THE MORAL STATUS OF NATURE Reasons to Care for the Natural World Lars Samuelsson • Umeå Studies in Philosophy 9 THE MORAL STATUS OF NATURE Reasons to Care for the Natural World Lars Samuelsson Umeå 2008 • © Lars Samuelsson 2008 Series editors: Sten Lindström and Pär Sundström Department of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies Umeå University SE-901 87 Umeå, Sweden Cover photo (from Apollo 17, AS17-148-22725, taken on 7 December 1972) by courtesy of NASA/NSSDC ISBN 978-91-7264-547-9 ISSN 1650-1748 Printed in Sweden by Print & Media, Umeå University, Umeå 2008.2004480 Distributor: Department of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies, Umeå University, SE-901 87 Umeå, Sweden. To Anna • ABSTRACT The subject-matter of this essay is the moral status of nature. This subject is dealt with in terms of normative reasons. The main question is if there are direct normative reasons to care for nature in addition to the numerous indirect normative reasons that there are for doing so. Roughly, if there is some such reason, and that reason applies to any moral agent, then nature has direct moral status as I use the phrase. I develop the notions of direct normative reason and direct moral status in detail and identify and discuss the two main types of theory according to which nature has direct moral status: analogy-based nature- considerism (AN) and non-analogy-based nature-considerism (NN). I argue for the plausibility of a particular version of the latter, but against the plausibility of any version of the former. The theory that is representative of AN claims that nature has direct moral status in virtue of possessing interests. Proponents of this theory fail to show (i) that nature has interests of the kind that they reasonably want to ascribe to it, and (ii) that interests of this kind are morally significant. In contrast to AN, NN comes in a variety of different forms. I elaborate a version of NN according to which there are direct normative reasons to care for nature in virtue of (i) its unique complexity, and (ii) its indispensability (to all moral agents). I argue that even if these reasons should turn out not to apply to any moral agent, they are still genuine direct normative reasons: there is nothing irrational or misdirected about them. Finally, I show how the question of whether there are direct normative reasons to care for nature is relevant to private and political decision-making concerning nature. This is exemplified with a case from the Swedish mountain region. Key words: Environmental ethics, ecocentrism, biocentrism, nature-considerism, nature, nature as a whole, the natural world, complexity, indispensability, interests, reasons, reason for action, normative reason, moral status, moral standing, moral considerability, final value, intrinsic value. • ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS In the course of writing this essay I have benefited from the kind help and support from many people, all of whom I want to show my gratitude. The first person that I want to thank is my supervisor, Roger Fjellström, without whom this investigation would not have been possible. His immense support has not only endured during my work with this essay but started several years earlier, when I was an undergraduate student in philosophy and he was my teacher. As far as the present work is concerned, his critical reading and challenging remarks have been invaluable. I also want to thank – for support and helpful comments – the other philosop- hers who have been connected to the Department of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies at Umeå University during some period of my writing this essay. In particular, Bertil Strömberg should be mentioned. He has provided fruitful and encouraging criticism and made several constructive suggestions. In some cases his comments have led to substantial revisions. I also want to mention Peter Nilsson, who has been very supportive and frequently read and commented on the texts that I have presented, and Anders Berglund, who has assisted me with questions concerning text-formatting. At some of the higher seminars (in Umeå and elsewhere) where I have presented earlier versions of parts of this essay, there have also been participants from outside the philosophy section of the Department of Historical, Philosop- hical and Religious Studies at Umeå University. I want to thank them as well. Some of these persons have also read and commented on my texts outside of the seminars, and they deserve special acknowledgement. The comments that I have received from Christian Munthe have been particularly valuable, and I also want to mention Erik Malmqvist, who has provided useful remarks on parts of the essay. The persons already named (in particular Roger Fjellström) also deserve acknowledgement for correcting my English and giving me linguistic advice, as do Pär Sundström and (especially) Ulla Andersson. The main financial support for this work has been provided within the framework of the research project “Ethical Perspectives and Integrity in Sustai- x The Moral Status of Nature nable Use of Natural Resources – Studies in Environmental Ethics, with Special Regard to the Swedish Mountain Region”, financed by Naturvårdsverket (Swe- dish Environmental Protection Agency)/Formas, to which I am very grateful. In connection with this point I also want to thank the applicants for this project: Roger Fjellström (main applicant), Umeå University, and Clas Fries and Göran Sjöberg (co-applicants), SLU (Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences), Umeå. Thanks also to Staffan Pettersson, who was involved in the project at an early stage. On a personal note I want to thank, first my wife, Anna, for her profound support during my work with this essay, and for interesting and rewarding discussions concerning much of its content (I could not have done it without you!). Second, I want to thank my daughter, Leia, for keeping my spirits up during the last two years of struggling to finish this book. Last but not least I want to thank my parents for their support. • TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT VII ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS IX TABLE OF CONTENTS XI 1. INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 The subject and primary aim of the essay..................................................1 1.2 Outline of the essay ...................................................................................2 2. ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICAL BACKGROUND 5 2.1 The goal of sustainability – recognizing indirect reasons..........................5 2.2 Looking beyond sustainability – the intuition behind nature- considerism...............................................................................................9 2.3 Candidates for being the things that count morally for their own sake ...13 2.3.1 Living organisms ..............................................................................14 2.3.2 Species ..............................................................................................15 2.3.3 Ecosystems........................................................................................16 2.3.4 Biotic communities, nature areas and the biosphere.........................17 2.3.5 Nature................................................................................................17 2.4 Centrism vs. considerism.........................................................................18 2.4.1 Centrism............................................................................................18 2.4.2 Considerism ......................................................................................22 2.5 Two types of nature-considerism.............................................................23 2.6 Natural unities and natural wholes...........................................................25 2.7 Preview ....................................................................................................28 3. DIRECT MORAL STATUS AND REASONS FOR ACTION 29 3.1 Introduction..............................................................................................29 3.1.1 Reasons and environmental ethics....................................................30 3.1.2 Some remarks in connection with the primary aim of the essay ......31 xii The Moral Status of Nature 3.2 The notion of a normative reason for action............................................35 3.2.1 Normative reasons and motivating reasons ......................................38 3.2.2 Beliefs, propositions or states of affairs?..........................................40 3.2.3 Normative reasons and desires..........................................................44 3.2.4 A possible requirement on normative reasons ..................................46 3.3 The notion of a direct normative reason for action..................................48 3.3.1 Reasons deriving from instrumentally justified rules .......................49 3.3.2 Reasons to act out of consideration for some other thing.................51 3.3.3 The final characterization of directness of a normative reason for action ................................................................................................55 3.4 ‘Direct moral status’ – a useful substitute ...............................................57 3.4.1 The relation of giving rise to.............................................................60 3.4.2 The need for a clause about moral agents.........................................61 3.4.3 The focus on properties.....................................................................63 3.4.4 Positive and negative moral status....................................................64