionary perspective. Evolutionary epistemologies are naturalistic epistemologies. The basic challenge for naturalistic (and therefore also evolutionary) epistemologies is, according to the defenders of the “received view”, to show that their approaches to the epistemological enquiry retain the necessary normative element. I believe that the challenge must be clarified at the outset, since 1 For instance, E. Sober (1999c) tries to show that some central ideas of the “received view” should be retained. 5 “epistemology” has different meanings in different idiolects. For this reason epistemologists vary in attributing to a certain problem a prominence that others regard as unjustified. Epistemology has a descriptive, an explanatory and a prescriptive dimension. No single epistemology has the resources to provide a solution or to treat the multifarious nature of the epistemological problems that need to be addressed along these three dimensions. For this reason, in this dissertation I shall advocate a pluralistic approach. Epistemological pluralism should not be considered per se as a panacea to save epistemology from its traditional pitfalls. Many philosophers and students of science consider epistemology as a “dead” discipline. In what follows I shall try to show that this is not so. In doing so, I shall endorse the naturalistic turn. However, I am not going to argue that traditional approaches to epistemology are completely fallacious, nor that they are incompatible with the evolutionary stance. My project is humbler. The thesis I will defend is that evolutionary epistemology has much to teach us about the nature of science and that it offers many original insights that help us to explain the nature of the scientific process. Evolutionary epistemology is a naturalistic endeavour that describes, explains and provides normative insights about the evolution of science. In this chapter I shall start the analysis of evolutionary epistemologies indirectly by focusing on epistemic naturalism. Historically, epistemic naturalism came back into favour in the 1960s. Quine (1969) has been one of its major advocates. He suggested that since Carnap’s programme (i.e. the attempt to translate theoretical terms into the vocabulary of the observational basis) is unachievable, then the last reason for preferring rational reconstruction to psychology vanishes. Hence Quine’s dictum (Quine 1969, p. 78): why not settle for the real thing, for psychology, and studying the relation between sensory experience and theoretical knowledge? In what follows I shall show that Quine’s characterisation of epistemic naturalism is no longer up to date. 6 1.1 A characterisation o f epistemic naturalism Epistemic naturalism can be generally viewed as a variety of philosophical naturalism, where the latter rejects all forms of supematuralism and transcendentalism, holding that reality,