Foreign Policy at BROOKINGS THE TREATY ON INTERMEDIATE- RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES: History and Lessons Learned Avis Bohlen William Burns Steven Pifer John Woodworth Arms Control Series Paper 9 • December 2012 Foreign Policy at BROOKINGS THE TREATY ON INTERMEDIATE- RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES: History and Lessons Learned Avis Bohlen William Burns Steven Pifer John Woodworth Arms Control Series Paper 9 • December 2012 Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank Roger Harrison, David Jones, Michael O’Hanlon, Leo Reddy, Greg Thielmann, Tim Tulenko, and Jen- onne Walker for taking the time to review a draft of this paper and for their very useful reactions and comments. Of course, the contents and conclu- sions are those of the authors. The authors appreciate Gail Chalef’s and Tina Trenkner’s assistance in the paper’s editing and production. Finally, the Brookings Arms Control Initia- tive is grateful to the Ploughshares Fund and Carnegie Corporation of New York for their generous support for this paper and for other activities of the Arms Control Initiative. Brookings recognizes that the value it provides to any supporter is in its absolute commitment to quality, independence, and impact. Activities supported by its donors reflect this commitment, and the analysis and recommendations of the Institution’s scholars are not determined by any donation. Foreign Policy at Brookings • A r m s C o n t ro l s e r i e s tHe TREAtY ON INTERMEDiATE-rAnGe nUCLEAr FORCES: H i sto rY A n D l e s s o n s l e A r n e D iii Table of Contents Acknowledgments ...........................................................iii 1. Introduction and Executive Summary .........................................1 2. History of the INF Negotiations .............................................6 3. Factors That Led to a Successful Negotiation .................................14 4. INF Treaty Developments after 1991 .........................................21 5. Lessons for Future Arms Control............................................25 Endnotes...................................................................31 About the Authors............................................................... 32 Foreign Policy at Brookings • A r m s C o n t ro l s e r i e s tHe TREAtY ON INTERMEDiATE-rAnGe nUCLEAr FORCES: H i sto rY A n D l e s s o n s l e A r n e D iv 1. Introduction and Executive Summary INTRODUCTION cut strategic nuclear arms further without address- ing the question of non-strategic nuclear weapons. On December 8, 1987, President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev signed This paper reviews the history of the INF negotia- the most dramatic nuclear arms reduction treaty of tions and recaps the main provisions of the 1987 the Cold War. The Treaty between the United States treaty. It then describes the factors that led to a suc- of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub- cessful negotiation, including why a treaty became lics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range possible in 1985-1987 that was not doable in 1981- and Shorter-Range Missiles—referred to as the In- 1983, and discusses developments regarding the termediate-Range Nuclear Forces (or INF) Treaty— treaty since 1991. It concludes with a discussion of resulted in the elimination of all U.S. and Soviet lessons from the INF negotiation that might be ap- ground-launched missiles with ranges between 500 plied in future U.S.-Russian, or other nuclear arms and 5,500 kilometers. The treaty entered into force reduction, efforts. on June 1, 1988 and, by the end of its elimination THE INF TREATY period three years later, 2,692 U.S. and Soviet mis- siles had been destroyed. The INF Treaty proved a milestone in the changing The INF Treaty gave a boost to nuclear arms con- relationship between Washington and Moscow dur- trol in general, although reducing strategic weapons ing the 1980s. Reagan took office in 1981, at a time took longer and proved more of a challenge. Two- of considerable concern about the ongoing Soviet and-a-half years later, President George H.W. Bush military expansion, including a growing advantage joined with Gorbachev to sign the Strategic Arms in INF missile systems with the deployment of the Reductions Treaty (START I)—the first U.S.-Soviet new, multi-warhead SS-20 ballistic missile. NATO agreement to reduce, rather than merely limit, the had decided in 1979 to respond to the SS-20 by two superpowers’ strategic nuclear weapons systems. deploying new U.S. INF missiles—the Pershing II ballistic missile and ground-launched cruise missile Several factors combined in the 1980s to make the (GLCM)—to gain leverage in negotiating lower lev- INF Treaty possible. Today, 25 years later, are there els of Soviet INF or to address a perceived gap in lessons that can be drawn from the INF experience the nuclear escalatory ladder if an agreement was not that could be useful in further reducing nuclear possible. Negotiations began in late 1981. Deploy- weapons? In particular, many analysts—and many ment plans and preparations proceeded in parallel in the U.S. Senate, which must consent to ratifica- with preparations for and conduct of the arms con- tion of any new arms control treaty—believe that the trol negotiations. point has been reached where it will be difficult to Foreign Policy at Brookings • A r m s C o n t ro l s e r i e s tHe TREAtY ON INTERMEDiATE-rAnGe nUCLEAr FORCES: H i sto rY A n D l e s s o n s l e A r n e D 1 At the end of 1983, following two years of dismal moving too slowly, and, given his interest in reform- talks, the sides remained far apart, and the Soviets ing the Soviet system, he sought an improved inter- broke off negotiations following the arrival of the national environment, and INF benefited from that. first GLCMs and Pershing IIs in Europe. Most ana- lysts concluded that Moscow had little interest in NATO Solidarity: In order to achieve success at the finding a solution in this first phase of negotiations negotiating table, NATO had to make clear its com- but believed that the Soviets instead hoped that pub- mitment to deploy U.S. INF missiles. That required lic opposition in the five European basing countries particular political courage on the part of the five would derail the U.S. missile deployments. They European allies who had agreed to host the missiles, miscalculated; deployments proceeded. especially given the strong anti-nuclear movements in those countries. Pursuit of an arms control so- Negotiations resumed in 1985. Gorbachev had tak- lution and close consultations between the United en the helm in Moscow and questioned the rationale States and its NATO partners proved key to sus- for devoting so many resources to the military, given taining this resolve. A multilevel process of Alliance the Soviet economy’s dire situation. For his part, in consultations continued over the course of the nego- his second term, Reagan showed a greater interest in tiations. As a result, the positions the United States concluding serious arms reductions. Over the next took into the negotiations were very much a collab- two years, U.S. and Soviet negotiators moved past orative product. old roadblocks, found increasing common ground, and by the end of 1987 agreed on terms for the elim- Reconciling Security Interests and Resolving Trea- ination of all their INF missiles. ty Issues: The outcome of the INF negotiations can- not be understood without accounting for the ways Twenty-five years later, the INF Treaty stands as a in which the security interests of both sides were milestone in nuclear arms control. Not only did it ultimately satisfied. The United States and NATO eliminate an entire class of nuclear missiles, it did sought the zero-zero outcome—the elimination of so relatively quickly, in just three years. The treaty, all INF missiles on both sides—but were prepared moreover, applied the most innovative and intrusive to accept a limited number, provided it was equal verification measures that any arms control agree- for both sides. Once it became clear that NATO was ment to that point had seen. proceeding with its own INF missile deployment, the Soviets faced compelling choices. One by one, FACTORS BEHIND THE NEGOTIATIONS’ they chose to drop their demands, ultimately con- SUCCESS cluding that they would rather sacrifice all their INF missiles than face the deployment of Pershing IIs The successful outcome of the INF negotiations was and GLCMs in Europe and have to sanction them hardly a foregone conclusion; indeed, the arms con- in a treaty. trol picture looked particularly bleak in November 1983 following Moscow’s decision to break off both The Place of Strategic Insurance: The panoply of the INF and START negotiations. But negotiations U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear arms inevitably resumed in 1985 and ultimately yielded success. Six loomed over the INF talks. In the end, the Soviets core issues explain why the negotiations eventually could accept elimination of their large force of INF succeeded. missiles in the belief that, if their strategic power could deter the United States, it could equally coun- The Impact of Political Change: The outcome of terbalance the United Kingdom, France, and China. the INF talks cannot be understood in isolation from The U.S. calculation was more complicated because the political circumstances that surrounded the ne- of the need to preserve the credibility of the U.S. ex- gotiations. In this context, Gorbachev played a very tended nuclear guarantee for its allies. It seems clear important role. He criticized Soviet diplomacy for that U.S. and Soviet strategic arms—the strategic Foreign Policy at Brookings • A r m s C o n t ro l s e r i e s tHe TREAtY ON INTERMEDiATE-rAnGe nUCLEAr FORCES: H i sto rY A n D l e s s o n s l e A r n e D 2 insurance—allowed both a freer hand to make the would work, given regional differences.