i:,,o.--_ ! L’.- Ll,- ,i”4’ 7- i .. I ,.--, I ,. // -_ F.7~;’ 3 /7 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS Problems Of The Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicle Program Show Need For Improvement In Management Control 6-767325 Department of the Navy BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES WASHINGTON. D.C 20548 B-167325 To the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives This is our report entitled “Problems of the Deep Sub- mergence Rescue Vehicle Program Show Need for Improve- ment in Management Control, Department of t?le Navy.” Our review was made pursuant to the Budget and Ac- counting Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), and the Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C. 67). Copies of this report are being sent to the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Secretary of Defense; and the Secretary of the Navy. Comptroller General of the United States 50TH ANNIVERSARY 1921- 1971 ---- I COMPTROLL~ERGENERAS'S I PROBLEMSOF THE DEEP SUBMERGENCERESCUE I REPORT TO THE CONGRESS VEHICLE PROGRAMSHOW NEED FOR IMPRDVE- MENT IN NAVY'S MANAGEMENTCONTROL B-167325 I I DIGEST I ------ WHY THE REVIEW PJASMADE The development cost and time for the Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicle have far exceeded original estimates, This review was made to deter- mine the causes. An earlier General Accounting Office (GAO) report to the Congress on the rescue vehicle's development, in February 1970, indicated that the increased effectiveness to be obtained from producing four more vehi- cles in addition to the two already on order, would be small in rela- tion to their cost of purchase and operation. That report also noted the increases in the program's cost and development time, The rescue vehicle is a small submersible craft designed to rescue personnel from a disabled submarine. It would be transported by air to a port near a submarine disaster and then be carried to the site by a support craft. The vehicle would then shuttle between the disabled submarine and the support craft, rescuing the submarine crew. L m FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The estimated cost for the rescue vehicle program increased by more than 1,100 percent from 1964 to 1969--from $36.5 million for a 12-vehicle system and 1 year of operation to $463 million for a six-vehicle system. The estimated development and introduction period increased from 4 to 10 years. (See p. 9.) I I I In addition, changes made in the design of the vehicle necessitated a I redesign of support craft and some of the supporting equipment, which I I increased their costs. (See p. 17.) I I however, the Navy advised that it I In response to GAO's earlier report, I had initiated a cost-effectiveness study. In December 1970 the Navy I decided to confine the program to two rescue vehicles, at an estimated I I cost of $199.4 million, rather than six rescue vehicles as had been I planned before the study. (See pp. 5 and 6.) I I I GAO believes that a substantial portion of the cost growth and program I stretch-out occurred because I JUHE 3,1971 --the original estimates, made by a Deep Submergence Systems Review Group estab?ished by the Secretary of the Navy after the U+S.S. "Thresher" submarine disaster of April 1963, were Tow and were made without sufficient design, preliminary deve?opment, and testing and --changes were made in the vehicle design to increase its capabilities beyond those stated in the formal requirement document for the vehi- cle (Specific Operational Requirement). The design changes included --an increase in the operating depth of the vehicle to almost three times the depth at which rescue of submarine personnel is possible (see p. 16)9 and --an increase in the vehicle's rescue capacity from 14 to 24 survivors. 1 (See p. 20.) I Under the Navy management system, the Chief of Naval Operations deter- mines the equipment needs of the operating forces. According to Navy records, however, the decisions to make changes in the rescue vehicle were made by the developing group--the Deep Submergence Systems Project Office. (See p. 14.) GAO found no thorough and well-documented analysis of consideration given in-the decisionmaking process to the effects the changes would have on development cost and time-- which were considerable--or to the measurement of the benefits obtainable from the increased capabilities against the increased program costs. Moreover9 there was little indi- cation of specific approval by top Navy echelons of the significant change decisions. (See p. 14.) The Navy management system includes many controls. It does not, how- ever, require formal approval by top-level management of major changes increasing the capabilities of a developmental system beyond those called for in the Specific Operational Requirement. (See p* 25.) Since all funds needed to complete the rescue vehicle project were not required at one time and since the Project Office was able to reprogram funds from its other projects, no point was reached at which a need for funds for technical changes forced a formal decision by the Chief of Naval Operations. (See pp. 31 and 32.) The Project Office said that discussions were held with officials of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. (See pp. 14 and 15.) GAO believes that discussions do not ensure that responsible officials are fully informed of the consequences of major changes. In GAO's opinion, a requirement for formal approval by the Chief of tiaval Opera- tions, or other designated user representatives, of major changes would provide more effective control and assurance that benefits are carefully weighed against possible cost increases and development delays. (See p. 27.) 7 I I I I I I I RECOMMENDATIONSOR SlJCGES"IONS I I I To provide more effective control over development projects and over I significant increases in development cost and time, the Secretary of I I the Navy should require that I I --a sufficient body of design, experimental development work, and I I subsystem testing be done before promulgation of an end-item sys- I tem requirement document and thus establish a sound factual basis I I for authorizing full-scale development (see p. 33); I I I --analyses be made of the impact on program cost and time schedules of I proposed changes designed to increase the capabiljties of equipment I beyond the required level (see p. 33); and I I I --advance approval of top-level management be obtained for all changes I I which are desiqned to increase the caoabilities of the equipment be- I yond requirements and which significantly affect program ‘cost and I I time schedules (see p. 34). I I I I AGENCYACTIONS AND UNRESOLVEDISSUES I I I The Navy did not agree with all of GAO's conclusions but considered the I management objectives implicit in GAO's recommendations to be generally I I sound. The Navy, however, did not cite any actions to be taken, I I I The Navy pointed out that, after the rescue vehicle program had been I initiated, the Department of Defense established new methods to improve I the management of major acquisition programs. The Navy believes that I I the new methods will correct the problems reported by GAO. (See pp. I 34 and 35.) I I I The new methods should help to ensure more participation by top manage- I I ment in the acquisition process. GAO believes, however, that it still I is necessary to revise Navy regulations. The regulations should require I that analyses be made of the impact on development cost and time of all I I significant technical changes designed to increase the capabilities of I equipment beyond those in a program's Specific Operational Requirement. I I The analyses should provide the information necessary for determining I whether such changes are expected to increase effectiveness sufficiently I I to justify added costs or time. I I Navy regulations should require also that, where analyses show a signif- I I icant increase in development cost or time, the Chief of Naval Opera- I tions, or other high-level user representative, certify that each major I I change is necessary for the equipment to perform its mission. The regu- I I lations should prohibit project managers from committing the Government I to proceed with the changes until certifications are given. (See p. 35.) I I I I I I I I I 3 I I I MATTERS FOR COA'SIDER.4TIOA'OF THE' CONGRESS This report is being submitted to the Congress because of its expressed i I interest in the acquisition of major systems and to inform it of the I opportunity, through tightened management control, to limit increases I I in cost and development time in acquiring equipment and systems. I 4 Contents Page DIGEST 1 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 5 Origin of project 6 Project management 7 COST GROWTHAND DELAYS IN DEVELOPMENTPROGRAM 9 Low original estimate 12 Changes in vehicle design 14 Increased operating depth 16 Increased capacity for rescuees 20 Addition of provision for diver lockout 23 LACK OF TOP-LEVEL APPROVAL OF CHANGES IN DEVELOPMENTPROGRAM 25 Top-level approval not required for technical changes increasing equip- ment's capabilities 26 Approval of technical plans not a con- trolling factor 28 Technical Development Plan 28 Project Master Plan 29 Need for additional funds did not force top-level consideration of changes 31 RECOMMENDATIONSAND AGENCY COMMENTS 33 Recommendations 33 SCOPE OF REVIEW 36 APPENDIX I Letter of October 20, 1970, from the Assis- tant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management) 39 Page APPENDIX II Principal officials of the Department of De- fense and the Department of the Navy re- sponsible for administration of activities discussed in this report 49 COMPTROLLERGEiiERdL'S PROBLEMS OF THE DEEP SUBMERGENCE RESCUE REPORT TO THE COT/GRESS VEHICLE PROGRAM SHOW NEED FOR IMPROVE- MENT IN NAVY'S MANAGEMENT CONTROL B-167325 ------DIGEST WHYTHE REVIEW WAS MADE The development cost and time for the Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicle have far exceeded original estimates.