Rethinking Disarmament: The Role of Weapons in the Resolution of Internal Armed Conflicts by Jamie Levin A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of PhD Department of Political Science University of Toronto © Copyright by Jamie Levin 2015 Rethinking Disarmament: The Role of Weapons in the Resolution of in Internal Armed Conflicts Jamie Levin PhD Department of Political Science University of Toronto 2015 Abstract Since the end of Cold War there has been an increase in the number internal conflicts and with it a corresponding rise in the number of third party interventions. Third parties, motivated by humanitarian concerns and spillover effects, have sought to create stable conditions for the termination of internal conflicts and the reconstruction of shattered societies. The disarmament of combatants has emerged as a leading practice. Disarmament is based on the arrestingly simple logic that the elimination of weapons removes the means by which combatants fight, thereby forcing them to commit to peace. Despite this emergent practice, however, belligerents consistently retain, and, in some cases, acquire weapons, even after signing peace agreements. Proponents of disarmament tend to view the retention of weapons as evidence of spoiling, yet disarmament leaves actors with little recourse in the likely event that a peace process collapses and conflict resumes. I argue that actors often retain weapons because the risk of violent reversal remains high even after the signing of a peace agreement. In the likely event of the breakdown of peace, weapons can be used to help ensure survival of those who retain them. This research explores the role of weapons and disarmament in internal conflicts with reference to both historical (the American War of Independence) and contemporary examples (Israel-Palestine and El Salvador). Though not all are examples of successful peacemaking, weapons played a productive role not only securing combatants, but also by allowing them to make more credible commitments and take greater risks associated with peace. This research reveals a paradox: while weapons provide belligerents with much-needed insurance, allowing them to take risks associated with peacemaking, retaining weapons appears to magnify the likelihood that an agreement will fail. Nevertheless, belligerents have at their disposal various ways to overcome this problem. I conclude by discussing the ways in which third parties may better support such initiatives. ii Acknowledgments I would like to thank my committee members Prof. Jeffrey Kopstein, Prof. Janice Stein, and Prof. Matthew Hoffmann for their time, patience, and valuable feedback on this project. Prof. Andrew Kydd for his external review. Prof. Chris Cochrane for the training and advice he provided on statistical methods. I would also like to thank my classmates Joseph MacKay, for the extensive feedback he provided on numerous rough drafts, and Abouzar Nasirzadeh, for acting as a sounding board for ideas, both good and bad. I wish to thank the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem Centre for their generous support as part of a yearlong fellowship. In particular Roni Shaked, a Truman Fellow, provided unending connections to members of the Palestinian Authority. Prof. Shlomo Avineri, of the Hebrew Universities Political Science Department provided valuable insights into early drafts. Finally, I would like to thank my partner Sarah and my parents who have put up with me through the drafting of this paper and have provided generous support, both financial and emotional. iii Table of Contents Acknowledgments .......................................................................................................................... iii Table of Contents ........................................................................................................................... iv Chapter 1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 1 Chapter 2 Disarmament, Insecurity, and the Westphalian Prejudice .................................... 36 Chapter 3 The Role of Weapons in the Transition from War to Peace in Internal Conflict . 69 Chapter 4 The United States Constitution and the Right to Bear Arms .............................. 112 Chapter 5 The Oslo Accords and Palestinian Guns: Spoilers or Cautious Peacemakers? .. 139 Chapter 6 Despite Hidden Weapons Peace Prevails in El Salvador ...................................... 85 Chapter 7 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 176 Bibliography ................................................................................................................................ 207 iv 1 Chapter 1 Introduction “Si vis pacem, para bellum” (If you want peace, prepare for war) -variously attributed Introduction The end of the Cold War marked a steep decline in the occurrence of inter-state war. Unfortunately, this decline did not mark the “end of history,” as some would have had us believe (Fukuyama, 1992). The reduction of inter-state war was offset by an overwhelming increase in the number of internal conflicts around the globe (T. D. Mason & Fett, 1996, p. 546; T. D. Mason, Weingarten, & Fett, 1999, p. 239). The break-up of the vast Soviet empire and a reduction in military aid precipitated numerous civil wars within the various successor states of the USSR and proxy states of both Superpowers (Gleditsch, 2007; Harbom, Hogbladh, & Wallensteen, 2006, p. 619; K. J. Holsti, 1995). Not only did the end of the Cold War mark an increase in the number of internal conflicts, it also removed a major challenge to their attempted resolution. The end of Cold War rivalries meant that the Superpowers no longer automatically vetoed intervention amongst their proxies and allies. Since then, third parties, such as the UN, EU, AU, and others, have increasingly intervened in internal conflicts in order to stem humanitarian crises, enforce ceasefires and peace agreements, and attempt to reconstruct shattered nations. In fact, more peacekeeping missions have been created since the end of the Cold War than in the previous forty-five years combined. Where previous missions tended to remain passive, coming after a conflict had been resolved, these new missions, broadly termed “second generation peacekeeping”, actively intervened to enforce the peace (Doyle & Higgins, 1995). With the increase in the number of internal conflicts, and concomitant attempts at their resolution, new norms and practices have emerged. One such example is disarmament (which is often used as a shorthand for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants). There is today a well-established consensus amongst theorists and practitioners alike that belligerents must be relieved of their arms in order to reconstruct shattered states and establish a robust and durable peace in the wake of internal armed conflict (c.f., Berdal, 1996; Colletta & Muggah, 2009, p. 3; Cooper, 2006; Council, 2000; Disarmament, 2007; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2 2006; Knight, 2004; Muggah, 2005, 2010; Operations, 1999; "Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace Operations," 2010). An emphasis on disarmament has found its way into a diverse range of theoretical literatures dealing with conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction, including the democratization literature (c.f., Gowa, 2000 on the the bullets to ballots hypothesis; Samuel P Huntington, 1957), the democratic civil peace literature (Ellingsen & Gleditsch, 1997; Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, & Gleditsch, 2001; Krain & Myers, 1997; David A Lake & Rothchild, 1996, p. 60; Raknerud & Hegre, 1997; Ward & Gleditsch, 1998), and the power sharing literature (D. L. Byman, 2002; Crocker & Hampson, 1996; Lijphart, 2004; Mansfield & Snyder, 1995; McRae, 1990; Nordlinger & Huntington, 1972; N. Sambanis, 2000; Sisk, 1996; J. Snyder & Jervis, 1999, p. 18; B.F. Walter, 1999, p. 141), to name but a few. Moreover, the practice of disarmament has been widely adopted by those attempting to resolve internal conflict on the ground. In fact, the overwhelming majority of peace agreements signed since the conclusion of the Cold War contain within them disarmament provisions, all recent peacekeeping missions established by the UN Security Council have included disarmament provisions in their mandate (Hoglbadh, 2008), and increasingly aid and other forms of international assistance are conditioned on disarmament. Indeed, disarmament has been described as a “growth industry” (Muggah, 2010, p. 2). This research aims to shed light on both the theory and practice of disarmament, in particular the many difficulties associated with its implementation. Despite the emergence of disarmament as a strong norm, or perhaps because of it, belligerents tend to stubbornly cling to their weapons (Knight, 2004, p. 503). The widespread failure to collect weapons, however, is often neglected or downplayed, and has not prompted a systematic reevaluation of the core assumptions underlying disarmament. In fact, practitioners and theorists alike are often single-mindedly focused on devising new strategies to disarm combatants instead of stopping to question the necessity of disarmament for the successful resolution of internal conflict (these efforts are dubbed the “second generation of disarmament”). For example, the UN Department