SUSTAINING AMERICA’S PRECISION STRIKE ADVANTAGE MARK GUNZINGER BRYAN CLARK SUSTAINING AMERICA’S PRECISION STRIKE ADVANTAGE MARK GUNZINGER BRYAN CLARK 2015 ABOUT THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS (CSBA) The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) is an independent, nonpartisan policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking and debate about national security strategy and investment options. CSBA’s analyses focus on key questions related to existing and emerging threats to U.S. national security, and its goal is to enable policymakers to make informed decisions on matters of strategy, security policy, and resource allocation. ©2015 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. All rights reserved. ABOUT THE AUTHORS Mark Gunzinger is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Mr. Gunzinger has served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces Transformation and Resources. A retired Air Force Colonel and Command Pilot, he joined the Office of the Secretary of Defense in 2004. Mark was appointed to the Senior Executive Service and served as Principal Director of the Department’s central staff for the 2005–2006 QDR. Following the 2006 QDR, he was appointed Director for Defense Transformation, Force Planning and Resources on the National Security Council staff. Mr. Gunzinger holds a Master of Science degree in National Security Strategy from the National War College, a Master of Airpower Art and Science degree from the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, a Master of Public Administration from Central Michigan University, and a Bachelor of Science in Chemistry from the United States Air Force Academy (Class of 1977). He is the recipient of the Department of Defense Distinguished Civilian Service Medal, the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service, the Defense Superior Service Medal, and the Legion of Merit Medal. Bryan Clark is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Prior to joining CSBA in 2013, Mr. Clark was special assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations and director of his Commander’s Action Group, where he led development of Navy strategy and implemented new initiatives in electromagnetic spectrum operations, undersea warfare, expeditionary operations, and personnel and readiness management. Mr. Clark served in the Navy headquarters staff from 2004 to 2011, leading studies in the Assessment Division and participating in the 2006 and 2010 Quadrennial Defense Reviews. His areas of emphasis were modeling and simulation, strategic planning, and institutional reform and governance. Prior to retiring from the Navy in 2007, Mr. Clark was an enlisted and officer submariner, serving in afloat and ashore submarine operational and training assignments, including tours as chief engineer and operations officer at the Navy’s nuclear power training unit. Mr. Clark holds an M.S. in national security studies from the National War College and a B.S. in chemistry and philosophy from the University of Idaho. He is the recipient of the Department of the Navy Superior Service Medal and the Legion of Merit. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The authors would like to thank the CSBA staff for their assistance with this report. Special thanks go to Jacob Cohn for his research and analysis of the Defense Department’s investments in precision-guided munitions and Kamilla Gunzinger for her production assistance. The analysis and findings presented here are solely the responsibility of the authors. Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . i Report Purpose and Scope ................................................... ii New Operational Concepts ................................................... ii Capability Implications ......................................................iii INTRODUCTION . 1 Report Approach ...........................................................2 Report Roadmap ..........................................................3 ADVANTAGES OF PRECISION-GUIDED MUNITIONS . 5 The March to Precision . 5 U.S. Direct Attack and Standoff Attack PGMs .....................................6 Advantages of Precision .....................................................7 Summary ...............................................................11 AN EMERGING SALVO COMPETITION . 13 Illustrating the Challenge of Precision Defenses. 15 Summary ...............................................................19 CHALLENGES OF PRECISION PLUS MASS . 21 More Direct Attack Munitions?. .21 More Very Long-Range Standoff Attack PGMs? ...................................24 Summary ...............................................................26 NEW OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS FOR LARGER PGM SALVOS . 29 Leveraging America’s Range Advantage . 30 Dispersing Fighter Bases ...................................................31 Shifting to Short-Range Standoff Strike . 35 Increasing PGM Salvo Survivability .............................................37 Increasing Maritime Strike Capacity. .39 Summary ...............................................................40 CREATING NEW PRECISION STRIKE ADVANTAGES . 43 Improving the Capabilities of PGMs ............................................44 Improving PGM Probability of Arrival. .48 More Targets per Salvo .....................................................52 Increasing PGM Lethality Against Hardened or Deeply Buried Targets ....................55 Summary ..............................................................56 POTENTIAL BARRIERS TO CHANGE . 59 Summary ..............................................................62 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS .. 63 APPENDIX 1: GROSS WEAPON SYSTEM UNIT COSTS FOR PGMS IN PRODUCTION FOR THE U .S . MILITARY . 67 LIST OF ACRONYMS . 70 FIGURES FIGURE 1. FROM SORTIES PER TARGET TO TARGETS PER SORTIE ....................... 8 FIGURE 2. COUNTERING THE U.S. MILITARY’S PRECISION STRIKE KILL CHAIN ............. 13 FIGURE 3. ILLUSTRATIVE DEGRADED PGM PROBABILITY OF ARRIVAL .................... 16 FIGURE 4. WEAPONS AND SORTIES NEEDED FOR AN OIF-SIZED STRIKE CAMPAIGN WITH DEGRADED PGM PROBABILITY OF ARRIVAL .................................. 17 FIGURE 5. PGMS BY CATEGORY PROCURED BY DOD FROM 2001 THROUGH 2014 .......... 18 FIGURE 6. USING PRECISION PLUS MASS TO COMPENSATE FOR ENEMY DEFENSES ......... 19 FIGURE 7. COMPOSITION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE’S CURRENT COMBAT AIRCRAFT ....................................................... 22 FIGURE 8. PENETRATING BOMBERS NEEDED TO SUPPORT A 30-DAY STRIKE CAMPAIGN ...... 23 FIGURE 9. TOTAL DOD PGM PROCUREMENT SINCE 2001 ............................ 24 FIGURE 10. AIRCRAFT NEEDED TO SUPPORT A 30-DAY STANDOFF STRIKE CAMPAIGN ........ 26 FIGURE 11. OPERATING CONCEPT FOR LONG-RANGE STRIKE .......................... 31 FIGURE 12. EMERGING CONCEPT FOR DISTRIBUTED STOVL OPERATIONS ................ 32 FIGURE 13. POTENTIAL WESTERN PACIFIC AIRFIELDS FOR STOVL AIRCRAFT ............... 33 FIGURE 14. EMERGING CONCEPT FOR CLUSTER BASING ............................ 34 FIGURE 15. SHIFT TOWARD STANDOFF ATTACK IN CONTESTED ENVIRONMENTS ........... 35 FIGURE 16. WEIGHT VS. RANGE, OR WEIGHT VS. PAYLOAD FOR DOD STRIKE WEAPONS ........................................................ 36 FIGURE 17. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT FOR “TUNNELING” ............................. 38 FIGURE 18. COLLABORATIVE PRECISION-GUIDED MUNITIONS TO HIT 100 AIMPOINTS ....... 39 FIGURE 19. COST VS. RANGE, OR COST VS. PAYLOAD FOR DOD STANDOFF PGMS .......... 45 FIGURE 20. POTENTIAL AREA COVERED BY FUTURE COUNTER-SWARM WEAPONS ........... 54 FIGURE 21. SHIFTING THE PRECISION STRIKE EFFECTIVENESS CURVE .................. 57 FIGURE 22. PGM PROCUREMENT AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE’S TOTAL BUDGET . 59 TABLES TABLE 1. MUNITIONS USED IN MAJOR U.S. POST-COLD WAR AIR CAMPAIGNS. 9 www.csbaonline.org i Executive Summary The U.S. military has enjoyed an overwhelming advantage in precision strike since the end of the Cold War. The highly publicized use of laser-guided bombs and cruise missiles during Operation Desert Storm in 1991 heralded the potential for advanced precision-guided muni- tions to “dramatically increase the effectiveness of a fighting force.”1 Following Desert Storm, the Department of Defense (DoD) adopted a force planning construct developed during its “bottom-up” strategic review that prioritized the need to organize, train, and equip U.S. forces to deter, and if necessary defeat, conventional forces invading two U.S. allies or part- ner states nearly simultaneously.2 This two-war planning construct assumed that future U.S. power projection forces would be able use large numbers of PGMs launched by aircraft, ships, submarines, and ground batteries to attack target sets with near impunity, much as they had during Desert Storm. DoD’s subsequent strategic reviews have reaffirmed the need for the U.S. military to prepare for fighting two major conflicts in separate theaters. The Pentagon’s latest strategic assess- ment, the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), concluded the nation should maintain a military that “could defeat a regional adversary in a large-scale multi-phased campaign” while deterring or spoiling the offensive of a second opportunistic aggressor.3 The 2014 QDR shared another characteristic with most of DoD’s post-Cold War strategic reviews: it focused primar- ily on the size of its force and major force modernization programs, and it excluded a serious assessment of the numbers and kinds of PGMs needed to conduct future operations.4 1 Office of the Secretary