UNCOUPLED How our Singles are Reshaping Jewish Engagement STEVEN M. COHEN and ARI Y. KELMAN The Jewish Identity Project of Reboot Andrea and Charles Bronfman Philanthropies UNCOUPLED How our Singles are Reshaping Jewish Engagement STEVEN M. COHEN, Hebrew Union College – Jewish Institute of Religion and ARI Y. KELMAN, University of California at Davis The Jewish Identity Project of Reboot Andrea and Charles Bronfman Philanthropies www.acbp.net This report is the third in a series of studies. For more information, please visit www.acbp.net/About/publications.php and be in touch with any feedback at [email protected]. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS We gratefully acknowledge friends and colleagues whose insights have contributed to this study. Reports like this one experience several iterations as ideas, information and style evolve; and with each pair of eyes and set of comments, the final project improves. For their generosity, support and critical perspectives, we want to thank Marion Blumenthal, Sharna Goldseker, Joel Perlmann, Rich Polt, Jeffrey Solomon, Dana Ferine, and, in particular, Roger Bennett. All provided detailed and valuable feedback on prior versions of this study. We also thank Marco and Anne Cibola of Nove Studio for their design work. 3 OVERVIEW At first glance, most young adult, non- they are unconnected to organized Jewry – Orthodox Jews in America seem rather and the two phenomena are related. unengaged in Jewish life. This seems espe- As compared with the in-married (Jews cially true of single Jews between the ages married to other Jews), single Jews score of 25 and 39. Few of them join synagogues or sharply lower on measures of communal JCCs, even fewer contribute to Jewish feder- affiliation and ritual observance. Many ation campaigns, and with the exception of single, non-Orthodox Jews are indeed both attending Passover Seders or High Holiday unaffiliated and non-observant. Never- services, not many young adults outside of theless, single Jews match married Jews Orthodoxy practice Jewish rituals. in several other critical measurements of What exactly do these patterns mean? Jewishness. As many as 67% of these non- Do they mean a total disengagement of Orthodox singles agree, “I am proud to be a Jews under 40 from all things Jewish and Jew,” slightly surpassing the 66% of in-married from other Jews? Are we, in fact, seeing the Jews who agree. More broadly, single Jews emergence of a “lost generation” of American express Jewish pride in many different ways, Jews? Is this generation destined to remain they are widely and deeply connected to Jew- totally uninterested, unengaged and un- ish friends, and they express keen interest in coupled from Judaism and Jewishness? self-directed ways of expressing and explor- In exploring these questions, our ing their Jewish identities. analysis of recently collected national Like their married counterparts, survey data finds some rather surprising single Jews share similar interests in answers. We start with the critical obser- connecting Jewishly, but they shy away vation that at least half of non-Orthodox, from available Jewish institutions in part American Jews aged 25-39 are single, because congregations, JCCs and federa- primarily because Americans are getting tions remain geared to the conventional married much later than in the past. In fact, family unit. Therefore, lack of visible in- never in Jews’ demographic history have we volvement in Jewish life by single young seen so many young adults unmarried, or adults ought not to be construed as distanc- “uncoupled.” And they are uncoupled in two ing from being Jewish. Their relatively low senses of the term: they are unmarried, and levels of measurable Jewish behavior have 4 more to do with the available options for ex- pressing engagement than with the putative absence of interest in things Jewish. Given the high level of Jewish inter- est and low rate of communal and ritual involvement among young adult, single Jews, this uncoupled population represents the greatest opportunity and the greatest risk to Judaism in the United States. Single Jews are akin to “swing voters” – they can go either way. How they “vote,” how they make Jewish (or non-Jewish) choices, will determine the future of Jews, Judaism and Jewishness in the United States. 5 ozens of Jewish population stud- To gain some perspective on this ies point to the same disturbing question, we can turn to other American phenomenon: non-Orthodox religious groups, as Jews are by no means Jews under the age of 40 report alone in exhibiting diminished engage- notably lower rates of affiliation ment in religious life. Overall, religious Dand participation in Jewish institutional involvement in the United States has been life than have their counterparts in the in a period of decline. Robert Wuthnow, past. Compared to their elders and prede- a leading sociologist of American religion, cessors, fewer younger Jews adhere to the recently observed: classical benchmarks that define Judaism in the eyes of their parents and grandparents: The future of American religion belonging to synagogues, attending services, is in doubt.… Younger adults or identifying with a major denomination are already less actively involved (particularly Conservatism). Fewer younger in their congregations than Jews belong to Jewish organizations (or are older adults are. Not only this, even familiar with them), donate to Jew- younger adults are currently less ish federations or profess to care about involved than younger adults Israel. In addition, as compared with their were a generation ago. The de- elders, younger Jews report fewer Jewish mographics behind this declin- spouses, fewer Jewish friends and fewer Jewish ing involvement also do not bode neighbors. What might explain these signs well for the future. (2007: 17) of withdrawal from Jewish life, and what might they mean? Do they in fact signal Other relevant evidence comes from an across-the-board disinclination to the most recently published major study of engage with Jews and Judaism? Or alterna- American Catholics. The authors conclude tively, do they amount simply to resistance that today’s Catholics “are not as attached to selective, traditional forms of Jewish to the Church as previous generations have engagement, the kind that are more appro- been” (D’Antonio et al. 2007: 148). priate for and popular with middle-aged From still another quarter we learn people with children? of the worsening image of Christianity in 6 America. Drawing upon years of national young outsiders, [but] this group is at least survey data, David Kinnaman, a commit- three times larger than it was just a decade ted Evangelical Protestant analyst, reports ago” (2007: 24). on young adult “outsiders” to born-again What explains younger American Christianity (outsiders are members of adults’ declining participation in con- other faiths or former adherents of Christian ventional religious life? Wuthnow (2007) religious groups). He concludes that outsiders attributes much of the decline to the later have grown more antagonistic to Christianity, age at marriage and child-bearing. Married amounting to “a growing tide of hostil- couples with children comprise the hard- ity and resentment toward Christianity” core demographic base of church-goers and (2007: 24). Although Christianity enjoyed church-members. The shrinking number considerable popularity in the mid 1990s, of married couples in the young adult years “[n]ow, a decade later… our most recent translates directly into lower levels of par- data show that young outsiders have lost much ticipation in church life. of their respect for the Christian faith.… Jews are also experiencing similar Hard-core critics represent a minority of demographic trends. In 1990, just 33% Growth in singles and decline in in-married between 1990 and 2000, for non-Orthodox Jews, 25-39 and 40-54. 24% 32% 33% 50% 26% 35% 25-39 in 1990 25-39 in 2000 singles in-married inter-married 26% 23% 25% 36% 51% 38% 40-54 in 1990 40-54 in 2000 7 of non-Orthodox Jews aged 25-39 were levels of religious and ethnic engagement. single. By 2000-01, the comparable num- Fewer young adult Jews with children ber had grown to 50%. Those aged 40-54 mean that fewer young adult Jews have experienced a similar shift from 23% immediate reasons to join synagogues, single in 1990 to 36% in 2000-01. In all JCCs and other institutions that provide likelihood, the proportion of single young child-oriented services. The post-war Baby adults has continued to grow since 2000- Boom not only fueled the growth and 01. For adult Jews under 40, singlehood is expansion of these institutions, it heavily now not at all the isolated exception or the influenced their organizational cultures. socially deviant status, but the general rule, Given the shift toward extended single- if not the socially acceptable norm. hood, Jews are facing a disjuncture between As a corollary of later marriage and child-oriented institutions and a heavily increased non-marriage, or what we may call childless younger Jewish population. The “extended singlehood,” far fewer young adults very perception that these institutions are have had children, and when they do have child-oriented undoubtedly contributes to children, they have them later in life than the alienation felt by childless young adults. did their parents and older siblings. In 1990, This new, longer-lasting period of among non-Orthodox Jews aged 25-39, 48% extended adult singlehood constitutes a gen- reported living in households with children; uinely novel development. In the course of by 2000, the comparable figure had dropped modern Jewish demographic history, never to 34%. Those aged 40-54 experienced the have so many adults spent so much time same slide, albeit less precipitous, from 46% with so few children of their own. For years in 1990 to 42% in 2000.