Analyse de CDA Institute CDA L'Institut l’Institut de la CAD Institute de la CAD Analysis ~ 1987 ~ NOVEMBER / NOVEMBRE 2015 THE CONFERENCE OF DEFENCE ASSOCIATIONS INSTITUTE L’INSTITUT DE LA CONFÉRENCE DES ASSOCIATIONS DE LA DÉFENSE CANADIAN NATIONAL STRATEGY AND THE ROLE OF EXECUTIVE EDUCATION David Last July | juillet 2016 ANALYSIS | ANALYSE JULY | JUILLET 2016 ussian hybrid warfare threatens the Ukraine. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is deep- Rening. NATO is divided about exercises to bolster the Baltic republics. Libya hasn’t stabilized since NATO bombing. More than a decade of investment in Iraq and Afghanistan looks unlikely to pay off with peace. American leadership in the Middle East seems to be faltering as Washington itself faces gridlock and domestic protest. Future American leadership is uncertain, with populist revolts undermining traditional political parties. Angry and fearful citizens voted to take Britain out of Europe, almost to their own surprise, and Scotland and Northern Ireland might not want to go. Canadians seem equally fascinated and appalled by turns. The Trudeau honeymoon is waning, and the Defence Policy Review is unlikely to produce anything approaching a consensus. “Where are the strategic lead- Who will speak to policy choices if military executives are unable to explain and debate in public? We are like rabbits in the headlights, scatter-brained squirrels, or ers and deep thinkers who will old dogs barely raising an ear to the din. Everything is new and shocking, paralyz- chart the course through the ing our actions, or everything is urgent and requires immediate response? Or it is all the same old story, and nothing new is needed? Where are the strategic leaders apparently new and dramatic and deep thinkers who will chart the course through the apparently new and dra- changes in our security en- matic changes in our security environment? Who will clarify policy choices and their consequences? Two recent contributions to the CDA Institute Analysis se- vironment? Who will clarify ries from veteran campaigners provide a framework for coherent national strategy policy choices and their conse- and a warning about the pitfalls of past reviews.1 These are good starting points for thought, but won’t produce a substantive debate based on knowledge to which many quences?” are not privy. In this brief I will discuss the concept of professional executives, security education, and national strategy, concluding with a call for the executive equivalent of academic freedom. Ca- nadian Generals and Deputy Ministers don’t write much in public. Political leaders and the policy establishment would benefit from more debate in the open. Let the security executives speak with their own voices and knowledge, so Canadians understand our options. Executives who commu- nicate effectively to the public will help to build a policy consensus that serves social cohesion, hu- man, national, and international security. Political leadership can set the boundaries of that debate. Security and Military Executives Defence departments and military forces don’t have a monopoly on security issues, but defence policy tends inappropriately to monopolize discussions of security. This is true even in Canada, where defence is traditionally not a senior ministry. Canada doesn’t appreciate big personalities in its Generals. John de Chastelaine was a throwback to an earlier era. Rick Hillier and Walt Natync- CDA INSTITUTE 1 INSTITUT DE LA CAD ANALYSIS | ANALYSE JULY | JUILLET 2016 zyk were socialized by their American experience, and are liked or disliked for it. The Canadian norm is less colourful. Who remembers the yeoman service of John Anderson, Maurice Baril, or Ray Henault? This should make it easier for civilian executives to contribute to the security and strategy debate in Canada. Military and civilian executives have different expertise. From the trenches of the middling but experienced military staff, prompted by the push of professionalism and the pull of intermittent senior leader interest, we have endlessly studied leadership, its demands, and its requirements. The interest from senior leaders has been intermittent because the demands on them have been relent- less and often well beyond the scope of their preparation for the positions in which they find them- selves. Interviews with senior officers suggest that they have often felt unprepared for their roles in senior management.2 Civilian executives can sympathize on matters of strategy and security, but may be ahead of Generals on finance and management, so they should be part of the same con- versation on security, and together might draw from a deeper well of professional and leadership knowledge that is both civil and military. In common with military forces around the world, Canada’s officers are part of an inverted profes- sion. They begin as specialists – Army, Navy, or Air Force, operators, logisticians, communicators, and others. As they progress through their professional mid-career and senior officer education, they learn to integrate those specialties and eventually, as effective generalists, they become Gener- als or Admirals. Are they up to the task of guiding the institution, developing coherent strategy, and advising political leaders? Can they integrate the prudence and wisdom needed to achieve human, national, and international security in chaotic and changing times? Society needs them to test their intellectual depth and agility in a wider marketplace of ideas as they rise to positions of leadership. Security professionals in any country are part of a system of competing professions making plau- sible claims to contribute to security: international security through expeditions, national security through police and public safety, or human security through health and welfare. With the shadows of big wars in our collective memory, military education gives inadequate attention to integrating non-military dimensions of security. By making a strong case to militarize problems, we sometimes apply inappropriate instruments. The separation of military and non-military expertise, and the competition between professional groups representing different interests are an inevitable conse- quence of social organization,3 but also reflects fragmented departmental mandates. Even without conflating ministry mandates, accessible forums for debate can help to make professional competi- tion more useful to society. CDA INSTITUTE 2 INSTITUT DE LA CAD ANALYSIS | ANALYSE JULY | JUILLET 2016 Professional Education The military culture of continuous education and professional development is envied by some civil servants who must struggle to find time for courses, like the ones Colonels and Generals are re- quired to undertake. By some accounts, the introduction of higher education and broader thinking has been forced on an anti-intellectual institution,4 and others see the transformation as incomplete and fragile.5 But all accounts agree that the process of developing strategic leaders has been regular- ly re-examined in Canada. Reports by Rowley (1969), Davis (1974), Evraire (1988), Morton (1995), and reforms instituted by Hillier (2007) have been revisited by military leadership “Civilians responsible for any at each step.6 The latest round began with reports by Major General Mike Jeffery dimension of security...could (2008) and by Jeffery and Sutherland (2010), followed by the Giguere report (2014) on Project Strategic Leader.7 The focus of these reports was development of military benefit from military execu- executives, but the problems Generals and Admirals confront require a whole-of- tive education, and military society understanding, and a whole-of-government response. Civilians responsible for any dimension of security – human, national, or international – could benefit executive education would from military executive education, and military executive education would benefit benefit from their inclusion, to from their inclusion, to dilute the focus on defence and expand the understanding of security. dilute the focus on defence and expand the understanding of Trained incapacity is a theme running through social and professional transforma- tion, and it is familiar to military leaders. The more you know about how to do security.” something, the harder it is to learn a new way to do it.8 The adage that Generals prepare to fight the last war, and the content of professional military education, are both surprisingly consistent around the world, even as most states face changing circumstances and new challenges. Could this be related to the failure of security professionals to produce security? Are military educators getting it half right, or more than half wrong? Military executives may suffer from trained incapacity to address new security challenges. The data below (Table 1) reflect a sample of significant mid-sized countries in each region. They illustrate mid-career professional education focused on the technical business of conducting military op- erations. We know a great deal about conducting military operations, and invest a great deal in transferring that knowledge to successive generations of military leaders, who arrive at senior lev- els competent in the arts of war, but less confident in the pursuit of security. Staff colleges in most countries in the world are consistent in their content and focus, delivering what any Canadian staff college graduate would recognize as a professional body of military knowledge. But there is also a demonstrable shortfall