R248221 PUBLIC STL-ll-01IPT/TC F1 077IPRVl20 131 0311R248221-R248279IEN/nc BEFORE THE TRIAL CHAMBER SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON Case No: STL-ll-OllPT/TC Before: Judge David Re, Presiding Judge Janet Nosworthy Judge Micheline Braidy Judge Walid Akoum, Alternate Judge Registrar: Mr. Daryl Mundis Date: 31 October 2013 Filing Party: Prosecutor Original language: English Classification: Public THE PROSECUTOR v. SALIM JAMIL A YY ASH, MUSTAFA AMINE BADREDDINE, HUSSEIN HASSAN ONEISSI & ASSAD HASSAN SABRA Redacted Version of the Prosecution's Updated Pre-Trial Brief, dated 23 August 2013 Office of the Prosecutor: Counsel for Mr. Salim Jamil Ayyash: Mr. Nonnan Farrell Mr. Eugene Q'Sullivan Mr. Emile Aoun Legal Representatives of Victims: Counsel for Mr. Mustafa Amine Badreddine: Mr. Peter Haynes Mr. Antoine Korkmaz Mr. Mohammad F Mattar Mr. John Jones Ms. Nada Abdelsater-Abusamra Counsel for Mr. Hussein Hassan Oneissi: Mr. Vincent Courcelle-Labrousse ~----~ PUBLIC R248222 STL-ll-01IPT/TC F1 077IPRVl20 131 0311R248221-R248279IEN/nc I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................ 1 11. THE ACCUSED .................................................................................................................. 3 A. MUSTAFA AMINE BADREDDINE ......................................................................................... 3 B. SALIM JAMIL AYYASH ........................................................................................................ 5 C. HUSSEIN HAS SAN ONEISSI. ................................................................................................. 5 D. ASSAD HASSAN SABRA ...................................................................................................... 6 Ill. THE VICTIMS .................................................................................................................. 6 A. RAFIK HARIRI. .................................................................................................................... 6 B. OTHER VICTIMS .................................................................................................................. 6 IV. THE USE OF PHONE NETWORKS TO PREPARE AND EXECUTE THE ATTACK ............................................................................................................................ 7 A. THE RED NETWORK ........................................................................................................... 7 B. THE GREEN NETWORK ....................................................................................................... 8 C. THE BLUE NETWORK .......................................................................................................... 9 D. THE YELLOW NETWORK .................................................................................................. 10 E. THE PURPLE PHONES ........................................................................................................ 11 F. PERSONAL AND SEQUENTIAL MOBILE PHONES ................................................................. 11 v. ATTRIBUTION OF PHONES ........................................................................................ 12 A.BADREDDINE'sPHONES .............................................................................................. 14 B. AYYASH's PHONES ........................................................................................................ 18 C. ONEISSI's PHONES ......................................................................................................... 20 D. SABRA's PHONES ........................................................................................................... 20 E. MERHI's PHONES ............................................................................................................ 20 VI. THE CONSPIRACY ....................................................................................................... 22 VII. PREPARATIONS FOR THE TERRORIST ATTACK ............................................ 22 A. OBSERVATIONS IN PREPARATION FOR THE ATTACK ......................................................... 23 1. Observations between 20 October and 10 November 2004 ........................................ 24 2. Surveillance on 11 November 2004 ............................................................................. 25 3. Observations on 21 December 2004 ............................................................................ 25 4. Observations on 30 December 2004 ............................................................................ 25 5. Purchase of the Red Network Handsets and Phones ................................................... 26 6. Observations on 14 January 2005 ................................................................................ 26 7. Planned Surveillance on 20 January 2005 ................................................................... 26 8. Observations on 28 January 2005 ................................................................................ 27 9. Surveillance and Observations on 31 January 2005 .................................................... 28 10. Topping up the credit on the Red Network phones ................................................... 30 11. Surveillance on 3 February 2005 ............................................................................... 30 12. Surveillance on 8 February 2005 ............................................................................... 32 13. Final preparations before the Attack .......................................................................... 34 14. Conclusion as to Observations and Surveillance ....................................................... 35 B. THE PURCHASE OF THE MITSUBISHI CANTER VAN USED AS THE VBIED TO PERPETRATE THE TERRORIST ATTACK ................................................................................................. 35 C. PREPARATIONS RELATED TO THE FALSE CLAIM OF RESPONSIBILITy ................................ 38 VIII. THE TERRORIST ATTACK ..................................................................................... 42 STL-11-01lPT/TC 31 October 2013 Public Redacted PUBLIC R248223 STL-ll-01IPT/TC F1 077IPRVl20 131 0311R248221-R248279IEN/nc IX. THE DELIVERY OF THE VIDEO AFTER THE TERRORIST ATTACK ............ 47 X. [REDACTED] .................................................................................................................... 52 A. [REDACTED] ..................................................................................................................... 52 B. ATTACKS IN KUWAIT ........................................................................................................ 54 C. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................... 55 XI. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 56 STL-11-01lPT/TC 2 31 October 2013 Public Redacted R248224 PUBLIC STL-ll-01IPT/TC F1 077IPRVl20 131 0311R248221-R248279IEN/nc I. INTRODUCTION 1. On 14 February 2005, at 12:55 on Rue Minet el Hos'n in Beirut, as former Prime Minister Rafik Baha' eddine AL-HARIRI (HARIRI) and his security convoy were returning to his residence at Quraitem Palace from a session of Parliament, a suicide bomber detonated a large quantity of explosives concealed in a Mitsubishi Canter van parked along the side of the road. The resulting explosion killed HARIRI and 21 other persons and injured 226 persons. 2. Shortly after the terrorist attack, AI-Jazeera news network in Beirut received a video with a letter attached on which a man named Ahmad ABU ADASS (ABU ADASS) falsely claimed to be the suicide bomber on behalf of a non-existent fundamentalist group named "Nusra and Jihad Group in Greater Syria". AI-Jazeera broadcast the video. 3. The assassination of HARIRI was the culmination of extensive preparations by a select group of persons with either professional skills andlor experience, who acted together to commit this terrorist attack. The Accused, with others, used phones from five mobile phone groups to communicate while preparing and perpetrating this terrorist attack. On at least 50 days there was surveillance of HARIRI and observations of locations associated with him, beginning, at the latest on 20 October 2004 until the day of the attack, 14 February 2005. 4. The four Accused, Mustafa Amine BADREDDINE (BADREDDINE), Salim Jamil AYYASH (AYYASH), Hussein Hassan ONEISSI (ONEISSI), and Assad Hassan SABRA (SABRA) (collectively, the Accused) conspired with others, including MERHI, to commit this terrorist attack to assassinate HARIRI. BADREDDINE, AYYASH, and others also co-perpetrated the substantive offences of committing a terrorist act, intentional homicide of HARIRI and 21 others, and attempted intentional homicide of 226 others. ONEISSI, and SABRA are accomplices to these offences. STL-11-01lPT/TC 31 October 2013 Public Redacted R248225 PUBLIC STL-ll-OIIPT/TC Fl 077IPRVl20 131 0311R248221-R248279IEN/nc 5. "Subjects",l including the Accused and MERHI, used phones from five interconnected mobile phone groups to coordinate and monitor the preparations for and perpetration of the terrorist attack. Four of these five phone groups operated as "Networks". A Network is a group of phones with a high frequency of contact amongst the phones within that group. 6. The phone groups, which are colour-coded