CONQUERING THE NATURAL FRONTIER: FRENCH EXPANSION TO THE RHINE RIVER DURING THE WAR OF THE FIRST COALITION, 1792-1797 Jordan R. Hayworth, M.A. Dissertation Prepared for Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS December 2015 APPROVED: Michael V. Leggiere, Major Professor Guy Chet, Committee Member Marie-Christine Weidmann Koop, Committee Member Nancy Stockdale, Committee Member Geoffrey Wawro, Committee Member Richard B. McCaslin, Chair of the Department of History Costas Tsatsoulis, Dean of the Robert B. Toulouse Graduate School Hayworth, Jordan R. Conquering the Natural Frontier: French Expansion to the Rhine River during the War of the First Coalition, 1792-1797. Doctor of Philosophy (European History), December 2015, 487 pp., 14 maps, references, 445 titles. After conquering Belgium and the Rhineland in 1794, the French Army of the Sambre and Meuse faced severe logistical, disciplinary, and morale problems that signaled the erosion of its capabilities. The army’s degeneration resulted from a revolution in French foreign policy designed to conquer the natural frontiers, a policy often falsely portrayed as a diplomatic tradition of the French monarchy. In fact, the natural frontiers policy – expansion to the Rhine, the Pyrenees, and the Alps – emerged only after the start of the War of the First Coalition in 1792. Moreover, the pursuit of natural frontiers caused more controversy than previously understood. No less a figure than Lazare Carnot – the Organizer of Victory – viewed French expansion to the Rhine as impractical and likely to perpetuate war. While the war of conquest provided the French state with the resources to survive, it entailed numerous unforeseen consequences. Most notably, the Revolutionary armies became isolated from the nation and displayed more loyalty to their commanders than to the civilian authorities. In 1797, the Sambre and Meuse Army became a political tool of General Lazare Hoche, who sought control over the Rhineland by supporting the creation of a Cisrhenan Republic. Ultimately, troops from Hoche’s army removed Carnot from the French Directory in the coup d’état of 18 fructidor, a crucial benchmark in the militarization of French politics two years before Napoleon Bonaparte’s seizure of power. Accordingly, the conquest of the Rhine frontier contributed to the erosion of democratic governance in Revolutionary France. Copyright 2015 by Jordan R. Hayworth ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to sincerely thank my major professor and mentor, Dr. Michael V. Leggiere, who has constantly supported and encouraged my efforts for the past five years. I also owe a debt of gratitude to my committee members, Drs. Guy Chet, Nancy Stockdale, Geoffrey Wawro, and Marie-Christine Weidmann Koop. The Chair of the Department of History, Dr. Richard McCaslin, has provided much support for my work. Dr. Frederick Schneid at High Point University has been a constant source of encouragement and advice ever since he invited me to attend the inaugural Gunther E. Rothenberg Seminar in Military History. I received generous grants from the Toulouse Graduate School as well as the College of Arts and Sciences at UNT. The Department of History provided monetary support, as did the department’s Military History Center. I must thank everyone at the French war archives at Vincennes and the Archives nationales for making my research trips very pleasant. Professor Peter Hicks at the Fondation Napoléon welcomed me and kindly provided research information and a much-appreciated dinner. Friends and colleagues have been a source of support. I would like to thank Jonathan Abel, Casey Baker, Kyle Hatzinger, Nate Jarrett, Eric Smith, Paul Streitelmeier, and Chad Tomaselli. Scholars such as Michael Bonura, Huw Davies, John Gill, Donald Horward, Kenneth Johnson, Alexander Mikaberidze, and Sam Watson offered much advice and encouragement at conferences and other venues. It is a great blessing to have far too many friends and family to thank in the space allotted. To all those I’ve left out please know that you are not forgotten. Last, but definitely not least, I would like to express my sincere thanks to my wife, Brittany, and my parents, Rick and Dwanna Hayworth, for their unwavering love. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS AKNOWLEDGEMENTS......................................................................................................iii MAPS .....................................................................................................................................vi Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................1 2. THE NATURAL FRONTIERS UNDER THE ANCIEN RÉGIME .........................24 3. THE BRISSOTIN CRUSADE FOR WAR ...............................................................67 4. WAR, CONQUEST, AND DISASTER ....................................................................112 5. THE ORGANIZATION OF VICTORY ...................................................................157 6. THE CONQUEST OF BELGIUM AND THE RHINELAND .................................206 7. WAR FOR THE RHINE DURING THE THERMIDOREAN REPUBLIC .............257 8. THE DIRECTORY’S WAR ......................................................................................313 9. A SHATTERED ARMY ...........................................................................................367 10. HOCHE, THE CISRHENAN REPUBLIC, AND 18 FRUCTIDOR ........................410 11. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................456 BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................466 iv LIST OF MAPS 1. General Map……………………………………………………………………………...vii 2. Roman Gaul .......................................................................................................................28 3. Treaty of Verdun ................................................................................................................34 4. The Rhineland ....................................................................................................................77 5. Operations in the Low Countries .......................................................................................115 6. Operations in Germany ......................................................................................................131 7. Carnot’s Plan of Expansion ...............................................................................................218 8. The Ourthe .........................................................................................................................242 9. Gillet’s Proposed Operation ...............................................................................................245 10. The Roer...........................................................................................................................248 11. 1795 Line of Neutrality……………………………………………………...………….272 12. Modified Line of Prussian Neutrality…………………………………………...………382 13. Neuwied Campaign………………………………………………………..……………435 14. Treaty of Campo Formio………………………………...……………...……………....453 v Map 1. General Map vi CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION States fight wars for many reasons, but contests over the possession or control of land and resources ranks as the most common.1 This dissertation examines a period in which massive amounts of territory, resources, and people changed hands as a result of military conquest. During the French Revolution, the national space of France shifted from the dynastic dominion of the Bourbon monarchy to the sacred patrie of French citizens. Ideological changes in attitudes toward national space held important implications for many parts of Europe because the new citizens possessed notions of territorial boundaries that differed from the traditional rulers and statesmen of the ancien régime. These citizens associated territory with the nation’s essence rather than a symbol of dynastic control, security, and prestige.2 Although the revolutionaries in France routinely violated the principle of popular sovereignty, they professed that territorial boundaries should be primarily decided through national self-determination rather than diplomatic negotiations with representatives of monarchical regimes. The clash between traditional and revolutionary views of territorial boundaries and international relations constituted a key factor in European politics after 1789. 1 A voluminous literature exists on the origins of war and wars. T. C. W. Blanning in The Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars (New York: Longman, 1986), 1-29, provides a critical analysis of several theories offered by the fields of psychology, ethology, anthropology, political science, and sociology. Foundational texts include E. F. M. Durbin and John Bowlby, Personal Aggressiveness and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939); Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959); Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (New York: Doubleday, 1966); Robert Ardey, The Territorial Imperative: A Personal Inquiry into the Animal Origins of Property and Nations (New York: Atheneum, 1966); Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (New York: Free Press, 1988); Donald Kagan, On the Origins of War: And the Preservation of Peace (New York: Anchor, 1996). 2 Paul Schroeder in The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848 (New York: Oxford