Excerpts from Documents on Neutrality vs Involvement Working in groups as large as 5, read these excerpts of documents from the years leading up to the declaration of war by the United States; for each of the excerpts pull out specific phrases that best capture the message (think of both the stated messages as well as unstated messages) of the piece. Use these to create a time line of events leading up to the outbreak of WW2 1. Statement by the Secretary of State, January 7, 1932: (Japanese Invasion of Manchuria) _______________________________________________________________________________ … In view of the present situation and of its own rights and obligations therein, the American Government deems it to be its duty to notify both the Imperial Japanese Government and the Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot admit the legality of any situation de facto nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those Governments, or agents thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the open door policy; and that it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris [the Kellogg-Briand Pact] of August 27, 1928, to which Treaty both China and Japan, as well as the United States, are parties. 2. The Consul General at Berlin (Messersmith) to the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) November 23, 1933 (Germany withdraws from disarmament talks) _______________________________________________________________________________ “In spite of the way in which the feelings of the German people have been whipped up by this new Government I do not believe that the majority of the German people yet desire war, but there is certainly no great desire for peace. Everything that is being done in the country to-day has for its object to make the people believe that Germany is threatened vitally in every aspect of its life by outside influences and by other countries. Everything is being done to use this feeling to stimulate military training and exercises, and innumerable measures are being taken to develop the German people into a hardy, sturdy race which will be able to meet all comers. The military spirit is constantly growing. It cannot be otherwise. The leaders of Germany to-day have no desire for peace unless it is a peace which the world makes at the expense of complete compliance with German desires and ambitions. Hitler and his associates really and sincerely want peace for the moment, but only to have a chance to get ready to use force if it is found finally essential. They are preparing their way so carefully that these is not in my mind any question but that the German people will be with them when they want to use force and when they feel that they have the necessary means to carry through their objects. 3. Address by President Roosevelt at Arlington Cemetery November 11, 1935 (Hitler no longer agrees to follow guidelines of Treaty of Versailles) _______________________________________________________________________________ “The primary purpose of this Nation is to avoid being drawn into war. It seeks also in every practicable way to promote peace and to discourage war.... “I would not be frank with you if I did not tell you that the dangers that confront the future of mankind as a whole are greater to the world and therefore to us than the dangers which confront the people of the United States by and in themselves alone. “Jealousies between nations continue; armaments increase; national ambitions that disturb the world's peace are thrust forward. Most serious of all, international confidence in the sacredness of international contracts is on the wane. “While, therefore, we cannot and must not hide our concern for grave world dangers, and while, at the same time, we cannot build walls around ourselves and hide our heads in the sand, we must go forward with all our strength to stress and to strive for international peace. “ “In this effort America must and will protect herself. Under no circumstances will this policy of self-protection go to lengths beyond self-protection. Aggression on the part of the United States is an impossibility insofar as the present administration of your Government is concerned. Defense against aggression by others—adequate defense on land, on sea, and in air—is our accepted policy; and the measure of that defense is and will be solely the amount necessary to safeguard us against the armaments of others. The more greatly they decrease their armaments, the more quickly and surely shall we decrease ours.” 4. The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State January 27, 1936 _______________________________________________________________________________ “The ability of a dictator to devote practically the entire resources of his country to armament cannot be matched by democratic countries in times of peace. Rightly or wrongly, the idea is becoming prevalent that German rearmament on this scale and in this tempo can be designed only for the purposes of aggression. I believe that in making this statement I am reflecting the profound conviction of most of the statesmen on this Continent. “It seems to be generally believed that there will be no German aggression towards the west. Germany will presumably make every effort not to give Great Britain apprehension as to the Low Countries. Her present policy is predicated on not giving offense to Great Britain. Many French themselves appear to believe that they need fear no attack on their eastern frontier or through Belgium and Holland. If Germany does contemplate aggression, it is generally expected that it will be to the east or down the Danube. “I have gone into this speculation, Mr. Secretary, with no desire to be alarming but because it is a reflection of the type of thought that is occupying the minds of those on the Council. It is the type of thought that has led to a feeling of apprehension which has brought about the conviction that only by an agreement with Germany, both of a political nature and for the limitation of armaments, can a cataclysm be avoided. It is a time in which wisdom and statesmanship are needed on this Continent as never since the end of the War.” 5. Address Delivered by President Roosevelt at Chautauqua New York, August 14, 1936 (Germany reoccupies the Rhineland) _______________________________________________________________________________ “We shun political commitments which might entangle us in foreign wars; we avoid connection with the political activities of the League of Nations.... “We are not isolationists except insofar as we seek to isolate ourselves completely from war. Yet we must remember that so long as war exists on earth there will be some danger that even the nation which most ardently desires peace may be drawn into war. “I have seen war. I have seen war on land and sea. I have seen blood running from the wounded. I have seen men coughing out their gassed lungs. I have seen the dead in the mud. I have seen cities destroyed. I have seen 200 limping, exhausted men come out of line—the survivors of a regiment of 1,000 that went forward 48 hours before. I have seen children starving. I have seen the agony of mothers and wives. I hate war. 6. The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State, December 4, 1936: (Japan signs agreement with Germany and Italy to resist Communism and provide aide to each other) _______________________________________________________________________________ The adverse reaction both abroad and in Japan to the recent agreement with Germany seems to have surprised the Japanese Foreign Office, which is trying in every way to minimize the effect by denying categorically the existence of an understanding in regard to military matters or participation in a Fascist bloc… It appears that there is a feeling that the agreement has engendered an unfortunate suspicion that relations with the United States and Great Britain have thereby been weakened and that Japan should strengthen rather than weaken her relations with those countries.... … the agreement is a kind of police measure providing for a standing commission in Berlin in which an official from the Japanese Home Office will represent Japan. There will be an exchange of information and the Japanese Government will proceed only against Japanese abroad or at home who may engage in communistic propaganda or activities Foreign diplomatic representatives in Tokyo in general are of the opinion, nevertheless, that the Japanese and German General Staffs have concluded a secret military understanding.. The British Ambassador feels certain that a secret military agreement exists and he is of the opinion that, as one item of the alleged agreement… The Soviet Ambassador is convinced that while the agreement as published is merely a facade to hide a secret agreement for joint action in the event of war with the Soviet Union, this alleged secret agreement is nevertheless aimed also at Great Britain and he insists that an agreement or understanding exists for the division between Germany and Japan in case of war of certain British possessions overseas as well as the Dutch East Indies. The Soviet Ambassador considers the alleged secret pact as part and parcel of Germany's need for colonies and of Japan's southern expansion program. These ideas, although they may be far-fetched, are in accord with the perhaps not unreasonable suspicion of Japanese intentions and activities usually held by the Soviet Ambassador, who has informed the American Ambassador that the Soviet Government has indisputable evidence that a military agreement exists 7.