The Aden Protectorate Levies, Counter-insurgency and the Loyalist Bargain in South Arabia, 1951-1957. Huw Bennett Edward Burke European powers depended upon indigenous collaboration to conquer new colonial territories and then to make their rule sustainable. As the seismic changes in global order brought about by the Second World War shifted the very basis of that rule, colonial powers were compelled to re-negotiate the terms of collaboration. This chapter takes the West Aden Protectorate case to illuminate how the loyalist bargain was maintained, and why that process was so difficult. The episode shows that the colonial power in the form of the Aden and British governments, far from being master manipulators in the business of divide-and-rule, struggled to exercise control over a numerically insubstantial opponent. While most writing on indigenous collaboration, or loyalism, is concerned with the creation and maintenance of colonial orders in general, this chapter focuses on the implications of the relationship for violence. It centres upon the position of the local security forces, particularly the Aden Protectorate Levies (APL), as the primary intermediaries. It argues that the intensity of colonial violence towards a resistant population was diminished by the effective military tactics adopted by rebels, a growing reluctance by the APL soldiers to punish their own people, and the impotence of the only viable military alternative – aerial bombardment. In combination, these three factors forced the civil and military authorities in Aden to halt their expansionism. However, the colonial administration in Aden was so determined to revive their offensive “forward policy” that they won a bureaucratic battle to displace the Royal Air Force from controlling the local security forces, and several years later renewed the fighting in the West Aden Protectorate with British Army assistance instead. Perspectives on collaboration, loyalism and indigenous security forces Historians have long sought to understand the relationships between colonial rulers and their subjects, searching for the bases of the co-operation that coexisted with violent coercion. The debate has been framed around conceptions of collaboration, loyalty, indirect rule, and alliances.1 Perhaps the most influential model remains Ronald Robinson’s 1972 theory of collaboration. Robinson posited that imperial powers lacked the material resources to impose control throughout their newly acquired possessions: local collaborators proffered essential manpower and knowledge about alien societies. For indigenous elites, partnership with the invaders could be exploited to maintain or improve their own standing. The bargain struck between colonisers and collaborators implied a willingness to appreciate the wider demands placed on both parties by their constituencies – be they metropolitan politics or indigenous societies. If either party to the bargain grew too powerful or dissatisfied, then collaboration could break down, necessitating a reconstruction on different terms and, potentially, with different participants.2 This model has been applied to contexts as diverse as the Rhodesian mining industry to the Indian Army in the First World War.3 1 Colin Newbury, ‘Patrons, Clients, and Empire: The Subordination of Indigenous Hierarchies in Asia and Africa’, Journal of World History 11, no. 2 (2000): 227. 2 Ronald Robinson, ‘Non-European foundations of European imperialism: sketch for a theory of collaboration’, in Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe (eds.), Studies in the theory of imperialism (London: Longman, 1972), 117-142. 3 Charles van Onselen, ‘The role of collaborators in the Rhodesian mining industry 1900-1935’, African Affairs 72, no. 289 (1973): 401-418; George Morton Jack, ‘The Indian Army on the Western Front, 1914-1915: A Portrait of Collaboration’, War in History 13, no. 3 (2006): 329-362. 1 Most colonies raised small formations of soldiers and policemen to uphold internal security, guard frontiers, and assist neighbouring colonies in an emergency.4 Military history and military sociology as sub-disciplines have been accused of Eurocentrism.5 Though some studies concentrate on the British officer’s experience in colonial armies, a rich literature grounded in cultural and social histories has developed.6 Broadly speaking, these works address three principal concerns: recruitment, strategic logics, and the political consequences of military service. Writing on recruitment investigates the practices designed to encourage men to join up, the ideological assumptions underlying these policies, and the motivations expressed by indigenous personnel. The Indian Army after the 1857 uprising has been the case most intensively researched. Incentives included pay, healthcare provision, and opportunities for adventure.7 Timothy Stapleton’s book on colonial Zimbabwe demonstrates the equal importance of the prestige endowed on those who enlisted.8 Seeking predictably loyal armed servants, colonial authorities believed certain ethnic groups possessed special military attributes. In India the so-called “martial races” included Nepalese Gurkhas, Punjabi Sikhs and Muslims from the northern frontier.9 Heather Streets shows these racial constructs owed as much to discourses within the imperial metropole as to organisational cultures in armies.10 Writing on colonial armies in wartime tends to derive either from a war and society perspective, or from military analysis. The latter approach sometimes descends into the listing of practical lessons for contemporary officers, ignoring historical context; the former can show scant interest in the fighting so intrinsic to war.11 The sharpest insights come from methodologies that integrate the two. Michelle Moyd’s penetrating work on German East Africa notes the surprising paucity of research on colonial soldiers at war. She argues that askaris in the locally raised Schutztruppe derived their war-fighting methods in part from precolonial raiding practices.12 Tarak Barkawi’s book on the Indian and British armies in the Second World War places greater emphasis upon cohesion fostered among troops in battle. Pre-war martial race ideas disintegrated as the Indian Army expanded rapidly in new demographic directions.13 Military effectiveness in wartime was maintained by three mechanisms. The welfare system upheld morale by giving soldiers rest, recreation and medical care. Organising personnel on regimental lines offered distinctive identities, often rooted in home locations, as a basis for 4 David Killingray and David Omissi, Guardians of empire: the armed forces of the colonial powers c. 1700-1964 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), 9-11. 5 Tarak Barkawi, ‘Culture and Combat in the Colonies: The Indian Army in the Second World War’, Journal of Contemporary History 41, no. 2 (2006): 325. 6 On British officers: Anthony Clayton and David Killingray, Khaki and Blue: Military and Police in British Colonial Africa (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1989). 7 David Omissi, The Sepoy and the Raj: The Indian Army, 1860-1940 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1994). 8 Timothy Stapleton, African Police and Soldiers in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1923-80 (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2011), 16. 9 Gavin Rand and Kim A. Wagner, ‘Recruiting the “martial races”: identities and military service in colonial India’, Patterns of Prejudice 46, no. 3-4 (2012): 232-254. 10 Heather Streets, Martial races: The military, race and masculinity in British imperial culture, 1857-1914 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004). 11 Robert M. Cassidy, ‘The Long Small War: Indigenous Forces for Counterinsurgency,’ Parameters, (2006): 47- 62. 12 Michelle R. Moyd, Violent Intermediaries: African Soldiers, Conquest, and Everyday Colonialism in German East Africa (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2014), 15, 66. 13 Tarak Barkawi, Soldiers of Empire: Indian and British Armies in World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 51, 159-160. 2 pride, recognition and competition with outsiders. Finally, military discipline, including possible punishment by courts-martial, compelled obedience and thus task completion.14 Recent work on the British empire in the Second World War aims to break through national “bubbles”, analysing the integration of colonial armies into the higher strategic direction of the war. They also pay considerable attention to the final major strand in the historiography, an interest in the political implications of wartime service for colonial societies in the subsequent peace, or indeed into the post-colonial era.15 Scholars have shown how veterans leveraged their experiences to ensure their position in the post-war political elite.16 In other cases, such as Greek Cypriots who informed for the British during the 1950s Cyprus conflict, or the harkis who fought alongside the French military in Algeria’s independence war, the consequences could be dire: death or, at best, permanent exile.17 Africanists such as Moyd and Stapleton employ lengthy periodisations to underscore continuities in regional military cultures, which transcend the exclusively colonial domain. However, such sensitivity to local factors can hinder an appreciation for transnational influences on colonial militaries. As the European empires reeled from the shock to white prestige inflicted by the Second World War, security forces recruited from indigenous populations appeared to add greater legitimacy to the colonial state. Militias, auxiliaries and