The Arab-Israel War of 1967 1967 was the year of the six-day war. Here we bring together its impact on Israel and on the Jewish communities in the Arab countries; United States Middle East policy and United Nations deliberations; effects on the East European Communist bloc, its citizens, and its Jewish communities, and American opinion. For discus- sions of reactions in other parts of the world, see the reviews of individual countries. THE EDITORS Middle East Israel A ALL aspects of Israel's life in 1967 were dominated by the explosion of hostilities on June 5. Two decades of Arab-Israel tension culminated in a massive combined Arab military threat, which was answered by a swift mobilization of Israel's citizen army and, after a period of waiting for international action, by a powerful offensive against the Egyptian, Jor- danian and Syrian forces, leading to the greatest victory in Jewish military annals. During the weeks of danger preceding the six-day war, Jewry throughout the world rallied to Israel's aid: immediate financial support was forthcoming on an unprecedented scale, and thousands of young volunteers offered per- sonal participation in Israel's defense, though they arrived too late to affect the issue (see reviews of individual countries). A new upsurge of national confidence swept away the morale crisis that had accompanied the economic slowdown in 1966. The worldwide Jewish reaction to Israel's danger, and the problems associated with the extension of its military rule over a million more Arabs, led to a reappraisal of atti- tudes towards diaspora Jewry. It was generally agreed that immigration from the free countries now was of more vital importance than ever before, and much thought was given to adapting the machinery of government and the structure of the Zionist organization to the tasks of attracting immigrants from the West and facilitating their integration. In the international arena, Israel successfully withstood Arab and Soviet pressure for the unconditional withdrawal of its forces from the areas occu- pied as a result of the six-day war. But, although there was practically unani- mous national support for the government's insistence on peace treaties with the Arab states as a condition of any settlement, there was much public de- bate on whether Israel should be prepared to barter territories for peace in the event of direct negotiations. An important by-product of the crisis was the formation of a Cabinet of National Unity and the agreement between Mapai, Ahdut Ha-'avodah and Rafi for the establishment of a united Labor party. The total population of areas under Israeli control at the end of 1967 was 115 116 / AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK, 1968 estimated at 3,767,000: 2,365,000 Jews; 344,000 non-Jews (mainly Arabs and Druzes) in areas within the former armistice lines; 66,000 non-Jews in East Jerusalem, and 992,000 in areas under military administration. Arab-Israel Tension Rises Tension on the Syrian frontier rose steadily during the early months of 1967. On January 17 Prime Minister Levi Eshkol drew attention to the grav- ity of the situation: during the first three weeks of the year, there were 23 Syrian attacks, including machine-gun and tank artillery fire on Israeli farmers inside and outside the demilitarized zones, mine-laying on roads and on a village football field, and sabotage of water installations. Israel and Syria accepted United Nations Secretary General U Thant's proposal for talks, within the framework of an emergency meeting of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission (which had been deadlocked since 1959), to discuss "practical arrangements on problems of cultivation on the Armistice Demarcation Line to secure a peaceful atmosphere on the ADL for farmers and civilians in the areas." At the first meeting, on January 25, an official report by General Odd Bull, United Nations chairman of the commission, stated that both sides "reaffirmed their commitment to refrain from all kinds of hostile or aggres- sive action, in accordance with the provisions of the UN charter and the general armistice agreements.' However, at the second and third meetings, January 29 and February 2, the Syrian delegation insisted on discussing at length questions of principle connected with the status of the demilitarized zones, despite General Bull's appeal to both sides to stick to the agreed agenda. On February 8 President Nur al Din al Atasi of Syria declared: Our agreement to participate in the [Mixed Armistice Commission] meeting will in no way influence our attitude concerning the Palestine problem, as well as the real method of liberation. The Palestine problem will be solved only in the heart of the usurped land. The fourth meeting, set for February 9, was postponed indefinitely at the request of the Syrians. Border violence, mainly in the north, continued, and Israel repeatedly complained to the UN Security Council. Between July 1966 and May 1967, 34 such complaints were submitted. Foreign Minister Abba Eban denied in the Keneset, on February 4, Soviet and Arab allegations of Israeli opposition to the "revolutionary" nature of the Syrian regime. "We are only interested in changing the aggressive policy of Syria towards Israel," he said. "The nature of Syria's regime and the char- acter of her society are not our concern." Referring to the border troubles, Israeli Chief of Staff Major General Isaac Rabin, said in Tel Aviv on March 24: The solution to this problem involves a number of means—political, military and defensive. We have to react toward the country that encourages incursions ISRAEL / 117 into Israel and take action against the country from which these infiltrators come. On April 2 Prime Minister Levi Eshkol told the cabinet that recent sabo- tage attempts were regarded with the utmost gravity. Three days later, For- eign Minister Eban issued another warning to Syria in the Keneset that "the Government of Israel will take and carry out whatever steps it deems neces- sary to protect its territory and the lives of its citizens." On April 7 a serious clash occurred on the northern border, after the Syrians had shelled the villages of Tel Katzir, Ha'on, Ein Gev, and Gadot intermittently for four days, over 200 heavy mortar shells falling on Gadot, where not a single house escaped damage. When the Syrians brought up tanks and heavy artillery, Israeli artillery returned fire, and bombers, cov- ered by Mirage fighters, were sent up to silence their positions. Six Syrian Mig 21s were shot down by Israeli fighters pursuing them as far as Damas- cus. The Israeli air force action had saved the villages from catastrophe, Eshkol stated in a broadcast on the following day. After several more days of Syrian shooting, Israel again complained to the Security Council, drawing attention to official Syrian communiques that admitted opening fire on Is- raeli tractors. In view of rumors of Israeli troop concentrations near the Syrian border, General Bull had proposed to both parties (April 5) an investigation of the situation by UN observers. Israel agreed to this and a further, similar, request in the first week of May, but the Syrians refused. Prime Minister Eshkol invited Soviet Ambassador Dimitri Chuvakhin to tour the border to see for himself, but the envoy declined the invitation. Addressing a Mapai meeting in Tel Aviv, on May 12, Prime Minister Eshkol said: In view of the fourteen incidents of sabotage and infiltration perpetrated in the past month alone, Israel may have no other choice but to adopt suitable counter measures against the foci of sabotage and their abettors. In reply to a question, he emphasized that Israel would continue to thwart any attempt to interfere with shipping to and from Israel through the Red Sea. On May 13 Soviet Russia informed Egypt that Israel was concentrating troops on its border with Syria with a view to launching an attack within a week. President Gamal Abdel Nasser began moving forces on a large scale through the streets of Cairo and building up Egyptian strength in the Sinai Peninsula. When the news reached Israel during the night of May 14, the government immediately informed the United Nations that Russia's allega- tions were baseless. Reporting to the Security Council, on May 19, Secretary General U Thant stated: The Government of Israel very recently has assured me that there are no un- usual troop concentrations or movements along the Syrian lines. Reports 118 / AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK, 1968 from UNTSO observers confirmed the absence of troop concentrations and sig- nificant troop movements on both sides of the line. On May 16 Cairo Radio declared: The existence of Israel has continued too long. We welcome the Israeli aggres- sion, we welcome the battle that we have long awaited. The great hour has come. The battle has come in which we shall destroy Israel. On the same day the Histadrut Davar reported Prime Minister Eshkol's statement to the government that Egyptian troop movements were meant for show and had more demonstrative than practical significance. However, Israel had mobilized part of its reserves as a precautionary measure. Also, on May 16, Egypt demanded the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force which had been stationed since 1957 on the border of the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula, and at Sharm el-Sheikh, commanding the Strait of Tiran, the approach to Israel's Red Sea port of Eilat. U Thant replied that any request for the temporary removal of the force from the border would be regarded as a demand for its complete evacuation, and Egypt thereupon officially requested the evacuation of UNEF from Egyptian territory and the Gaza Strip.