Liberty University Law Review Volume 4 Issue 3 Article 8 October 2015 Constructing the Co-Ed Military Elaine Donnelly Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/lu_law_review Recommended Citation Donnelly, Elaine (2015) "Constructing the Co-Ed Military," Liberty University Law Review: Vol. 4 : Iss. 3 , Article 8. Available at: https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/lu_law_review/vol4/iss3/8 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Liberty University School of Law at Scholars Crossing. It has been accepted for inclusion in Liberty University Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholars Crossing. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ARTICLE CONSTRUCTING THE CO-ED MILITARY Elaine Donnelly I. INTRODUCTION The armed forces of the United States are organizationally strong. All branches and communities have proud histories, cultural traditions, and members motivated by patriotism as well as personal career goals. The institutional strength of the military, however, also makes it vulnerable to political pressures that can undermine its culture. Because everyone must follow orders, the armed forces are a prime venue for social engineering. Some civilians believe in social constructionismthe idea that fundamental human characteristics, including gender differences other than obvious anatomy, are learned behaviors that can be radically changed. Some want to construct a new gender-free military, putting to the ultimate test theories about the interchangeability of women and men in all roles. Independent review of social change in the armed forces is critically important. Our gender-integrated volunteer force is at war and undergoing radical organizational and cultural change at the same time. Individual men and women stand between our nation and enemies who would do us harm, but the success of their mission depends on a complex organization that is more demanding than anything in civilian life. This institution asks courageous men and women to surrender their individuality and independence, many of their personal rights, and sometimes their very lives. The rest of us should lend support by guarding the strength and integrity of the institution in which they serve. This article was originally published as Elaine Donnelly, Constructing the Co-Ed Military, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POLY 815 (2007). It is reprinted here with the permission of the author and the Duke Journal of Gender Law and Policy. Elaine Donnelly is President of the Center for Military Readiness, an independent, non-partisan public policy organization that specializes in military personnel issues. In 1984, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger appointed her to the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) for a three-year term, and in 1992, President George H.W. Bush appointed her to the Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces. 618 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:617 A. The Importance of Objective Analysis On January 27, 1967, a deadly accident occurred that could have stalled Americas program of space exploration indefinitely. During a pre-launch test of the Apollo One spacecraft,1 an electrical spark ignited the pure- oxygen atmosphere inside the cramped capsule, killing astronauts Virgil Grissom, Edward White, and Roger Chafee.2 Critics demanded to know why the mechanical and electrical engineers of the National Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA) failed to recognize the inherent dangers of operating in a pure-oxygen environment. In the aftermath of that tragedy, NASA made choices that are instructive to another institution today: the United States military. In 1967, a pure-oxygen atmosphere was thought to be the best for sustaining human life in orbit; pure-oxygen systems weighed less than mixed-gas systems and had been deployed successfully in the Mercury and Gemini missions.3 This basic assumption would prove to be both flawed and fatal. Moreover, indicators of trouble immediately preceding the fireincluding communication problems, a sour smell in the spacesuit loop, and a sudden, unexplained rise in oxygen flow to the 1. Apollo One is the official name given retroactively to the Apollo/Saturn 204 (AS- 204) spacecraft. See National Air and Space Museum, Apollo One Summary of Events, Jan. 27, 1967, http://www.nasm.si.edu/collections/imagery/apollo/AS01/a01sum.htm (last visited May 1, 2007). 2. Mary C. White, NASA History, Detailed Biographies of Apollo 1 CrewEpilogue (Aug. 4, 2006), http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/Apollo204/zorn/epilog.htm. 3. Conversation with Capt. Walter M. Schirra, U.S. Navy (Ret.), one of the original seven Mercury astronauts, in San Diego, Cal. (Mar. 1994); see also NASA, REPORT OF APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD, at pt. IV (Apr. 5, 1967), available at http://history.nasa.gov/Apollo204/content.html (The test was conducted with . a 100- percent oxygen atmosphere.); id. at app. D-11-9. The purge with 100-percent O2 at above sea-level pressure contributed to the propagation of fire in the Apollo 204 Spacecraft. This was the planned cabin environment for testing and launch, since prelaunch denitrogenation is necessary to forestall the possibility of bends at the mission ambient pressure of 5 pounds per square inch absolute. A comprehensive review of the operational and physiological trade-offs of the various methods of denitrogenation is in progress. Id. The Apollo One tragedy had been foreshadowed six years earlier, in 1961, when Valentin Bondarenko, a Soviet cosmonaut trainee, was horribly burned and killed in an accidental fire inside an isolation chamber with a high-oxygen environment. The USSR concealed that calamity from the public for many years. James Oberg observed, The mere knowledge that a Soviet oxygen-rich fire had killed a cosmonaut might have been enough to forestall an American repetition of the disaster. See JAMES E. OBERG, UNCOVERING SOVIET DISASTERS: EXPLORING THE LIMITS OF GLASNOST 170 (1988). 2010] CONSTRUCTING THE CO-ED MILITARY 619 spacesuitswere noted but disregarded. Tragically, only eight seconds after Grissom reported fire in the cockpit, the astronauts perished in a fireball that melted and fused their spacesuits.4 NASA temporarily suspended the Apollo program and conducted a full investigation. During that critical time, NASA engineers could have defended their previous assumptions regarding the benefits of a pure- oxygen atmosphere in orbit. They could have defined as their goal the perfection of spacecraft machinerythat is, using pure-oxygen atmospheres in all orbiting spacecraft, with zero tolerance of sparks. Instead, NASA engineers challenged and objectively reevaluated the basic assumptions that had guided the space program prior to the fire. As a result, the pure-oxygen system aboard the Apollo spacecraft was replaced with a less volatile mixed-gas atmosphere. Furthermore, redundant backup systems that presumed both imperfection and potential failures were built into all spacecraft systems and machinery. Less than two years after the Apollo One fire, in December 1968, Apollo Eight became the first manned mission to successfully orbit the moon. This episode in American history teaches lessons that are applicable not only to rocket science but also to social science. The mechanical engineers of NASA objectively reevaluated their basic assumptions, analyzed their mistakes, and implemented steps to prevent predictable and avoidable disasters. By contrast, social engineers out to change the culture of Americas military have refused to reevaluate their basic assumptions and have disregarded the negative consequences of their own mistakes. Young men and women are being asked to risk their lives in the equivalent of a volatile, pure-oxygen atmospherean environment that social engineers insist will work as long as the military enforces zero tolerance of sparks. This theoretical hubris disregards human failings, which are even more common than imperfections in spacecraft machinery. Like NASA, our military cannot operate on presumptions of perfectionespecially when lives and national security are at risk. In recent years of accelerated cultural change in the military, social engineers have taken advantage of certain political sensitivities to stifle objective analysis. To a certain extent, reticence about social problems in the military is understandableAmericans are enormously proud of the men and women who serve in the All-Volunteer Force. Nevertheless, straightforward debate about military social policies does not constitute criticism of men and women in uniform. In many ways, these men and women are like courageous astronauts who do not themselves make the 4. National Air and Space Museum, supra note 1. 620 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:617 decisions and policies under which they will live, and sometimes die, in the pursuit of a noble cause. Pride in our astronauts does not preclude criticism of NASA. When flawed presumptions and engineering mistakes lead to unnecessary disaster and death, Americans and their elected representatives have the rightand, indeed, the responsibilityto demand objective analysis, unflinching candor, accountability for violations of law and policy, and constructive steps to remedy problems that elevate risks. In the same way, Americans have every right to question the flawed assumptions of social engineers who demand radical change in the culture of the military. There is reason for concern about civilian and military advocates