Down, but Not Out: An Updated Examination of the Islamic State’s Visual Propaganda Daniel Milton Down, but Not Out: An Updated Examination of the Islamic State’s Visual Propaganda Daniel Milton Combating Terrorism Center at West Point United States Military Academy www.ctc.usma.edu The views expressed in this report are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect those of the Combating Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy, Department of Defense, or U.S. Government. July 2018 COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Director Every project that comes out of the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) is, on some level, a group project. None of the CTC’s work would be possible Brian Dodwell without so many capable minds ofering their guidance to a project. Fore- most among these is Mr. Muhammad al-`Ubaydi. Muhammad’s intellec- Research Director tual and linguistic contributions to the development of this report, and Dr. Daniel Milton perhaps more importantly, to the author, are beyond measure and greatly appreciated. Dr. Jason Warner and Mr. Don Rassler provided the red ink Distinguished Chair necessary to improve this report through their revisions, comments, and LTG (Ret) Dell Dailey critiques. The author is very grateful to First Lieutenant Darren Hagan for providing critical support in collecting and coding. The leadership trio of Class of 1987 Senior Fellow Lieutenant Colonel Bryan Price, Mr. Brian Dodwell, and Dr. Rachel Yon Amb. Michael Sheehan have always supported and contributed to the CTC’s research, and this report is no exception. Mr. Charlie Winter merits special thanks for his George H. GIlmore Senior Fellow criticism, feedback, and advice on an earlier draft of this project. His care- ful review of this piece made it much better than it would have otherwise Prof. Bruce Hoffman been. Mrs. Kristina Hummel, as with all CTC products, ran the anchor leg Senior Fellow on this efort and made this report sharper and easier to understand. The author would also like to acknowledge Thomson-Reuters Special Service Michael Morell and the staf who provided support for this research efort. Despite the help of so many, the author alone remains responsible for any errors that Senior Fellow remain in the report. Chief Joseph Pfeifer, FDNY Class of 1971 Senior Fellow The Honorable Juan Zarate Daniel Milton CONTACT Combating Terrorism Center U.S. Military Academy 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall West Point, NY 10996 Phone: (845) 938-8495 Web: www.ctc.usma.edu The views expressed in this report are those of the author and not of the United States Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary.....................................................................................................................IV Introduction...................................................................................................................................1 Methodological Notes................................................................................................................2 Limitations..................................................................................................................................3 Trendlines from 30,000 Feet: Overall Statistics of Official Media Releases............................................................................................................................................3 Quantity: Islamic State Propaganda Output....................................................................4 Media Martyrs: The Impact of Personnel Losses...........................................................6 The Issue of “Quality”..............................................................................................................9 Geographic Dynamics..................................................................................................................12 Inside Iraq and Syria Compared with Outside Iraq and Syria..................................13 Observations Related to Content................................................................................... .......21 Conclusion............................................................................................................................... ......25 II LIST OF TABLES Table 1: Islamic State Regional Media Bureaus in the CTC Dataset, By Country .................................................13 LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Number of Islamic State Official Visual Media Releases, January 2015 – June 2018 ......................... 4 Figure 2: Comparison of Amaq News Agency and Official Visual Releases, November 2016 – June 2018 ........5 Figure 3: Islamic State Announcement of Media Martyrs, by Quarter .................................................................... 6 Figure 4: Official Islamic State Videos as Percentage of Total Official Visual Output, January 2015 – June 2018 .......................................................................................................................................................... 10 Figure 5: Average Length of Islamic State Media Releases, January 2015 – June 2018 ....................................... 11 Figure 6: Percentage of Visual Products from Provinces Outside Iraq and Syria, January 2015 – June 2018 ...........................................................................................................................................................15 Figure 7: Quarterly Production Levels in Selected Islamic State Provincial Media Bureaus Outside Iraq and Syria, January 2015 – June 2018 .............................................................................................................................16 Figure 8: Number of Releases from Iraq and Syria vs. Outside of Iraq and Syria, January 2015 – June 2018 ...........................................................................................................................................................18 Figure 9: Comparison of Proportion of Visual Releases in Iraq vs. Syria, January 2015 – June 2018 .............19 Figure 10: Production Levels in Selected Islamic State Provincial Media Bureaus, January 2015 – June 2018 ..........................................................................................................................................................20 Figure 11: Thematic Change in Islamic State Official Releases (2015 - 2018) ........................................................ 22 Figure 12: Percentage of Non-Military Releases Inside Iraq and Syria vs. Outside, January 2015 – June 2018 ......................................................................................................................................................... 24 III MILTON DOWN, BUT NOT OUT JULY 2018 Executive Summary As the physical territory held by the group known as the Islamic State diminished in 2016-2017, con- cern about of the status of the group’s “virtual” caliphate increased. This report focuses on one aspect of that virtual caliphate: the production of visual propaganda by the group’s ofcial media bureaus. Using a dataset of more than 13,000 pieces of ofcial visual propaganda distributed from January 2015 to June 2018, this report examines how the production of such pieces has changed over this timeframe in terms of the number of pieces distributed, the geographic dynamics associated with the production of propaganda, and the content featured in these products. Through the course of this examination, several key findings emerge: Ofcial visual propaganda production has decreased significantly: According to the CTC’s collec- tion criteria, August 2015 represented the high-water mark for the production of ofcial visual pro- paganda, with 754 releases. The low-point occurred in June 2018, with 44 releases. This represents a 94-percent decrease in visual propaganda production. It is important to note that this decrease does not account for non-visual production such as text-only tweets. Despite the decrease, fluctuation in visual propaganda production is likely to continue: At the macro level, production rebounded slightly in January 2018 before falling of again. This follows a more sustained rebound in production that occurred in late 2016. At the local media bureau level, increases and decreases have occurred quite frequently. Since July 2015, 100 Islamic State media operatives have been announced as being martyred: Among many reasons for the decrease in propaganda production, one revealed by this report is the number of media personnel who have been killed. In the first quarter of 2016 alone, 20 such personnel were eulogized in the group’s propaganda. Islamic State videos (excluding Amaq and Furat Media Establishment) have been increasing in length since January 2015: In the first five months of 2015, the average length of an Islamic State video was a little over six minutes. In the first five months of 2018, this number had increased to approximately 16 minutes 30 seconds. This may suggest a decreased ability to create narrowly tailored and targeted videos. The Islamic State’s media bureaus inside of Iraq and Syria present a worrying sign for the future: During 2016 and after the liberation of parts of Iraq from formal Islamic State control in December 2017, production of ofcial visual products from Iraqi media bureaus declined. Since that point, however, production coming specifically from Iraq has rebounded slightly, highlighting the group’s resilience and potential future threat in the region.