International Journal of Philosophy and Theology December 2017, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 66-81 ISSN: 2333-5750 (Print), 2333-5769 (Online) Copyright © The Author(s). All Rights Reserved. Published by American Research Institute for Policy Development DOI: 10.15640/ijpt.v5n2a8 URL: https://doi.org/10.15640/ijpt.v5n2a8 Divine Providence in Augustine’s City of God: A Doctrine of Confessio Dr. Barry David1 “The grace of God could not have been more graciously commended to us than it was. For the only Son of God, remaining immutable in Himself, put on humanity and bestowed upon mankind the spirit of His love through the mediation of a Man. Through this, it was made possible for us to come to Him...to the immutable from the mutable…But you need humility if you are to acquiesce in this truth…”2 I.) Introduction My thesis is that Augustine‟s doctrine of divine providence in De Civitate Dei (Civ. Dei) is structured, decisively for the better but sometimes for worse, by his confessio-centered intellectusfidei.3The latter consists in two unequal but co- implicate and mutually supporting components, namely (i) a metaphysics-compatible piety (confessio) that is ultimately determining, and (ii) a piety-compatible metaphysics of being, i.e. of what exists, that provides confessio‟s basic intellectual context and much of its content. While confessio, grounded in real assent to the doctrine of divine incarnation in Christ, consists in active gratitude to God for one‟s existing and opportunity for full existing (essentially, love of God and neighbour), Augustine‟s ontology distinguishes the fundamental structure of reality concerning God, creature, and the inter-relationship between God and man. As such, the latter includes both a paradigm of being and a closely related paradigm of worship explaining the nature, means, and structure of happiness. The former paradigm holds, inter alia, that (i) God is omniscient, omnipotent, all-good, triune, provident, creator, and (ii) man is created for union with God and owes to Him a debt of gratitude that is repaid in divine worship. By contrast, Augustine‟s paradigm of worship maintains, inter alia, (i) that Christ is the incarnate Word, i.e. the divine- human mediator between God and man, (ii) that man repays his debt of gratitude by worshipping Christ, and (iii) various important trinitarian paradigms. The latter not only distinguishes (i) God in Himself, (ii) man as imago trinitatis, and (iii) divine creating and providence but (iv), most importantly, Augustine‟s intellectusfidei itself so far as esse=being, nosse=the truth of being, and velle=confessio, i.e. the love of God and neighbor, man‟s proper response of gratitude for his existing and ability to know the truth of being (e.g. Confessiones [Conf.] 13.11.12). Confessio, therefore, is an intelligible disposition towards God and being, but it can vary by degree. It is more reasonable, i.e. has compelling content and practical value, when its paradigm of worship coheres with its paradigm of being, but is less so, i.e. has vitiated content and value, when its paradigms contradict. 1 Department of Philosophy, Ave Maria University, 5050 Ave Maria Boulevard, Ave Maria, Florida, U.S.A., 34142-9505. 2Civ. Dei 10.29, from Augustine: The City of God against the Pagans, translated and edited by R. W. Dyson, (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 436. 3 Concerning Augustine‟s intellectusfidei see inter alia: R.E. Cushman, “Faith and Reason in the Thought of St. Augustine,” Church History, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Dec., 1950), 271-294; R. Teske, “Saint Augustine as Philosopher: The Birth of Christian Metaphysics,” Augustinian Studies 23 (1992), 7-32; J.M. Rist, Augustine (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1994) 1-22, 290-313; R. Crouse, “Paucis Mutatis Verbis: St. Augustine‟s Platonism,” in Augustine and His Critics, eds. R. Dodaro and G. Lawless (New York; Routledge, 2000/2), 37-50; J. Wetzel, “Snares of truth: Augustine on free will and predestination,” in Augustine and His Critics, op.cit., 124-141, 130-4; F. Van Fleteren, “Augustine and Philosophy: IntellectusFidei,” in Augustine and Philosophy, eds. P. Cary, J. Doody, and K. Paffenroth (Lanham, Md; Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2010), 23-40; and B. David, “Feature Book Review: Inner Grace,” International Philosophical Quarterly, 50:2, Issue 198 (June 2010), 257-269, 262-9. With Rist, Teske, and Van Fleteren, I understand that Augustine‟s intellectusfidei matures over the course of his career yet (see Rist) has weak spots; and, with Cushman, Crouse, and Wetzel, I hold that Augustine‟s intellectusfidei is essentially confession/confessio, a form of Christian- Platonism anchored in pursuing truth and love for God (properly recognized as incarnate and triune) and neighbor. Dr. Barry David 67 Why is confessio the determining factor in Augustine's intellectusfidei? He understands that the unmerited divine gift of right love not only disposes the soul to receive requisite knowledge but guarantees the most important thing of all, viz. right relationship with God.4 As Augustine‟s own personal experience5 and the example of Monnica taught him, right living has right love for its sufficient condition and knowledge for its necessary condition.6 Hence, although confessio‟s immediate content, viz. its paradigm of worship, is measured by a defensible normative ontology, it is the standpoint of confessio that determines Augustine‟s intellectusfidei as a whole. Most importantly, by the time Augustine writes Civ. Dei his intellectusfidei displays a significant tension since at certain points its paradigm of worship overtly denies his normative ontology. Where is this problem found in Augustine‟s work? What causes it? What is its effect? It is located in a portion of his eschatology but has as its proximate cause a doctrine of grace first developed in Ad Simplicianum (Simpl.) 1.2 (~395-6 A.D.).7In that context, Augustine proclaims a teaching of divine-human interaction that both deepens and contradicts his understanding that (i) God is the sufficient condition i.e. creator, and therefore governor, helper, and goal of human being; and (ii) human will is a secondary, essentially responsive, cause of human action and events. While Augustine consistently maintains that will's co-operation with God always depends on His initiative and power,8 he also holds that (i) Original Sin9 makes humanity into a “mass of sin” (massapeccata) condemned to eternal misery10 and consequently (ii) that God intends beatitude for some persons rather than all giving His elect good will11 while leaving everyone else (for the remainder of time and for eternity) with an evil will.12 Despite Augustine's claim to the contrary (he maintains his doctrine upholds the divine sovereignty),13 these latter teachings contradict his normative ontology because they imply (i) that human willing, rather than God, is the sufficient condition for human being and (ii), on the flip side, that God is responsible for moral evil. By contrast, the metaphysics disclosed in Augustine's treatment of God's elect makes it evident that He (i) leads all humans to beatitude and (ii) permits human will to frustrate itself for a time rather than forever. As such, Augustine‟s profound insight into the depths and particularities of God‟s work in (i) will‟s co-operating with divine grace and (ii) establishing His eternal community (church) is at the expense of recognizing the scope of God‟s work with humanity as a whole. For if God is the sufficient condition for human being it logically follows that (i) His church is (somehow) universal rather than particular and (ii) His ultimate purpose in establishing some therein before others is to ultimately include all others (presumably, both in this life and in the afterlife). Therefore, while the unmerited generosity and particular application of God‟s help in this life is one thing, its ultimate (i.e. eternal) extent is another. Augustine, however, mistakenly conflates the one with the other to the effect that since God „calls‟ some before others, He ultimately gives eternal bliss to some rather than to all.14Consequently, Augustine's interpretation of God's relationship with those He helps is insightful and coherent, but his teaching that God is finally unwilling to provide the same aid to all is problematic.15 4 See Cushman, op. cit., esp. 273-4, 285-94. Augustine‟s standpoint (290) is that “The Word made flesh, the Mediator, so moves the will that man is enabled to love the good of which he has been aware without acknowledgement, without caritas.” 5 See inter alia: Conf. 3.5.9-7.9.13; 7.9.13-15; 7.17.21-8.12.28; Civ. Dei 8.10-12. 6E.g. De Beata Vita (Beata V.) 2.10, 3.21; De Ordine (Ord.) 2.1.1; Conf. 3.11.19-20; 9.10.23-25; cf.De Vera Religione (Vera Rel.). 1.1; De Doctrina Christiana (Doc. Chr.) 2.7.9-10; Conf. 7.21.27; Civ. Dei21.27) 7On the importance of Simpl. 1.2 in Augustine‟s intellectual development see, inter alia, E. TeSelle, Augustine the Theologian (New York; Herder and Herder, 1970), 176-182;Rist, Augustine, 14, 148-185; Wetzel, op. cit., 128-130; Bonner, Freedom and Necessity: St. Augustine’s teaching on Divine Power and Human Freedom (Washington, D. C.; Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 42-46; and P. Cary, Inner Grace: Augustine in the Traditions of Plato andPaul (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 51-62. 8Simpl. 1.2.3-12. 9For helpful discussion of Augustine‟s doctrine of Original Sin see P. Rigby, “Original Sin,” inSaint Augustine through the Ages: an Encyclopedia, ed. A. Fitzgerald, (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1999), 607-614.