Liberty University Law Review Volume 5 Issue 3 Article 3 July 2011 Lessons from Theodicy: The Problem of Evil and the Limits of Governmental Power David E. Gilbert Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/lu_law_review Recommended Citation Gilbert, David E. (2011) "Lessons from Theodicy: The Problem of Evil and the Limits of Governmental Power," Liberty University Law Review: Vol. 5 : Iss. 3 , Article 3. Available at: https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/lu_law_review/vol5/iss3/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Liberty University School of Law at Scholars Crossing. It has been accepted for inclusion in Liberty University Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholars Crossing. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ARTICLE LESSONS FROM THEODICY: THE PROBLEM OF EVIL AND THE LIMITS OF GOVERNMENTAL POWER David E. Gilbert† Why is there any misery at all in the world? Not by chance, surely. From some cause then. Is it from the intention of the Diety? But he is perfectly benevolent. Is it contrary to his intention? But he is almighty. Nothing can shake the solidity of this reasoning, so short, so clear, so decisive, except we assert that these subjects exceed all human capacity, and that our common measures of truth and falsehood are not applicable to them. 1 David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion I. INTRODUCTION Although I teach law, I am fascinated by the philosophy of religion. And I am fascinated, in particular, by the Problem of Evil, which asserts that the 2 following propositions cannot be reconciled: † A version of this article was presented on May 31, 2010 at a symposium entitled “The Monotheistic Religions and the Human Liberties.” The symposium was held in Constantza, Romania and was sponsored by The Centre for Religious and Juridical- Canonical Study and Research of the Three Monotheistic Religions (Mosaic, Christian and Islamic) of Ovidius University of Constantza. I understand that this article has been published in DIONYSIANA, the Centre’s academic review, and I wish to thank the Centre for its invitation to speak at the symposium, for its generous hospitality, and for its permission to publish this article in the United States. I also wish to thank David Beck for his help in formulating my arguments and F. Phillip Manns for his help in refining them. I am honored to be a member of a university faculty that includes such men. Finally, I wish to thank the editors and staff of the Liberty University Law Review for their enthusiasm for the article and for their careful editorial work. I will always be honored to say that they were once my students. Any remaining errors—whether of thought or expression—are mine and mine alone. 1. DAVID HUME, DIALOGUES CONCERNING NATURAL RELIGION WITH THE POSTHUMOUS ESSAYS, “OF THE MORTALITY OF THE SOUL” AND “OF SUICIDE,” AND FROM AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, “OF MIRACLES” 66 (Richard H. Popkin ed., Hackett Publishing Co. 2d ed. 1988) (1779) (first publication date is for DIALOGUES CONCERNING NATURAL RELIGION). 2. This is referred to as the logical Problem of Evil. There is also an evidential Problem of Evil that stems from the claim that, given the existence of evil, it is improbable 380 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:379 God is omnipotent; God is omniscient;3 God is perfectly good; and Evil exists. My fascination with this topic has much to do with the fact that I am a Christian. Yet that is not the whole of the matter. My fascination also stems from the fact that the Problem of Evil deals with ultimate questions— “ultimate” in the sense that they address the absolute limits of certain concepts. What does it mean, for example, to say that God is “omnipotent”? Does this mean He can “make a four-sided triangle”4 or “a stone too heavy for [H]imself to lift”5? And what does it mean to say that God is “omniscient”? Does He know the color of a number? Does He know today what I will freely choose to do tomorrow? If He does, are my actions, therefore, somehow predetermined? There is a perhaps less theoretical side to the Problem of Evil. That is the aspect of the Problem of Evil that addresses the nature of good and evil. What does it mean for a thing or event or person to “be evil”? What does it mean for a person to “do good”? These questions are hardly academic. Indeed, the answers we give—whether explicitly or implicitly—show up in the way we relate to one another and in the way we organize our societies. Theistic philosophers have been wrestling with these questions for centuries—and by necessity. It is their view of God that is challenged by the Problem of Evil. And, though some have been willing to suggest that evil is a figment of our imagination,6 many have focused their efforts on that the theistic God exists. See, e.g., MARILYN MCCORD ADAMS & ROBERT MERRIHEW ADAMS, Introduction to THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 16 (Marilyn McCord Adams & Robert Merrihew Adams eds., 1990). 3. Omniscience may be considered a trait comprehended by the term “omnipotence.” I include it explicitly, however, because it frequently appears in formulations of the problem of evil. See, e.g., ADAMS, supra note 2, at 2; ALVIN C. PLANTINGA, GOD, FREEDOM, AND EVIL 21 (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. 1977) (1974). 4. JOHN HICK, EVIL AND THE GOD OF LOVE 265 (Harper & Row, Publishers rev. ed. 1978). 5. RICHARD SWINBURNE, THE COHERENCE OF THEISM 157 (Clarendon Press rev. ed. 1993). 6. See J.L. MACKIE, Evil and Omnipotence 64 MIND 200-12 (1955), reprinted in THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 25-37 (Marilyn McCord Adams & Robert Merrihew Adams eds., 1990) at 26-27. Mackie writes: Some have said that evil is an illusion, perhaps because they held that the whole world of temporal, changing things is an illusion, and that what we call evil belongs only to this world, or perhaps because they held that although 2011] LESSONS FROM THEODICY 381 explaining the reasons that could have motivated (or in fact did motivate) a loving, all-knowing, and all-powerful God to create a world with as much evil in it as ours clearly contains. From my point of view, the reasons they have come up with are fascinating and instructive—and not merely for the insights they suggest regarding the character of God and His purposes for our lives. I contend that the reasons they give suggest answers to questions we ought to be asking about the proper role of government in our societies. For example, in my own country many appear to assume that, if there is a problem, government must offer a solution. The mere existence of an evil, regardless of its source or location, seems to function as a sufficient condition for government action. Indeed it is impolite to suggest otherwise. I think this view of government is mistaken and destructive. On the contrary, I contend the following: 1. That government cannot eliminate all evil; 2. That government should not seek to eliminate all evil; 3. That government must, nevertheless, seek to eliminate some evil; and 4. That systems of law founded on theism are best equipped to resolve the practical tension between points (1) and (2), on the one hand, and point (3) on the other. To explain and support these positions, I intend to draw on the Problem of Evil itself, the Judeo-Christian tradition, and on several prominent responses to the Problem of Evil, namely Alvin Plantinga’s “Free Will Defense,” John Hick’s “Soul-Making Theodicy,” and the eschatological theodicy suggested by Roderick Chisholm’s concept of “defeat.” Although these are not the only thinkers whose work I will discuss, their arguments provide the primary structure for my arguments. Before I go on, however, I should distinguish between two kinds of evil: moral evil and natural evil. To borrow Alvin Plantinga’s definitions: moral evil “is evil that results from free human activity; natural evil is any other kind of evil.”7 In this paper, I intend to address the connections I see temporal things are much as we see them, those that we call evil are not really evil. Some have said that what we call evil is merely the privation of good, that evil in a positive sense, evil that would really be opposed to good, does not exist. Many have agreed with Pope that disorder is harmony not understood, and that partial evil is universal good. Id. at 26. 7. PLANTINGA, supra note 3, at 30. 382 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:379 between the Problem of Evil and the proper limits of governmental power. Accordingly, I plan to focus my remarks on moral evil, which is the category of evil that government is best equipped to address. There will be times, however, when I must refer to or address natural evil. In these cases, I will endeavor to be clear that I am discussing natural evil, not moral evil. In all other cases, however, you may assume that when I refer to “evil” I mean to refer to “moral evil.” II. GOVERNMENT CANNOT ELIMINATE ALL EVIL Government cannot eliminate all evil, because government lacks—and cannot acquire—sufficient knowledge, power, or goodness to achieve this end. This is because the elimination of evil requires a level of knowledge, power, and goodness approaching the omniscience, omnipotence, and perfect goodness that theists attribute to God. That government does not— and cannot hope to—meet these conditions should be obvious, but I think an awareness of this fact is sadly absent from conversations about public policy—at least in my own country.