THE DISSOLUTION OF THE FRAME PROBLEM FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF EMBODIED AND ENACTIVE INTERTWINEMENT OF AFFECT AND COGNITION A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES OF MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY BY AYŞE USLU IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY JANUARY 2017 Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences Prof. Dr. Tülin Gençöz Director I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Prof. Dr. Ş.Halil Turan Head of Department This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Assoc. Prof. Dr. Elif Çırakman Supervisor Examining Committee Members Prof. Dr. David Grünberg (ODTÜ, PHIL) Assoc. Prof. Dr. Elif Çırakman (ODTÜ, PHIL) Assoc. Prof. Dr. Barış Parkan (ODTÜ, PHIL) Asst. Prof. Dr. Erhan Demircioğlu (Koç Univ., PHIL) Prof. Dr. Ertuğrul Rufayi Turan (Ankara Univ., PHIL) I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work. Name, Last name : Ayşe Uslu Signature : iii ABSTRACT THE DISSOLUTION OF THE FRAME PROBLEM FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF EMBODIED AND ENACTIVE INTERTWINEMENT OF AFFECT AND COGNITION Uslu, Ayşe Ph.D., Department of Philosophy Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Elif Çırakman January 2017, 257 pages This dissertation aims to examine whether it is possible to show that there is no emotionless cognition and no emotion without cognition in terms of the meaning- generating role of the body and if this is possible, then how this contributes to dissolution of the frame problem. The main argument of the dissertation is that the dissolution of the frame problem depends on the recognition of the fact that cognition and emotion are embodied processes, and sense-making processes for living-beings are results of the interplay between cognition and affectivity, which are intertwined. In this respect, this dissertation criticizes the cognitivist approaches regarding cognition and emotion as disembodied processes, and correspondingly claiming emotion-cognition dichotomy since any approach based on disembodiment to cognition and emotion and separation of them cannot give account of how the frame problem is not a problem for living beings at all. Keywords: emotion, cognition, embodied, enactivism, autopoiesis iv ÖZ DUYGU VE BİLİŞİN BEDENLENMİŞ VE ENAKTİF İÇ İÇELİĞİ PERSPEKTİFİNDEN ÇERÇEVE PROBLEMİNİN ORTADAN KALKMASI Uslu, Ayşe Doktora, Felsefe Bölümü Tez Yöneticisi : Doç. Dr. Elif Çırakman Ocak 2017, 257 sayfa Bu tez, bedenin anlam üretimine katkısı bakımından duyguların yokluğunda bilişin, bilişin yokluğunda duygunun oluşmadığını göstermenin imkanını sorgulamayı, ve eğer bunun olanağını göstermek mümkünse, bu durumun Çerçeve Problemini aşmaya nasıl katkıda bulunduğu incelemeyi amaçlar. Tezin ana argümanı, Çerçeve Probleminin ortadan kalkışının, bilişin ve duygunun bedenlenmiş süreçler olduğu ve yaşayan canlılar için anlam üretim süreçlerinin iç içe girmiş olan bilişsellik ve duygulanımsallığın arasındaki karşılıklı etkileşimi sonucu olduğu gerçeğinin kabulüne bağlı olduğudur. Bu bakımdan bu tez, biliş ve duyguyu bedenlenmemiş süreçler olarak kabul eden, buna bağlı olarak da biliş-duygu ikiliğini öne süren bilişselci yaklaşımları eleştirmektedir. Çünkü, biliş ve duyguyu konusunda bedenlenmemişliğe ve bunların ayrılığı fikrine dayalı hiç bir yaklaşım, Çerçeve Probleminin yaşayan varlıklar için nasıl bir problem olmaktan çıkmış olduğunu açıklayamaz. Anahtar Kelimeler: duygu, biliş, bedenlenmiş, enaktivizm, otopoiesis v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to gratefully and sincerely thank my supervisor Elif Çırakman for her guidance, understanding, patience and most importantly her friendship during the entire period of my PhD study at METU and in the time of writing of this dissertation. Without her guidance and persistent help this dissertation would not have been possible. Her mentorship was paramount in providing experience that helped me to shape my academic career goals. I would like to express my deepest appreciation to Erhan Demircioğlu for his guidance, encouragement, effort and friendship without which I cannot start this dissertation and make progress in philosophy of mind that was kind of a new area to study for me. He strongly motivated me in all the time of research and writing of this dissertation for taking account of opposite views and accordingly developing better arguments. His guidance helped me to map my philosophical intuitions and clarify my philosophical tendencies in a way that these can also be supported by scientific research. Besides, I would like to thank Monica Meijsing, who supervised my dissertation during the period of my research in the School of Humanities, Philosophy Department, Tilburg University, for her support, encouragement and cooperation. She reviewed several drafts of chapters of my dissertation and provided me assistance and invaluable comments on my writing and grammar. In addition, I would like to thank the members of the committees during the research: Barış Parkan, David Grünberg, Hilmi Demir and Ertuğrul Rufayi Turan, for their insightful comments and encouragement. Last but certainly not least, thanks to all women in my family, who respect my giving priority in my life to quest for knowledge, for their patience and unwavering love, which undeniably fed my life force. Without them, I would be a candle without light. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS PLAGIARISM...........................................................................................................iii ABSTRACT .............................................................................................................. iv ÖZ .............................................................................................................................. v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ....................................................................................... vi TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................... vii LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................. ix LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................... x CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1 2. THE PHILOSOPHICAL FRAME PROBLEM ............................................... 8 2.1 What is the Frame Problem?................................................................12 2.2 Daniel Dennett’s Epistemological View .............................................14 2.3 Hubert Dreyfus’ Take on the Relevance Problem .............................. 22 2.4. Four Assumptions in AI.......................................................................24 2.5. The Phenomenological Solution to the Frame Problem.......................33 3. EMBODIED COGNITION ......................................................................... 43 3.1 Phenomenological Background .......................................................... 43 3.1.1 Merleau Ponty’s Philosophy ...................................................... 44 3.1.2 Intentionality .............................................................................. 47 3.2 Cartesianism ........................................................................................ 49 3.3 Representationalism ............................................................................ 53 3.4 Computationalism. .............................................................................. 55 3.5 The Main Arguments of Embodied Cognition.................................... 57 4. EMOTIONS AS A SOLUTION FOR THE FRAME PROBLEM .............. 67 4.1 Theories of Emotion ........................................................................... 69 4.1.1 The Cognitivist Approaches ................................................... 71 vii 4.1.1.1 Judgement Theories ................................................. 71 4.1.1.2 The Cognitive Appraisal Theory of Emotions ......... 74 4.1.1.3 Criticisms of Cognitivist Approach ......................... 78 4.1.2 The Non-Cognitivist Approaches ........................................... 81 4.1.2.1 James-Lange Framework and Feeling Theories ...... 81 4.1.2.2 Damasio’s Somatic Marker Hypothesis ................... 84 4.1.2.3 The Role of Representation in Emotion and Cognition is Questioned in Damasio’s view ............................ 96 4.1.2.4 Prinz’s Embodied Appraisal Theory of Emotion ... 107 4.2 Megill’s Solution for the Frame Problem ......................................... 111 4.3 Problems with Megill’s View ........................................................... 114 4.3.1 Cognitivist View of Cognition Based on Emotion-Cognition Dualism ................................................................................. 115 4.3.2 The Rejection of Emotional Qualia in the Constitution of Cognitive Processes...............................................................120 5. ENACTIVISM ........................................................................................... 135 5.1 The Enactivist Perspective ...............................................................