The Slava Celebration: A Private and a Public Matter SABINA HADŽIBULIĆ Åbo Akademi Abstract A family celebration named the slava or krsna slava (celebration/ glorification or christened celebration) is a unique custom within the tradition of the Serbian Orthodox Church when each family annu- ally celebrates its patron saint. Besides Christmas and Easter, slava is the most important celebration in the life of every family. Although its roots reach as far back as medieval times, the slava and its role in family tradition were neglected and marginalised during the com- munist period of Serbian history. With the revitalisation of religion, and especially the reaffirmation of the Serbian Orthodox Church at the end of the last century, the slava has regained its significance and recognition, and even transcended the private family sphere. Today it is often used as an indicator of one’s ethnicity and status with little real connection to its authentic religious meaning and purpose. Ad- ditionally, what was originally a family tradition has become a festival for many public institutions, companies, and professional associa- tions. This paper aims to present the slava’s distinctive structure and features, as well as to explore ways in which this transformation is related to the revitalisation of religion and the growing nationalism in transitional Serbian society. Keywords: slava, the Serbian Orthodox Church, revitalisation of religion, nationalism. The Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) celebrates all Christian holidays ac- cording to the Julian calendar.1 However, what distinguishes it from all other Christian communities, even those belonging to the Orthodox tradition, is the slava or krsna slava celebration. Besides Christmas and Easter the slava is one of the most important celebrations in the life of every family. Its unique status was recognised internationally, in November 2014, when the slava celebration was included in UNESCO’s Lists of Intangible Cultural Heritage, thus becoming the first Serbian intangible cultural asset to be registered.2 1 I would like to thank Professor Mikko Lagerspetz for all the insightful and knowledgeable comments regarding different drafts of this article. 2 See <http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/RL/01010>, accessed May 20, 2015. © The Finnish Society for the Study of Religion Temenos Vol. 53 No. 1 (2017), 31–53 32 SABINA HADŽIBULIĆ In what follows I will first discussthe relationship between the SOC and the Serbian state, with a focus on recent history. I will then present some of the key features of the slava family celebration by analysing its structure and some of its distinctive elements. Finally, I will attempt to describe and analyse the slava’s transformation in the context of the revitalisation of re- ligion and the growing nationalism in Serbia during the transition crisis of the last decade of the 20th century and beyond. My discussion is based on the debate in media and literature, media reports of events, and my own personal experience and involvement in the last three decades. State, Church, and nation The Serbian Orthodox Church (Српска православна црква) became an autocephalous church in 1219, although the modern SOC was established later, in 1920. It claims to be the second oldest Slavic Orthodox Church in the world. During the 20th century the SOC passed through several differ- ent stages in its relations with the state (Vukomanović 2001, 101–4). In the Kingdom of Serbia (1882–1918) it had the privileged position of the official state religion (1903). All state and national holidays were accompanied by church rituals, while the church’s clergy had state salaries. Likewise, con- fessional religious education was a mandatory subject in all public schools. With the formation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918 the Serbian Patriarch became a member of the Royal Council and several priests became members of the National Assembly. During the Second World War the SOC lost a quarter of its clergy, and many churches and monasteries were destroyed. With the establishment of the new communist government and the subsequent agrarian reform in the immediate post-war years ‘the Church was deprived of its material basis, with no regular source of income, impoverished and, therefore, was dependent on state aid’ (Radić 1994, 352).3 Although the church has formally separated from the state, with no open conflict between them, the domi- nant public discourse treated religion as an undesirable phenomenon – a ‘bourgeois remnant’. The role of the SOC was marginalised and its presence reduced strictly to the private sphere. This coincided with the massive secu- larisation of the population of the dominantly Orthodox areas of Yugoslavia. According to the 1953 census the confessional (self-)identification of citizens was 85.2 per cent, while 12.4 per cent were atheists. Three decades later 3 It has been estimated that during the agrarian reform between 1945 and 1948 the state confiscated nearly 85 per cent of all land and properties owned by the SOC. THE Slava Celebration 33 almost half the population declared themselves atheist, whereas less than a quarter declared as religious (23.8 per cent), and about as many (22.8 per cent) as undefined (Djordjević 1984). The intense secularisation in homo- geneously Orthodox regions had largely been conditioned by the church’s de-monopolisation, as well as its continued centuries-old dependence on the state which had prevented it from creating an independent political identity (e. g. Paić 1991; Benc 1991; Radić 1995; Blagojević 1995; Vukomanović 2001). In retrospect its dependence on and constant symbiosis with the state was one of the SOC’s greatest weaknesses, but it has again resulted in a new modification of its status in the public sphere. The collapse of socialism in Central and Eastern European societies and ‘the overall instability […] of the 1990s and the late 1980s seems to have produced an experience of “value vacuum”’ (Lagerspetz 2004, 9) and ideological void. After the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the period of uncertainty intensified by the civil wars in the ex-Yugoslav states (1991– 1995), the question of religion in the public sphere resurfaced. Following decades of isolation the church again gained media visibility, and new churches and other religious buildings were constructed. Religious studies became popular again, as did both male and female monastic orders. A new wave of religious literature and journals began to be published (see, e. g., Radisavljević-Ćiparizović 2006: 37–8). The growing visibility of the church in public life was accompanied by a rapid and massive return of people to religion. Two extensive surveys on religiosity in Serbia (Blagojević 1995; Radisavljević-Ćiparizović 1999) both indicate a notable increase in religiosity at the beginning of the 90s (with 71 per cent of respondents confessionally self-identifying), followed by a slight decrease and stabilisation at the end of the decade (with 60 per cent of respondents reporting themselves as belonging to a confession). As Brubaker (1996, 2011) argues, all Yugoslav successor states demon- strated nationalising dynamics after the great reconfiguration which was a product of the ‘unfinished and ongoing nature of nationalist projects and nationalization processes. […] The reorganization of political space had produced (nominally) independent states; it had not produced ‘genuine’ nation-states [...]. From a nationalist point of view, the states were organiza- tional shells that had to be filled with national content, bringing population, territory, culture and polity into the close congruence that defines a fully realized nation-state’ (2011, 1786). In Serbia the period of ‘blocked trans- formation’ (Lazić 2005) from 1991 until 2000 was politically dominated by the goal of resolving the ‘Serbian question’, i. e. of creating a Serbian state 34 SABINA HADŽIBULIĆ comprising all ex-Yugoslav regions with Serbian settlements. Orthodoxy was recognised as a significant element of Serbian national identity (see, e. g., Perica 2002). The SOC became actively engaged in re-nationalisation and homogenisation by following a simple formula equating nation and religion, i. e. ethnic and confessional affiliation. This development was often publicly presented as a matter of the national culture’s survival: as the church is deeply rooted in the national ethos, the latter cannot survive without the former (Ramet 1988). As the then Serbian Patriarch Pavle stated, ‘To be a Serb means to be Orthodox by default. …[A] Serb cannot be an atheist. … [A] Serb is never not baptized’ (Srpski Patrijarh Pavle 2002). Despite the newly created more positive relationship, the status of the SOC vis-à-vis the state remained largely undefined because of President Slobodan Milosevic’s refusal to clearly determine his stance on the mat- ter. In the public discourse religion was treated as a significant element of ethnicity, but the church still lacked any official position. It was, indeed, at the beginning of a new millennium, and with the establishment of the first democratic government in October 2000, that a striking change took place. According to the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia (2006) the Republic of Serbia is a secular state, churches and religious communities are separate from the state, and there is no state or compulsory religion.4 Nevertheless, the transition in Serbia has been characterised by a newly established relationship between the young democratic state and the SOC, which can be said to involve the greater and more frequent participation of the church in the state and in political affairs, but can also be interpreted as the church’s effort to ‘provide a new ideological and value framework for the state institutions such as the school and the army’ (Vukomanović 2008, 105). This particularly refers to confessional religious education, (re-) established in all Serbian public schools in 2001, and also to the re-joining of the Orthodox Theological Faculty to the state-owned Belgrade University in 2010.