Russian New Art of Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine Soňa Rusnáková1 Abstract The main aim of this paper is to analyse the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation. For the purposes of the paper, the theory of hybrid warfare was chosen as an analytical category. Throughout the paper, the concept of hybrid warfare is examined and applied on case study of Crimean annexation. Hybrid warfare, especially in connection with Russian actions in Crimea has been an intensely debated concept. There is an ongoing debate among scholars concerning the meaning of the concept, its existence and employment by the Russian Federation. This paper showed that the article of Valeriy Gerasimov – the incumbent Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation- invoked a new warfare strategy for the Russian Federation which was consequently for the very first time in its full spectre and effectivity employed on case of Crimean annexation in March 2014. Observing the application of the hybrid warfare in practice serves the purposes of countering its further potential application in post-Soviet space and Russian ‘near abroad’. Key Words: Russia, Ukraine, Crimea, hybrid warfare, annexation INTRODUCTION Due to its actions in Crimea which can be approached as a projection of the new capability of Russia to simultaneously employ vast spectrum of warfare means in one battlefield, the concept of hybrid warfare has become more and more interlinked with the new military thinking of Russia and most importantly, the attention was directed towards the effects this new Russian warfare style might have in the future on security of neighbouring and ‘near abroad’ countries. The concerns of the West elevated after the article of Russian Chief of General Staff, Valery Gerasimov - The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying Out Combat Operations was released in February 2013 in Russian military newspaper. However, the opinions of scholars on the interpretation of Gerasimov vary. The article is in the West known as the ‘Gerasimov’s Doctrine’ and considered to affirm the new orientation of Russian military operations towards hybrid warfare. According to scholars who advocate this position, due to the fact that Russia significantly lags behind the USA and NATO in terms of its conventional capabilities, it has to rely on developing rather non-conventional capabilities 1 Mgr. Soňa Rusnáková, Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs Slovak Journal of Political Sciences, Volume 17, 2017, No. 3 - 4 343 DOI: 10.1515/sjps-2017-0014 to compensate for its shortcomings. The hybrid warfare has become “Russia’s new art of war” (Jones, 2014), an updated military strategy of Russian military directing its future operations. The idea that Russia could use hybrid warfare for regaining territories of post-Soviet states cannot be underestimated: “…the strategy of hybrid warfare is applicable in the former Soviet region precisely because here Russia can leverage its escalation dominance over its neighbours and its relatively better local knowledge” (Lanoszka, 2016, p. 194). Lanoszka provides four explications why post-Soviet region is in particular prone to attract hybrid style of warfare: the presence of ethnic Russian minorities in post-Soviet countries, the underlying historical grievances among post-Soviet countries of which Russia can take advantage and apply the policy of ‘divide and rule’, weak social network among the members of civil society and lastly, overall regional complexity which provides comparative advantage for Russia in understanding the region’s realities better than any other external power (p. 194). One of the main objectives of this thesis will be to advocate this view on Russia and hybrid warfare as its new military thinking, used not only to adapt to new security era of hybrid threats, but demonstrating that Russia itself poses a serious security threat for neighbouring countries by projecting its offensive hybrid capabilities into the post-Soviet region. Other scholars claim that “…Gerasimov is simply explaining his view of the operational environment and the nature of future war, and not proposing a new Russian way of warfare or military doctrine...” (Bartles, 2016, p. 31). According to them, the West is misinterpreting the article and is overanalysing it since the article is merely a foresight on how future military operations are and will be in general conducted worldwide. They refuse to admit that the article establishes a guide on how Russia will wage warfare: “’Hybrid war’ can hardly be considered a definitive doctrine for Russia’s future power projection in its neighborhood, much less a model that could be easily reproduced in far flung and diverse corners of the post-Soviet space” (Kofman and Rojansky, 2015, p. 1). Moreover, they agree that the intervention in Crimea and Ukraine was unique in context and circumstances so “…the chances that it could simply repeat a Crimea or a Donbas scenario elsewhere are, fortunately, low” (p. 7). McDermott (2016) further adds to these perceptions that Among these untested and certainly unproven assertions are the ideas that Moscow has developed a doctrine and operational strategy referred to as “hybrid warfare,” or that its operations in Ukraine can be explained by reference to new and evolving defense and security capabilities. Unfortunately, hybrid warfare is an alien concept in Russian military theory and in its approach to modern warfare…(p. 97). 344 Slovak Journal of Political Sciences, Volume 17, 2017, No. 3 - 4 What is also worth to mention is another substantial distinction in the Western and Russian perception concerning the concept of the ‘soft power’. Usually the elements of unconventional/irregular/non-linear operations such as diplomatic, political, economic, social, financial, information and psychological ones can be regarded as falling under the category of soft power. However, the understanding of these means and their range varies between the West and Russia. As Meister and Puglierin (2015) suggest, “…the EU uses soft power to try to strengthen the civil societies in those countries, support independent media, and help the democratic transformation process expand to the east” (p. 1). Such understanding is in contrast with the Russian approach because it is based rather on attraction than coercion. These actions are evaluated by Russia as threatening its state interests and undermining its spheres of influence. Therefore on the opposite to the Western perception, “For Russian leaders, soft power is instead a non- military instrument for imposing its own goals and has always been perceived as a means of supplementing military power and contributing to manipulating, undermining, and weakening the opponent” (p. 4). Russia uses these means in offensive, deceitful and manipulative manner under the hybrid warfare strategy because of its victimized self-perception of failed superpower: The Kremlin’s especially broad sense of quite what constitutes ‘war,’ for example, the very measures imposed by the West in order to try and bring home condemnation of Russian aggression, economic sanctions, are themselves considered unilaterally hostile acts…Hence the belief that gibridnayavoina is quintessentially American invention…not only contributes to a sense of being under constant threat – and from a covert and subtle threat that could be behind any reversal, from labour unrest to lost trade opportunities – it also provides a justification for Russia’s own ‘guerilla geopolitics’… (Galeotti, 2016, p. 39). 1 HYBRID WARFARE “Hybrid warfare, hybrid threats, and hybrid aggression have been concepts used to describe the unprecedentedly complex and tailored integration of a whole-of-spectrum approach to warfare in the 21st century” (Abott, 2016, p. 4). In the context of Crimean annexation, the debates over the definition of the concept of ‘hybrid warfare’ and more specifically its understanding as a new way of waging war by Russia have arisen. For this reason, it is necessary to define its meaning and take a closer look on debates encompassing it. Scholars agree that hybrid warfare is neither an entirely new phenomenon nor that it can be attributed exclusively to Russian actions in Crimea and Ukraine in general. What is also acknowledged by many military analysts is that “… Slovak Journal of Political Sciences, Volume 17, 2017, No. 3 - 4 345 The beginning of the twenty-first century was marked by proliferation of hybrid wars, held between flexible and sophisticated adversaries engaged in asymmetric conflicts using various forms of warfare according to the purpose and timing” (Josan and Voicu, 2015, p. 49). The concept came to the light for the very first time in 2002 when William J. Nemeth used it to refer to the tactics of Chechen guerrilla against Russia during the Second Chechen War in 1999-2009. But the concept has become more popular among scholars after Frank Hoffman used it to describe the tactics of Hezbollah during the Lebanon war in 2006 which is assumed to be one of the most suitable examples of hybrid warfare. The level of complexity of actions performed by the non-state actor and its effectiveness was unprecedented. Drawing on the experience with Hezbollah’s sophisticated and complex operations, the first theoretical basis for the concept of hybrid threats and warfare can be traced to Hoffman’sConflict in the 21st Century published in 2007 where the author analysed the hybrid methods implemented by this non- state actor as well as defended the novelty and uniqueness of the concept of hybrid warfare itself. Although there is no unified and mutually agreed definition within the academics, there are several characteristics upon which its advocates find consensus. In its broader sense the hybrid warfare can be characterized as difficulty in distinguishing between the state of peace and war as well as blurring warfare modes by simultaneously merging unconventional and conventional, irregular and regular, non-linear and linear, covert and overt methods of waging war by non-state actor or state, plus having attributes of being dynamic, flexible, unpredictable, subversive, complex and multidimensional.