View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Scholarship@Western Western University Scholarship@Western Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository 12-15-2015 12:00 AM Moral Sense Theory and the Development of Kant's Ethics Michael H. Walschots The University of Western Ontario Supervisor Corey Dyck The University of Western Ontario Graduate Program in Philosophy A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the equirr ements for the degree in Doctor of Philosophy © Michael H. Walschots 2015 Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd Part of the History of Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Walschots, Michael H., "Moral Sense Theory and the Development of Kant's Ethics" (2015). Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository. 3383. https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/3383 This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact [email protected]. MORAL SENSE THEORY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF KANT’S ETHICS (Thesis format: Monograph) by Michael H. Walschots Graduate Program in Philosophy A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy The School of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies The University of Western Ontario London, Ontario, Canada © Michael H. Walschots 2015 Abstract This dissertation investigates a number of ways in which an eighteenth century British philosophical movement known as “moral sense theory” influenced the development of German philosopher Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) moral theory. “Moral sense theory,” as presented in the works of Anthony Ashley Cooper, 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713), and Francis Hutcheson (1694-1747), can be captured by two related claims: (1) morally good actions are motivated by benevolence, i.e. the disinterested desire for the happiness of others, and (2) we judge benevolent actions as morally good on the basis of “the moral sense,” a capacity that allows us to feel a particular kind of pleasure when we perceive such actions. I illustrate that Kant found both of these claims appealing during the earliest stage of his philosophical development, but eventually came to reject moral sense theory’s conception of moral judgement. However, I illustrate that even after this rejection Kant preserves certain features of moral sense theory’s conception of moral motivation. In the mature presentation of his moral philosophy Kant offers detailed objections to moral sense theory’s conception of moral judgement, but I illustrate that, in opposition to the claims of many recent interpreters, the considered presentation of his conception of moral motivation has only a few superficial features in common with the view presented by Hutcheson in particular. Nonetheless, this comparison helps illuminate Kant’s complex position on moral motivation. Important for an understanding of Kant’s mature conception of motivation is also the thought of Adam Smith (1723-1790), a thinker who is not part of but was highly influenced by moral sense theory. I illustrate that Smith’s notion of the attitude of “regard” for what he calls the “general rules of conduct,” as well as his conception of the “sense of duty,” influenced Kant’s conception of “respect [Achtung]” for the moral law. Finally, I illustrate that Kant’s understanding of the pleasure associated with acting morally, what he calls “self-contentment [Selbstzufriedenheit],” can be clarified in light of how Hutcheson solves a problem related to the pleasure of the moral sense. Keywords Kant, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Adam Smith, moral sense, moral judgement, motivation, respect, duty, pleasure, virtue. ii Acknowledgments I wish to thank a number of individuals and institutions that have supported me in various ways over the course of this project. First, my supervisor, Corey Dyck, has challenged me philosophically and has been a supportive academic mentor since the beginning of my degree. The quality of my research has greatly improved as a result of his feedback. I also wish to thank my committee members, Lorne Falkenstein and Dennis Klimchuk. They each have generous feedback on my entire dissertation and provided a fresh perspective on a variety of issues. Thanks also to Heiner Klemme who acted as my supervisor at the Johannes Gutenberg-University of Mainz during the 2013-14 academic year. Among other things, Prof. Klemme taught me much about how to properly understand the thought of a figure in their proper historical context. Thanks are also due to a number of colleagues, friends, and mentors who have provided me with much moral support: Oliver Cresswell, Richard Creek, Nicholas Nash, Melissa Jacquart, Stephanie Kapusta, Antonino Falduto, Yeonhee Yu, Diego Cosbiau, Beate Gundert and John Thorp. Michael Baumtrog deserves particular mention, for without his constant encouragement and reassurance, my project would have taken much longer to complete. I also wish to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for generously supporting the majority of my degree, as well as the Ontario Graduate Scholarship program. I am also very grateful to the German Academic Exchange Service, which supported the aforementioned year of study in Germany. Last but certainly not least, I wish to thank my family for their unconditional and unending support. My parents, Harry and Margaret, have never doubted me and knowing they believe in my career goals has been a source of reassurance throughout my academic career. My sister, Natalie, gave me advice and moral support, as well as served as an example of what it means to be a hard-worker but to never stop producing one’s highest quality work. My wife, Kacy, was patient and supportive during busy and stressful times. Not only did she do much to keep me sane throughout this process, but she often served as a challenging interlocutor as well. Finally, I wish to thank my late grandmother, Zinaida Mihailovsky, for reminding me about what is most important in life, and for being my biggest fan. I dedicate this project to her memory. iii Table of Contents Abstract ............................................................................................................................... ii Acknowledgments .............................................................................................................. iii List of Abbreviations ....................................................................................................... viii Introduction ........................................................................................................................ ix Chapter 1 ............................................................................................................................. 1 1 Moral Sense Theory ....................................................................................................... 1 1.1 Shaftesbury ............................................................................................................. 1 1.1.1 Motivation ................................................................................................... 1 1.1.2 The Moral Sense and the Origin of Right and Wrong ................................ 5 1.1.3 Conclusion ................................................................................................ 13 1.2 Hutcheson ............................................................................................................. 14 1.2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................... 14 1.2.2 Motivation ................................................................................................. 16 1.2.3 The Moral Sense ....................................................................................... 25 1.2.4 The Ultimate Criterion of Moral Judgement ............................................ 30 1.2.5 Subjectivity and Objectivity ..................................................................... 33 1.2.6 The Relation Between the Moral Sense and Motivation .......................... 35 1.2.7 The Pleasure Problem ............................................................................... 39 1.2.8 Conclusion ................................................................................................ 42 Chapter 2 ........................................................................................................................... 44 2 Adjudication and Execution: Moral Feeling in Kant’s Pre-Critical Moral Philosophy 44 2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 45 2.2 Moral Feeling in the 1760s ................................................................................... 48 2.2.1 The Prize Essay ......................................................................................... 48 iv 2.2.2 Negative Magnitudes ................................................................................ 51 2.2.3 The Observations ...................................................................................... 53 2.2.4 The Remarks ............................................................................................. 56 2.2.5 Dreams of a Spirit-Seer ............................................................................ 57 2.2.6 The ‘Announcement’