DIEU ET MON DROIT: THE MARGINALIZATION OF PARLIAMENT AND THE ROLE OF NEOLIBERALISM IN THE FUNCTION OF THE ONTARIO LEGISLATURE FROM 1971 TO 2014 By Thomas E. McDowell A dissertation presented to Ryerson University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy In the program of Policy Studies Ryerson University Toronto, Ontario, Canada, 2016 ©Thomas E. McDowell 2016 AUTHOR'S DECLARATION I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this dissertation. This is a true copy of the dissertation, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners. I authorize Ryerson University to lend this dissertation to other institutions or individuals for the purpose of scholarly research I further authorize Ryerson University to reproduce this dissertation by photocopying or by other means, in total or in part, at the request of other institutions or individuals for the purpose of scholarly research. I understand that my dissertation may be made electronically available to the public. ii Dieu et Mon Droit: The Marginalization of Parliament and the Role of Neoliberalism in the Function of the Ontario Legislature from 1971 to 2014 By Thomas E. McDowell Doctor of Philosophy 2016 Policy Studies, Ryerson University ABSTRACT In recent years, considerable attention has been paid to the increasingly popular trend among western governments to use arcane parliamentary mechanisms to circumvent the legislative process. However, despite growing concern for the influence of parliament, there are few comprehensive studies that capture the evolution of this pattern in the detail necessary to draw substantive conclusions about why it is occurring. This dissertation seeks to address this gap in the literature by undertaking a detailed archival analysis of the evolution of the role and function of the Ontario Legislature between 1971 and 2014. Using an interpretivist approach, it draws upon the Marxist political economy literature to assess the nature of the relationship between the marginalization of parliament and the emergence of neoliberalism as the dominant policy paradigm in Ontario over the course of the same period. This project makes the case that the Ontario Legislature has undergone a profound shift from an assembly characterized largely by cooperation between the three major political parties in the 1970s, to one in which governments have routinely made use of all methods of parliamentary procedures to undermine the opposition. An important explanation for the emergence of this trend, it is argued, has been to insulate controversial neoliberal reforms from democratic control by hastening their passage through the legislature. The utilization of these restrictive instruments iii has been coupled with a growing tendency by governments to overcome institutional obstacles to the implementation of neoliberal restructuring measures by granting themselves increasingly significant powers to govern through regulation. Thus, while a confluence of factors have contributed to the marginalization of the legislature in Ontario, the compulsion to shield neoliberal reforms from exposure to institutional processes emerges as arguably the most significant explanation. It is hoped this dissertation will make several contributions to the literature. First, although the scholarship has largely ignored the role of parliamentary institutions to the implementation of neoliberalism, this study shows that they are central to the story of neoliberal restructuring in Ontario. Second, it shows that all three major parties have not only moved Ontario in a neoliberal direction, but have also been responsible for significant changes to the legislature’s procedures. Third, it provides a historical canvass of the evolution of procedure at Queen’s Park, demonstrating that while restrictive measures were initially exceptional, employed only to facilitate the passage of highly controversial measures, over time they have become commonplace, routinely used for all varieties of legislation. iv In memory of Barbara McDowell v TABLE OF CONTENTS AUTHOR’S DECLARATION ...................................................................................................... ii ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................. iii LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................................... vii CHAPTER ONE DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS: A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW .......................................................1 CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW: DIEU ET MON DROIT; THE DECLINE OF PARLIAMENT IN CANADA .....................................................................................................................................41 CHAPTER THREE AN ONTARIO CASE STUDY: METHODS AND PROCEDURES ...........................................77 CHAPTER FOUR “THE REALITIES OF MARCH 19th”; THE DAVIS YEARS 1971-1984 ...............................122 CHAPTER FIVE A MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: ONTARIO IN TRANSITION: THE PETERSON YEARS 1985-1990 ...................................................................................................................................161 CHAPTER SIX “DEMOCRACY UNDER SIEGE”: THE NDP’S NEOLIBERAL TURN AND THE DECLINE OF PARLIAMENT AT QUEEN’S PARK; THE RAE YEARS 1990-1995 ...............................201 CHAPTER SEVEN REVOLUTION AT QUEEN’S PARK 1995-2003 .....................................................................242 CHAPTER EIGHT CONSOLIDATING A REVOLUTION: THE LIBERAL YEARS 2003-2014 ..........................297 CHAPTER NINE THE EMERGENCE OF A PERMANENT CRISIS CONFIGURATION AT QUEEN’S PARK: CONCLUSIONS .........................................................................................................................345 REFERENCES ...........................................................................................................................395 vi LIST OF TABLES Tables 3.1: Archives of Ontario – Boxes Accessed (Barcodes) .................................................... 96 Table 3.2: Archival Sessional Papers Accessed ............................................................................ 98 Table 3.3: Restricted Archival Documents Accessed.................................................................. 101 Table 7.1: Time Allocation Motions Passed by Harris/Eves Government Second Term ........... 290 Table 8.1: Time Allocation Motions Passed by the McGuinty/Wynne Governments ................ 328 Table 9.1: Time Allocation Motions Passed by Harris Government (1995-2006) ..................... 376 Table 9.2: Time Allocation Motions Passed by Harris/Eves Government Second Term ...........380 Table 9.3: Total Time Allocation Motions Passed by McGuinty/Wynne Governments ............. 385 vii CHAPTER ONE DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS: A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW The decline of parliamentary institutions in interwar Europe is a central, if often overlooked, explanation for the rise of fascism in the 1930s. At the end of the First World War, liberal parliamentary assemblies were established throughout Europe, as a method for ending the dynastic and imperial tendencies of the rule of monarchies throughout the Ancien Regime. Within a decade of the war, however, newly established parliamentary democracies that had sprung up in European nations such as Spain, Poland, Germany, Serbia, Croatia, and Hungary began to show signs of decline as governments frustrated with parliamentary deadlock sought methods to circumvent the authority of parliament and govern through the executive authority, despite the fact that the new constitutions heavily concentrated power in the legislative assemblies. Political theorist Carl Schmitt developed the idea of a “state of exception,” which would allow governments to invoke emergency constitutional authority during periods of crisis in order to allow the government to respond more aggressively to urgent circumstances without having to consult their often fractured and deadlocked legislative assemblies (Schmitt as cited in Mazower, 2000, p. 20). For Schmidt, parliaments had become an “empty formality” that functioned as a, “superfluous decoration, useless and even embarrassing, as though someone had painted the radiator of a modern central heating system with red flames in order to give the appearance of a blazing fire” (Schmitt, trans., 1988, p. 6). The only way for governments to save democracy from itself, was to amend the constitutions so that executives could exercise power where necessary to break deadlock and make important decisions. Within a decade of the war, governments throughout Europe were beginning to amend their constitutions to make provisions for such emergency clauses, to be used only in urgent circumstances. However, with the onset of the 1 Great Depression, governments were tempted to make use of these emergency constitutional provisions to address the economic crisis at hand. In Germany, the increased use of Article 48 of the German constitution, which gave the president the authority to circumvent parliament by using its executive authority, “made it difficult to determine at what point democracy slid into dictatorship” (Mazower, 2000, p. 21). Between 1925 and 1931 the provision was only used 16 times. In 1931 alone, the president used his emergency powers on 42 separate occasions, while only 36 laws were passed through parliament. The following year, there were 59 emergency decrees and only five total laws