ISSUE BRIEF No. 4554 | APRIL 28, 2016 The Role of Sweden and Finland in NATO’s Defense of the Baltic States Luke Coffey and Daniel Kochis ilitarily speaking, the three Baltic States— States. Sweden and Finland are important allies MEstonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—are isolated for the U.S. and a close partner of NATO. Howev- from other NATO members. It would be extremely er, neither is obligated to come to the assistance of difficult, but not impossible, for NATO to respond to any NATO member in the event of an armed attack. an incident in the Baltic region without the acqui- Therefore, the U.S. must plan accordingly. escence of non-NATO Finland and Sweden. Russia While any NATO intervention in the region knows this—and exploits this weakness to its advan- would be challenging without Swedish and Finn- tage. The U.S. must plan for any contingency in the ish support, this should not be overblown. The U.S. Baltic region, including one that sees Finland and intervened and then sustained large-scale combat Sweden refusing to acquiesce to a NATO request for operations for more than a decade in Afghanistan— support in a time of war. a landlocked Central Asian country several thou- sand miles away from the continental United States. Non-NATO Sweden and Finland The U.S. did this with questionable, and at times The countries in the Nordic region have direct wavering, support from neighboring countries and and indirect roles in guaranteeing the security of with poor regional infrastructure. With the right the Baltic States. Historically, the Baltic States planning and preparation the U.S. and NATO could have had a very close relationship with the Nordic do the same in the Baltics, even with Russia’s Anti- countries. Denmark and Norway have played an Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) strategy in the region important role in developing Baltic military capa- and even without Sweden or Finland’s support. bilities since the end of the Cold War, and Sweden and Finland, although not members of NATO also Geography of the Nordic Region have a close security relationship with the Baltic The Nordic region is also home to geographical States. spots of strategic importance for Baltic security. There is much concern about U.S. and NATO History has shown that most military operations dependence on non-NATO Sweden and Finland to in the Baltic region require access to what is today mount a credible defense or liberation of the Baltic Swedish and Finnish air, sea, and land. For exam- ple, during the Crimean War (1853–1856) and the Allied intervention in the Russian Civil War (1918– This paper, in its entirety, can be found at 1920), the Swedish fortress of Viapori (today known http://report.heritage.org/ib4554 as Suomenlinna in Finland) and the Åland Islands The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE played a crucial role. During both World Wars, the Washington, DC 20002 Skagerrak and Øresund Straits—both of which bor- (202) 546-4400 | heritage.org der Swedish waters and serve as a gateway to the Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage Baltic Sea—were highly contested. During the Cold of any bill before Congress. War, Denmark’s Bornholm Island was an area of ISSUE BRIEF | NO. 4554 APRIL 28, 2016 MAP 1 Three Islands Key to Baltic Security The location of the Åland, Gotland, and Bornholm islands20°E are strategically important to security in the Baltic Sea. Russia has long recognized the value of these islands and has even carried out military training exercises that simulated capturing them. ÅLAND ISLANDS FINLAND NORWAY (FINLAND) 60°N SWEDEN 15°E GOTLAND ISLAND ESTONIA (SWEDEN) RUSSIA BORNHOLM ISLAND LATVIA (DENMARK) DENMARK Baltic Sea LITHUANIA 55°N KALININGRAD (RUSSIA) missileIskander range DANISH BELARUS STRAITS 500 km GERMANY POLAND SOURCE: Heritage Foundation research. IB 4554 heritage.org contention between the Soviet Union and NATO. It would be naïve in the extreme to think Russia In the 21st century these considerations have not did not factor the importance of these three islands disappeared. and the Danish Straits into their Baltic Sea contin- The Danish Straits consist of three channels gency planning—and it would be just as irresponsi- connecting the Baltic Sea to the North Sea via the ble for the U.S. not to do the same. Kattegat and Skagerrak Seas. These straits are particularly important to the Baltic Sea nations as Role of Kaliningrad Oblast import and export routes. This is especially true for Another matter to consider is the role of the Russia, which has increasingly shipped its crude oil Kaliningrad Oblast in regional security. Kalinin- exports to Europe through Baltic ports. Overall, grad is a small Russian exclave along the Baltic Sea approximately 125,000 ships per year transit these (slightly larger than Connecticut), bordering both straits. If the U.S. needed to intervene militarily in Lithuania and Poland. Kaliningrad is part of Rus- the Baltic States, access to the Danish Straits would sia’s Western Military District, and approximately be vital. 25,000 Russian soldiers and security personnel are 2 ISSUE BRIEF | NO. 4554 APRIL 28, 2016 stationed there. It is home to Russia’s Baltic fleet, ■ Prepare contingency operations to defend which consists of around 50 vessels, including sub- the Baltics that do not include support from marines. Perhaps most important for Moscow is that Finland and Sweden. The U.S. should plan and Kaliningrad is the heart of Russia’s A2/AD strategy. rehearse defense of the Baltic States without the Russia has the advanced S400 air defense sys- cooperation of Finland and Sweden. However tem in Kaliningrad and has likely deployed Iskander unlikely this might be, until Finland and Sweden missiles there. Iskander missiles can carry nuclear become full members of NATO, it would be irre- or conventional warheads and have a range of 250 sponsible for U.S. military planners not to plan miles, placing Riga, Vilnius, and Warsaw within for this scenario. This training should include their reach. Russia also has facilities for storage of scenarios in which Russian forces capture the tactical nuclear weapons at Kaliningrad. (Whether Åland Islands and Gotland. nuclear weapons are presently there is a matter of much debate.) Russia is modernizing runways at its ■ Prepare to reinforce Europe quickly. During Chernyakhovsk and Donskoye air bases in Kalin- the Cold War, the U.S. conducted an annual mili- ingrad, providing Russia with nearby bases from tary exercise called Operation Reforger (Return which to fly near NATO airspace. Many of the aerial of Forces to Germany). Operation Reforger was incidents that cause NATO planes from Baltic Air designed to prove that the U.S. could move con- Policing to scramble involve Russian planes flying ventional military forces rapidly from the U.S. from or to bases in Kaliningrad. to Germany in the event of a war with the Soviet Union. The U.S. should consider holding a similar Preparing for All Eventualities exercise focused on defending the Baltic States. Without a doubt, Russia’s A2/AD coverage over the Baltic Region, coupled with Finland and Swe- ■ Factor Kaliningrad into NATO’s Baltic den’s reluctance to join NATO, makes defending the region contingency planning. The U.S. needs three Baltic States a challenge. Even under these dif- to work with its NATO allies to develop a strat- ficult circumstances, if correct polices are pursued, egy dealing with the Russian A2/AD capabilities the U.S. can ensure that it can live up to its treaty in Kaliningrad. In particular, this requires close obligations under NATO. The U.S. should: cooperation and planning with Poland. No cred- ible defense of the Baltics can be carried out with- ■ Work with the Nordic countries to improve out neutralizing the threat from Kaliningrad. relations with the Baltics. Historically, the Baltic States have had a very close relationship Sending the Right Messages with the Nordic countries. Good U.S. relations Moscow should not interpret Sweden and Fin- with the Nordic countries will mean closer rela- land’s non-NATO status as a green light to inter- tions with the Baltics. Although not members of vene in the Baltic States because NATO cannot come NATO, Sweden and Finland have a close security to their defense. Conversely, until they decide to relationship with the Baltic States. become full-fledged members of NATO, Stockholm and Helsinki should not expect the Alliance to come ■ Encourage Finland and Sweden to join NATO. automatically to their assistance if they are attacked Ultimately, the Swedish and Finnish populations by Russia, and NATO members should not give that will decide whether to join NATO, but the U.S. impression. NATO needs to plan for all eventualities should pursue a policy that encourages NATO in the Baltics—otherwise Russia will take advantage membership for these two Nordic countries. of the situation. Until they join NATO, they will not benefit from —Luke Coffey is Director of the Douglas and Sarah the Alliance’s security guarantee. Allison Center for Foreign Policy, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute, at The Heritage Foundation. Daniel Kochis is a Research Associate in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, of the Davis Institute. 3.