University of Central Florida STARS Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019 2009 The Bush Administration's Decision To Invade Iraq: Did They Fall Victim To Groupthink? Joel Nantais University of Central Florida Part of the Political Science Commons Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu This Masters Thesis (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019 by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more information, please contact [email protected]. STARS Citation Nantais, Joel, "The Bush Administration's Decision To Invade Iraq: Did They Fall Victim To Groupthink?" (2009). Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019. 4118. https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd/4118 THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION‟S DECISION TO INVADE IRAQ: DID THEY FALL VICTIM TO GROUPTHINK? by JOEL DAVID NANTAIS B.S. Indiana University of Pennsylvania, 2006 A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Sciences in the department of Political Science in the College of Sciences at the University of Central Florida Orlando, Florida Fall Term 2009 ABSTRACT The purpose of this study was to investigate whether the George W. Bush administration became victims of groupthink when they made the policy decision to invade Iraq in 2003. Groupthink is a policy-making model which was first put forward by Irving Janis which attempts to explain how experienced and elite policy-makers can make decisions which lead to disastrous outcomes due to conditions which cause defective decision-making. Research was conducted through a qualitative, within case study which was made possible through the inherent process tracing method of the groupthink model. Mainly secondary sources which detailed the historical case of the decision to invade Iraq via journalists, outside researchers, and even the members of the administration were utilized in this investigation. The principle conclusion was that groupthink appeared to exist in the policy-making process of the Bush administration. This was reached after finding many of the antecedent conditions as well as the symptoms of groupthink in the Bush administration. Especially prominent were the occurrence of structural faults of the administration, mindguarding, self-censorship, and collective rationalizations. However, it is important to note that these results are sensitive to the discovery or release of new or contradictory evidence. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 1: INRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 1 CHAPTER 2: A REVIEW OF THE THEORY ....................................................................... 17 Groupthink ................................................................................................................................ 17 Reviews of Groupthink ............................................................................................................. 27 Case Studies ........................................................................................................................... 27 Laboratory Studies ................................................................................................................. 35 Reformations of Groupthink ..................................................................................................... 39 CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................ 55 My Hypotheses .......................................................................................................................... 55 My Model .................................................................................................................................. 55 My Research Methods ............................................................................................................... 60 CHAPTER 4: THE ANTECEDENT CONDITIONS OF GROUPTHINK .......................... 67 Decision Makers Have a High level of Collective Efficacy ..................................................... 67 Structural Faults of the Organization ........................................................................................ 69 Isolation of the group ............................................................................................................. 70 Lack of procedural policy debate .......................................................................................... 74 iii Lack of an Impartial Leader .................................................................................................. 80 The Policy Group Perceives a High Likelihood of Success...................................................... 81 Summary of Antecedent Conditions ......................................................................................... 83 CHAPTER 5: THE OBSERVABLE SYMPTOMS OF GROUPTHINK ............................. 85 Type1- Illusion of invulnerability ............................................................................................. 85 Type1-Belief in the Inherent Morality of the Group ................................................................. 87 Type2-Collective Rationalizations ............................................................................................ 89 Type2-Sterotypes of Out-Groups .............................................................................................. 92 Type3-Self-Censorship.............................................................................................................. 94 Type3-Illusion of Unanimity ..................................................................................................... 98 Type3-Direct Pressure on Dissenters ........................................................................................ 99 Type3-Self-Appointed Mindguards ........................................................................................ 101 Summary of Groupthink Symptoms ....................................................................................... 103 CHAPTER 6: THE SYMPTOMS OF DEFECTIVE DECISION-MAKING ..................... 105 Incomplete Survey of Alternatives .......................................................................................... 105 Incomplete Survey of Objectives ............................................................................................ 107 Failure to Examine Risks of the Preferred Choice .................................................................. 108 Failure to Reappraise Initially Rejected Alternatives ............................................................. 111 Poor Information Search ......................................................................................................... 112 iv Selective Bias in Processing Information at Hand .................................................................. 114 Failure to Workout Contingency Plans ................................................................................... 115 CHAPTER 7: ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS ............................................................. 118 Standard Groupthink Model .................................................................................................... 118 Organizational Process Model ................................................................................................ 123 Analogical Reasoning ............................................................................................................. 129 President Bush as Sole Decider ............................................................................................... 136 Summary of Alternative Explanations .................................................................................... 141 CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION................................................................................................. 142 BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................... 147 v TABLE OF FIGURES Figure 1: Janis's Groupthink Model ______________________________________________________________ 18 Figure 2: Neck and Moorhead's Groupthink Model __________________________________________________ 40 Figure 3: Glenn Whyte's Groupthink Model _______________________________________________________ 44 Figure 4: Paul 't Hart's Groupthink Model ________________________________________________________ 53 Figure 5: Combined Groupthink Model ___________________________________________________________ 58 vi CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION In March of 2003 the United States of America along with the United Kingdom, Australia, and the rest of the “Coalition of the willing” began the invasion of Iraq with the intended goal of overthrowing the existing regime headed by Saddam Hussain and setting up a democracy in one of the most important countries in the Middle East. The fact that this was done is obvious to all, the reason why it was done is almost completely unknown. In a now famous quote by Richard Haass, then director of Policy Planning at the State Department, he states that he will “go to my grave not knowing that. I can‟t answer it. I can‟t explain the strategic obsession with Iraq and why it rose to the top of people‟s priority list” (Lemann, 2004). Although it is hoped that this is not true, many researchers and journalists have worked to