THE SINKING OF A SHIP Ө COSTA CONCORDIA REVISITED. Captain Michael Lloyd, RD**, MNM, CMMar, FNI. Kate Hopkins COSTA CONCORDIA IN GENOA, 2010 « A commander should be able to hold his ship and everything on board of her in the hollow of his hand, as it were. But with the modern foolish trust in material, and with those floating hotels, this has become impossible. A man may do his best, but he cannot succeed in a task which from greed, or more likely from sheer stupidity, has been made too great for anybody’s strength». Joseph Conrad, “Some Reflections on the Loss of the Titanic” 1912 INDEX ​ ​ PAGE​ Glossary ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​5 Introduction ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​7 Introduction ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​7 Ship Particulars ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​10 Preliminary ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​11 The Company ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​11 The Charges ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​13 1st PHASE ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​15 Timeline ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​16 The Initiation ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​18 The Bridge Organisation ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​20 The Navigation ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​21 Course Alteration ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​25 Wheel Over ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​26 The 8 Second delay ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​28 Language Influence ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​28 2ND PHASE. THE DAMAGE ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​32 Time Line ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​33 The Damage ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​35 Watertight Doors ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​36 The Emergency Generator ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​38 3RD PHASE.THE ABANDONMENT ​ ​ ​ ​ ​40 The Criteria of Abandonment ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​41 Alcohol ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​43 Lifejackets ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​43 The Mustering points ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​43 Stairways ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​44 Timeline ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​44 The Mental State of the Captain ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​46 Passenger Announcements ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​49 First Report ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​50 Rescue Services Response ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​50 General Emergency Alarm ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​52 Lifeboats ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​53 Life-rafts ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​55 Lifeboat/life-raft Capacity ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​55 The Abandonment Begins ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​56 Warm Clothing ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​57 Crew Training ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​57 4TH PHASE. CHAOS ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​59 Hypothermia ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​60 Lifejackets ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​61 Jumping from the ship ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​61 Shore services take over the abandonment ​ ​ ​ ​ ​63 Witnesses statements ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​63 MRSC talking with Captain ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​69 The Shore rescue services ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​70 The last survivor ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​73 Search for the Dead ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​74 Resignation of the President of RINA ​ ​ ​ ​ ​74 Rescue Data ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​75 5TH PHASE. THE GIGLIO MAGISTRATES INQUIRY ​ ​ ​76 Inquiry Transcript ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​77 The ISM Code ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​87 The decision of the Criminal Inquiry ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​90 6TH PHASE. COSTA CROCIERE PLEA BARGAIN ​ ​ ​97 7TH PHASE. SAFETY REPORT CONCLUSIONS ​ ​ ​ ​100 8TH PHASE. THE TRIALS ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​122 Italian Criminal Law ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​123 The Preliminary Investigation ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​123 The Trial Phase ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​123 Appeals ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​123 Plea bargaining ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​124 The Trial ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​124 The Appeal ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​126 FINAL ANALYSIS ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​127 1st Phase. The Collision ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​128 Responsibilities ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​131 2nd Phase. The Damage ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​133 3rd Phase the Abandonment ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​134 4th Phase Chaos ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​136 Responsibility ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​137 Seaworthy and Safe ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​140 Epilogue ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​142 References ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​148 ​ ​ ​ Glossary of abbreviations and acronyms ARES - Automated search and rescue AIS – Automa5c Tracking System Carabinieri – Italian Na5onal Military Police CE - Chief Engineer D/G - Diesel Generator DCP – Damage Control Plan DOC - Document of Compliance DPA - Designated Person Ashore ECC- European Cruise Council ECDIS- Electronic Computerised Display (Naviga5on) ECR – Engine Control Room EDG - Emergency Diesel Generator EEBD - Emergency Escape Breathing Device ETA - Es5mated Time of Arrival EU - European Union FCC – Fleet Crisis Coordinator GdF- Guardia de Finanzia. Branch of the Italian Police Force. GRT - Gross Registered Tons IB – Inves5ga5ve Body LSA – Life-Saving Appliance IMO – Interna5onal Mari5me Organiza5on ISM Code – Interna5onal Management Code for the Safe Opera5on of Ships and for Pollu5on Preven5on ITCG – Italian Coast Guard MAMS- Marine Asset Management cer5fica5on Martec system – SoQware that manages the Stability controls for emergency Hull breach and fire MLC – Mari5me Labour Conven5on MRCC – Mari5me Rescue Coordina5on Centre MRSC – Mari5me Rescue Sub Centre MSC – Mari5me Safety CommiTee NAPA- Ship stability soQware NGO- Non- Governmental organisa5on OSC – On Scene Commander OOW- Officer of the Watch OOW- Officer of the Watch PAX- Passengers PSA- Passenger Ship Associa5on RINA - Italian Classifica5on Society RO-PAX – High-speed roll-on/roll-off ferry RO-RO – Roll-on/roll-off ferry SAR – Mari5me Search and Rescue SOLAS – Interna5onal Conven5on for the Safety of Life at Sea SMS – Safety Management System STCW – Interna5onal Conven5on on Standards of Training, Cer5fica5on and Watchkeeping for Seafarers UCG – Coastal Guard Unit UMS – UnaTended machinery spaces VDR - Voyage Data Recorder VHF - Very High Frequency radio W/T- Waterght WTC – Water5ght compartment CCTV - Close Circuit Television Introduc)on This was intended to be a brief account of the sinking of the Costa Concordia. I had no pre conceived opinions except that of the stupidity of the Master and surprise that, according to the courts, no one else was held responsible. I did however, make protest in the first months of coverage about prejudging the Master based on various oQen lurid accounts of ac5ons and our na5onal concepts of moral behavior. Only a few of us in the marine industry did speak out and we were cri5cized for this at the 5me. As I worked my way through the various documents and accounts, I began to realise that there was far more to this casualty that what I had been led to believe by the official and media reports. The modern cruise ship, or to be more factually accurate ‘hotel ship,’ is a new phenomenon on the seas. The Companies that own and operate them even state that they are not in the shipping business, they are in the entertainment industry. Their ships con5nue to grow in size and the companies in corporate power, consequently their influence in the marine industry grows in propor5on. The legisla5ve regula5ons of various governing ins5tu5ons have been overwhelmed by the rapid development of the size and passenger capacity of their ships as have the mari5me bodies of the flag states that, theore5cally, are supposed to govern their mari5me responsibili5es. Their financial power, coupled with the backing of their suppor5ve non- Governmental Agencies (NGO’s) in the IMO and their financial influence over their flag states is increasing their impact in all aspects of mari5me endeavour. The joining of the entertainment and marine industries is an uneasy rela5onship, as one is devoted to passenger comfort and pleasure as a priority and the other has the safety of the passengers and ship as their priority. Even the management of the ship has required change with the tradi5onal Master and execu5ve officers losing areas of responsibility for the overall day to day running of the ship in favour of the hotel staff and thus the loss of execu5ve control. This is not a cri5cism, as the size of ship, the hotel exper5se and staff, now requires such considera5ons for the more efficient management. However, it does raise a dichotomy as to the leadership and chain of command in the event of emergencies. For the Captain and his senior officers there is also the danger that they are enveloped in the entertainment requirements interfering with their safety responsibili5es and as we see, the naviga5on and handling of the ship with the marke5ng departments increased influence over the opera5ons Department within these companies. It also can affect the recruitment and promo5on of the officers as, if the entertainment opera5ons have the major voice in the control of the company, it is obvious that those amenable to the hotel side on board are preferable to those who see themselves purely as seamen. The case of the Costa Concordia should serve as a warning to all of us on the need to clarify the chain of command on such vessels and to place the professional ability of those in senior posi5ons above that of their social affability. While this is intended to be a technical study, based on the various legisla5on and rules which govern our industry, it gradually also became something more. It became a story. Unfortunately for the dead, the injured and the trauma5zed, a true story. It is a story of ships, the sea and people. It is a story of what is wrong with the marine industry, especially the lack of proper governance by the very ins5tu5ons that purport to oversee this vast interna5onal industry and the disinterest of marine organisa5ons and government departments that know the truth but remain silent. The Titanic sank almost 100 years to the day in similar circumstances. A Captain who failed to listen, going at speed through a known icefield and who believed that his ship could not sink. But on that occasion, the discipline, the ship board organisa5on, the professional skills and the standard of moral courage of the day and those involved, held the ship from panic, and allowed the majority of the women and children be saved in what lifeboats they had. Even then not all was perfect, many lifeboats departed without being filled, and some without seamen. The Captain died and, through the skills of the Company that stood by him, became a hero rather than the villain, which he so easily could have become,