UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME REGIONAL OFFICE FOR CENTRAL ASIA Precursor Control on Central Asia’s Borders with China ROCA CAU UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME REGIONAL OFFICE FOR CENTRAL ASIA Table of Contents Introduction 1 Part 1: Precursor Trafficking in Central Asia S h i f t s i n P r o c e s s i n g 3 P r e c u r s o r T r a f f i c k i n g t o A f g h a n i s t a n 4 C h i n a 6 Part 2: The Central Asian-Chinese Borders S u m m a r y : K a z a k h s t a n ’ s B o r d e r w i t h C h i n a 8 o s t u k 8 D K h o r g o s 1 1 K o l z h a t 4 1 a r y n k o l 1 5 N O t h e r B o r d e r S e c t i o n s 1 5 A o t e o n t h e K y r g y z - K a z a k h B o r d e r 1 5 N S u m m a r y : K y r g y z s t a n ’ s B o r d e r w i t h C h i n a 1 5 T o r u g a r t 6 1 r k e s h t a m 8 1 I O t h e r B o r d e r S e c t i o n s 1 9 S u m m a r y : T a j i k i s t a n ’ s B o r d e r w i t h C h i n a 1 9 T h e K u l m a P a s s 1 9 O t h e r B o r d e r S e c t i o n s 2 0 C o r r u p t i o n 2 1 a i t h i n C h i n a 2 1 F n t e r n a t i o n a l ( o n - ) c o o p e r a t i o n 2 2 I N Part 3: Summary of Risks and Recommendations G e n e r a l R i s k a c t o r s 2 4 F K a z a k h s t a n 2 5 T h e K y r g y z - K a z a k h B o r d e r 2 6 K y r g y z s t a n 2 6 T a j i k i s t a n 2 7 R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s 2 7 Annex: Precursor Control in Central Asia 29 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME REGIONAL OFFICE FOR CENTRAL ASIA Figures Page F i g u r e 1 : O p i u m t o h e r o i n c o n v e r s i o n 4 F i g u r e 2 : S e i z u r e s o f a c e t i c a n h y d r i d e i n a n d a r o u n d A f g h a n i s t a n 5 F i g u r e 3 : C e n t r a l A s i a ’ s b o r d e r s w i t h C h i n a 7 F i g u r e 4 : H e a v y m a c h i n e r y i m p o r t s t h r o u g h D o s t u k 9 F i g u r e 5 : K h o r g o s ’ T C s c a n n e r 1 1 F i g u r e 6 : P r i n t o u t o f a T C s c a n a t K h o r g o s 1 3 F i g u r e 7 : U n u s e d C u s t o m s f a c i l i t i e s a t T o r u g a r t 1 7 F i g u r e 8 : T h e s e a l e d r o a d s e c t i o n n e a r I r k e s h t a m 1 8 F i g u r e 9 : A C h i n e s e t r u c k a p p r o a c h i n g t h e K u l m a P a s s 2 0 F i g u r e 1 0 : C r i m i n a l p r o v i s i o n s r e l a t i n g t o p r e c u r s o r s 3 2 Abbreviations D C A D r u g C o n t r o l A g e n c y G B G B A O o r n o - a d a k h s h a n A u t o n o m o u s O b l a s t B B I N C I n t e r n a t i o n a l N a r c o t i c s C o n t r o l o a r d U N O D C U n i t e d N a t i o n s O f f i c e o n D r u g s a n d C r i m e Precursor Control on Central Asia’s Borders with China 1 INTRODUCTION The chain of opiate smugglers and the tangle of their routes across Central Asia lead back to the source of their product in Afghanistan. However, the difficulties of addressing the Afghan drug trade at its source are large and manifold, as the enduring instability and continuing production of opium in that country attest. The amount of money being spent in Central Asia on addressing opiate trafficking is further evidence that the returns to counter-narcotics funding are, unfortunately, higher outside of the pivotal country than within it. However, the progression of goods from opium farmer to heroin consumer requires the early and inescapable addition of precursors. Crucially, Afghanistan does not produce these. The necessity of procuring large quantities of precursor chemicals in order to convert opium into heroin creates an opportunity for disrupting drug distribution early on in the production process. The effective detection and interdiction of precursor smuggling into Afghanistan would create immense pressure on opiate smuggling networks, choking them at the source of supply. The Paris Pact is the international coordination group for counter-narcotics programs in Central Asia and regional efforts to address precursor trafficking fall within its remit. In October 2004, at its first meeting in Vienna, its Policy Consultative Group recommendations on precursors included reference to formation of a Precursor Task Force. While the focus at that meeting was on the Tajik-Afghan border, the Group observed that China is a major producer of precursor chemicals for licit purposes and borders three Central Asian countries, including Tajikistan. It is a 16 hour drive by heavy truck between the Chinese-Tajik and Tajik-Afghan borders. However, even basic knowledge of these border crossings was sparse and control regimes had yet to be assessed. In light of this, in September and October 2005 the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Regional Office for Central Asia undertook fieldwork to assess border posts on the Central Asian-Chinese borders. The total assessment period was 4 weeks and included meetings in central agencies as well as at the posts themselves. From north to south, the crossings covered were the Kulma Pass, Irkeshtam, Torugart, Narynkol, Kolzhat, Khorgos and Dostuk; the only points not visited were the two northernmost crossings in Kazakhstan, Bakhty and Maykapchagay. The fieldwork also investigated unmanned sections of the borders. Part 1 of this report discusses the current state of knowledge regarding precursor trafficking in Central Asia. The dearth of information on the routes by which heroin producers in Afghanistan source precursor chemicals – particularly acetic anhydride – keeps counter-trafficking efforts in a preliminary phase. In this situation, China is a valid target for investigation, given its large chemicals industry, its provision of precursors to Myanmar and its proximity to Afghanistan. The apparent success of licit regulatory systems in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (see Annex) places the focus of investigation firmly on smuggling rather than diversion. This is the motivation for visiting Central Asia’s border crossings with China and Part 2 describes these.