UCLA UCLA Electronic Theses and Dissertations Title The Definitive Reform. How the 1996 Electoral Reform Triggered the Demise of the PRI's Dominant-Party Regime Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/92f462vv Author Garrido de Sierra, Sebastián Publication Date 2014 Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California University of California Los Angeles The Definitive Reform. How the 1996 Electoral Reform Triggered the Demise of the PRI's Dominant-Party Regime A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science by Sebasti´anGarrido de Sierra 2014 c Copyright by Sebasti´anGarrido de Sierra 2014 Abstract of the Dissertation The Definitive Reform. How the 1996 Electoral Reform Triggered the Demise of the PRI's Dominant-Party Regime by Sebasti´anGarrido de Sierra Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science University of California, Los Angeles, 2014 Professor Barbara Geddes, Chair This research offers a new explanation of the demise of the authoritarian dominant- party regime led by the PRI in Mexico from 1929 to 2000. I claim that this was largely triggered by the electoral reform of 1996. The reform changed the structure of incentives for many PRI faction leaders at the federal and state level. This started the rapid erosion of the PRI's elite unity, leading to the migration of experienced cadres and the valuable clientelistic machines under their control to other parties. This, in turn, reduced the clientelistic advantage that the PRI had enjoyed for decades, leading to its eventual defeat in the 2000 presidential election. But if the 1996 electoral reform was the main catalyst of the demise of the authoritarian regime led by the PRI, then why this party proposed, actively pro- moted and approved it? On the one hand, I argue that President Ernesto Zedillo proposed the reform in an attempt to reduce the recurrent post-electoral con- flicts that characterized Mexico's state and municipal elections between 1988 and 1994. Zedillo aimed to eradicate this source of political instability by achieving an electoral reform that would modify the incentives of the opposition parties in such a way that they abandoned their extra-legal tactics in favor of electoral com- ii petition and the legal mechanisms to settle any potential dispute. The PRI, on the other hand, supported the reform not only because certain parts of it signifi- cantly benefited the party, but also because the president still had the institutional and extra-institutional powers to decisively influence the political future of most Pri´ısta. This allowed Zedillo to convince and, if necessary, force the members of the PRI to approve those aspects of the reform that went against the official party's interests. I test my argument by combining archival research, interviews and the sta- tistical analysis of two original datasets constructed for this project. My results indicate that the 1996 electoral reform increased at least 400% the probability of defections of high-ranked faction leaders from the PRI, even after controlling for alternative explanations. Additionally, the empirical results indicate that these defections had a significant impact on the PRI's electoral performance. For in- stance, this party lost almost twice as many votes in those gubernatorial races where it had suffered the defection of a high-ranked Pri´ısta than in the states where the PRI remained united. iii The dissertation of Sebasti´anGarrido de Sierra is approved. Ivan Berend James DeNardo Michael Thies Barbara Geddes, Committee Chair University of California, Los Angeles 2014 iv To Jimena. Eight years after we started planning this adventure, the marathon is finally over, preciosa. I am deeply grateful for your love, patience and support throughout these years, and, of course, for those tender hugs. A otra cosa mariposa. To Flavia. Who constantly reminds me what really matters in life. To my parents, Tere and Celso. Who have always been an inspiration. Thanks for all your love, support and guidance over the years. v Table of Contents 1 Introduction :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 1 1.1 The argument in brief . .2 1.2 Dissertation's outline . .6 1.3 Dissertation's contributions . 10 2 Does Poor Economic Performance Explain the End of Dominant- Party Regimes? ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 13 2.1 Descriptive Analysis . 15 2.1.1 The Dependent Variable . 16 2.1.2 Economic Performance . 19 2.2 Models . 29 2.3 Final remarks . 41 2.4 Appendix . 43 3 Clientele Migration Theory. Explaining the Demise of the PRI's Dominant-Party Regime :::::::::::::::::::::::::: 45 3.1 Alternative Explanations . 46 3.2 Clientele Migration Theory . 54 3.2.1 The Clientelistic Nature of Dominant Parties . 55 3.2.2 The Importance of the Factions' Unity . 58 3.2.3 The \Safer Bet" . 60 3.2.4 The Type and Number of Defections Matters . 62 3.3 Summary . 65 vi 4 How the 1996 Reform Triggered the End of the PRI's Dominance 67 4.1 The demise of the PRI . 67 4.2 Empirical analysis . 81 4.2.1 The effect of the 1996 electoral reform on the PRI's unity . 81 4.2.2 The electoral consequences of defections . 99 4.3 Appendix A . 102 4.4 Appendix B . 103 4.5 Appendix C . 107 5 Why Was the 1996 Electoral Reform Proposed and Approved? 110 5.1 An Overview of the Reform's Negotiation . 112 5.1.1 First period . 114 5.1.2 Second period . 116 5.1.3 Third period . 117 5.2 Why did Zedillo Propose the Reform? . 120 5.2.1 The Emergence of Post-Election Conflicts . 123 5.2.2 Zedillo's Decision . 127 5.3 Why did the PRI Approve the Reform? . 132 5.3.1 The Carrots . 138 5.3.2 The Stick . 139 5.4 Final remarks . 148 5.5 Appendix . 151 6 Conclusions :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 152 vii List of Figures 2.1 Frequency of Dominant-Party Regimes' Ends, 1946-2010 . 17 2.2 Duration of Dominant-Party Regimes . 19 2.3 Three Measurements of Economic Performance of the Dominant- Party Regimes that Ended (2005 prices) . 24 2.4 Comparison of the Three Measurements of Economic Performance Across Different Groups of Observations . 27 2.5 Hazard Rate Functions Based on Model 8, Table 1 . 38 2.6 Predicted Effect of Five-Year Moving Average on the Probability of End of a Dominant-Party Regime . 41 3.1 A Dominant Party's Hypothetical Clientelistic Structure . 56 3.2 Self-Reinforcing Survival Mechanism of Dominant-Party Regimes 60 3.3 Threat Posed to a Dominant-Party Regime's Survival by Type of Factional Defection . 64 4.1 Defections of PRI members, 1986-2000 . 83 4.2 Defections of PRI's Gubernatorial Contenders, 1987-2006 . 91 4.3 Effect of the 1996 Electoral Reform on the Probability of a PRI Contender Leaving the Party . 98 5.1 Timeline of the Electoral Reform's Negotiation . 114 5.2 Percentage of post-election conflicts in mayoral elections, 1989-1998 126 viii List of Tables 2.1 Weibull Proportional Hazard Ratios . 32 2.2 Rare Events Logit Models . 33 2.3 Comparison of Models 7 and 8 Using Different Data . 36 4.1 Gubernatorial contenders that defected from the PRI . 87 4.2 Rare Events Logit Models, Including Observations up to 2006 . 95 4.3 Rare Events Logit Models, Including Observations up to 2000 . 95 4.4 Data Sources . 102 4.5 Rare Events Logit Models Using the Margin of Votes Obtained by the PRI in the Previous Election for Federal Deputies, Including Observations up to 2006 . 107 4.6 Rare Events Logit Models Using the Margin of Votes Obtained by the PRI in the Previous Election for Federal Deputies, Including Observations up to 2000 . 108 4.7 Rare Events Logit Models Using Imputed Gross State Product per Capita instead of Marginalization, Including Observations up to 2006109 4.8 Rare Events Logit Models Using Imputed Gross State Product per Capita instead of Marginalization, Including Observations up to 2000109 5.1 List of politicians interviewed . 151 ix Acknowledgments This dissertation would not have been possible without the effort and support of a large group of people and institutions. Many, many friends, colleagues and teachers have stimulated my thoughts throughout the last six years. Thanks to the luck of the draw, I was very fortunate to have Barbara Geddes as my advisor from the beginning of my doctoral program at UCLA. My debt to her is hard to measure. I learned from Barbara as her student and advisee, as well as her teacher and research assistant. Her thoughtful and honest comments saved me from walking into many dead ends and, more importantly, encouraged me to strengthen my arguments. Barbara's devotion to this profession, as well as her willingness to discuss any idea {including her own{ redefined the standard for what I aim to be in many aspects of my life. I am equally grateful to the rest of the members of my committee. Kathleen Bawn, Iv´anBerend, James DeNardo and Michael Thies all contributed in sig- nificant ways to improving my dissertation through their valuable insights and constructive feedback on the many iterations of this project. This dissertation was born as the final project for Jim's legendary PS 200 C class, in the Spring of 2009. A lot has changed since then, but not my admiration for Jim's commitment to his students and his capacity to create a methods class with layers of assessable knowledge for all audiences. Kathy has been an invaluable source of encouragement and optimism in every stage of this project. She played a particularly important role when I formal- ized part of my ideas in a model that greatly helped me clarify and develop my argument.