City University of New York (CUNY) CUNY Academic Works All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects 9-2017 The Impact of State-Promoted Participation in Democracy and Development: A Comparison of Venezuela and Mexico Domenico Romero The Graduate Center, City University of New York How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/2328 Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: [email protected] The Impact of State-Promoted Participation in Democracy and Development: A Comparison of Venezuela and Mexico By Domenico Romero A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York 2017 © 2017 Domenico Romero All Rights Reserved ii This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Kenneth P. Erickson _________________ _______________________________________ Date Chair of the Examining Committee Alyson Cole _________________ _______________________________________ Date Executive Officer Frances Fox Piven Mark Ungar Supervisory Committee THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK iii Abstract The Impact of State-Promoted Participation in Democracy and Development: A Comparison of Venezuela and Mexico by Domenico Romero Adviser: Professor Kenneth P. Erickson During the past two decades participatory democracy policies came to be seen as a useful alternative to address high inequality and lack of meaningful political representation allowed by clientelist politics in various parts of the world. This project explores the question: what is the impact that state-promoted participation has on democracy and development, the two key areas that political reformers in Latin America attempted to improve at the turn of the millennium? The hypotheses that this project proposes in response to that question are that participatory policies do not underperform neoliberal policies on macroeconomic or human development; that state-promoted participation strengthens social capital and clientelism hinders it; and that state- promoted participation strengthens democratic values and clientelism hinders them. The macroeconomic and human development hypothesis is self-explanatory. However, the introduction of the concept of social capital is required here as part of the causal mechanism that explains the impact that clientelism and participatory policies have on democracy. This study uses two cases that represent both ends of the political and economic policy spectrums: neoliberal Mexico under the PAN governments of 2000–2012, which broke a 70-year monopoly of the PRI, and participatory democracy in socialist Venezuela, where Hugo Chávez’s 1998 election broke the 40-year political monopoly of two centrist and elitist parties. The new political beginnings in these countries resulted in similar achievements in economic and human development, and in divergent and complex trajectories in terms of clientelism and participation. iv Acknowledgements I am deeply thankful to my mentor and advisor Professor Kenneth P. Erickson, for his patient and insightful guidance throughout this project: I could have not hoped for a wiser and more supportive ally during this enormous task. I would also like to thank the other members of my committee, Frances Fox Piven and Mark Ungar, who provided me with key feedback that expanded my perspective on the topic of this study. I am grateful to Professor Tom Weiss, who inspired and guided me since my early days in the doctoral program. Thanks also to Professor Vincent Boudreau for serving in my proposal committee, and for his insight in early versions of this dissertation. My gratitude goes also to Professor Susan Woodward, who through her dissertation workshop helped me greatly to focus my ideas for this endeavor. I would like to express special gratitude to all the people in Mexico and Venezuela who kindly accepted to be interviewed for this study. The views and experiences they shared with me made possible to a large extent any nuance and complexity achieved here in the analysis of the cases. Estoy profundamente agradecido con mi hermano Omar porque su compañía siempre ha inspirado retos por lograr y apoyo para lograrlos. Gracias a mi padre Antonio, por la curiosidad por aprender. El agradecimiento infinito a mi madre Bibiana, quien siempre ha sido roca de apoyo e inspiración de que es posible lograr cualquier cosa. Gracias a Laine, mi compañera de vida, de baile, de sueños, de lucha. Gracias a mis hijas Naila y Lucía, que inspiran un mundo mejor. v Contents List of Tables vii List of Figures x 1. Introduction: Participatory Democracy and Social Capital as Means to 1 Dismantle Clientelism 1.1. Literature review 6 1.2. Research design 32 2. Historical Context: Mexico and Venezuela before the 2000 and 1998 44 Political Transitions 2.1 Mexico’s Perfect Dictatorship: The PRI’s Clientelist System, Popular 46 Dissatisfaction and the Road to Electoral Democracy 2.2 Venezuela’s Partidocracia: The Punto Fijo Pact’s Clientelist System, 76 Popular Dissatisfaction, and the Road to Deepening Democracy 3. The Governments that Emerged from the Political Transitions in Mexico 111 2000 and Venezuela 1999 3.1 Mexico: The PAN administrations of 2000 – 2012 112 3.2 Venezuela: The Hugo Chávez Era 1999-2013 161 4. How Do Different Policy Approaches Affect Human Development? 240 Converging Results from Mexico and Venezuela 4.1 Human Development Improvements with Clientelist Continuity in 241 Mexico 2000 – 2012. 4.2 Human Development Improvements with Government-promoted 264 Participation in Venezuela 1999-2013. 5. How Do Different Policy Approaches Affect Social Capital and Democratic 290 Support? Diverging Results from Mexico and Venezuela 6. Conclusions: Neoliberal and Participatory Experiences Compared 341 7. Epilogue: Venezuela After Chávez 355 8. Bibliography 377 vi List of Tables 1.1 Contrasting principles for allocating public resources: Discretionary, 11 formula-based or demand-driven. 1.2 Theoretical Model, Part 1: Impact of Program Participation in Social Capital 37 and Democratic Values. 1.3 Theoretical Model, Part 2: Impact of Clientelism in Social Capital and 38 Democratic Values. 3.1.1. Assessment of President Fox’s character related qualities, 2000–2003. 116 3.1.2 Assessment of President Fox’s leadership related qualities, 2000–2005. 117 3.1.3 Oportunidades’ Citizen Attention program: Trends in ‘citizen demand’ 153 4.1.1 Mexico: GDP Percent Growth, 2000-2013 242 4.1.2 Mexico: GDP Percent Growth, 1961-2012 243 4.1.3 Mexico: Unemployment, 1991-2013 245 4.1.4 Mexico: Under-employment, seasonally adjusted, 2005-2015 247 4.1.5 Mexico: Remittances Inflows as percent of GDP, 1980-2011 249 4.1.6 Mexico: Remittances from Abroad, 1995-2014 (Quarterly, Seasonally 250 Adjusted) 4.1.7 Mexico: Gini Coefficient compared to other countries, 1989-2013 253 4.1.8 Mexico and select Latin American countries: HDI Evolution, 2000-2013 260 4.1.9 Mexico: Percent Change in Human Development Indexes, 2000-2013 261 4.1.10 Mexico: Evolution in Human Development Indexes, 2000-2013 262 4.2.1 Venezuela: GDP, GDP Growth, Oil Rents, and External Debt, 1960-2014 268 4.2.2 Venezuela and select countries: GDP Growth (annual %) 2006-2013 269 4.2.3 Venezuela: Real Sector Growth 2000-2012. Real Percent Change, Year on 271 Year 4.2.4 Venezuela: Poverty, Extreme Poverty, and Inequality 1997-2011 277 vii 4.2.5 Venezuela and other Latin America: HDI Evolution 1980-2012 282 4.2.6 Venezuela and other Latin America: Average Annual HDI Increase, 1980- 283 2013 5.1 Theoretical Model, Part 1: Impact of State-Promoted Participation on Social 293 Capital and Democratic Values 5.2 Theoretical Model, Part 2: Impact of Clientelism on Social Capital and 294 Democratic Values 5.1.1 Mexico and Venezuela: Generalized trust and distrust (%), 1996-2011 299 5.1.2 Venezuela: Intentional Homicides, Economic Concerns, and Concern about 303 Crime, 2000-2011 5.1.3 Mexico and Venezuela: Trust in government (%), 1995-2011 305 5.1.4 Mexico and Venezuela: “Belongs to and actively participates in…” (%), 307 2007 5.1.5 Mexico and Venezuela: What does it take to be a good citizen (%), 2007- 308 2011 5.1.6 Mexico and Venezuela: Country for everyone or just for the powerful (%), 311 2004-2011 5.1.7 Mexico and Venezuela: Democracy’s most essential characteristic (%), 2013 312 5.2.1 Mexico and Venezuela: Most effective ways to change things (%), 2006- 317 2009 5.2.2 Latin America: Most effective ways to change things (%), 2006-2009 318 5.2.3 Mexico and Venezuela: Support for Democracy (%), 1995-2011. 321 5.2.4 Latin America. Support for Democracy: Democracy is preferable to any 323 other form of government (%), 2000 and 2011 5.2.5 Latin America. Support for democracy: To people like me, it is the same if 324 the regime is a democratic one or not (%), 2000 and 2011 5.2.6 Mexico and Venezuela: Satisfaction with Democracy (%), 1995-2011 326 5.2.7 Mexico and Venezuela: Democracy may have issues but is the best system of 329 government (%), 2002-2013 5.2.8 Mexico and Venezuela: Development of Democracy scale (%), 1997-2011 332 viii 5.2.9 Mexico and Venezuela: Where would you place our country ten years ago? 335 (1 to 10 scale, from absolutely democratic to not democratic), 2013 5.2.10 Latin America: Where would you place our country ten years ago? (1 to 10 336 scale, from absolutely democratic to not democratic), 2013 5.2.11 In case of difficulties: President should not be limited by what the law says, 337 Very/In agreement (%), 2002-2008 5.2.12 In case of difficulties: President should bring order through the use of force, 338 Very/In agreement (%), 2002-2008 7.1 Venezuela: Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of 366 population), 1997-2015 7.2 Venezuela and other Latin America: HDI Evolution 2000-2014 367 7.3 Mexico and Venezuela.