The Foundations of Human Morality: A Critical Analysis of Moral Nativism by Nalini Elisa Ramlakhan A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Affairs in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy Carleton University Ottawa, Ontario ©2011 Nalini Elisa Ramlakhan Library and Archives Bibliotheque et Canada Archives Canada Published Heritage Direction du Branch Patrimoine de I'edition 395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1A0N4 Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 Canada Canada Your file Votre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-87787-6 Our file Notre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-87787-6 NOTICE: AVIS: The author has granted a non­ L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive exclusive license allowing Library and permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives Archives Canada to reproduce, Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public communicate to the public by par telecommunication ou par I'lnternet, preter, telecommunication or on the Internet, distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans le loan, distrbute and sell theses monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres, sur worldwide, for commercial or non­ support microforme, papier, electronique et/ou commercial purposes, in microform, autres formats. paper, electronic and/or any other formats. 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Canada ii Abstract The aim of this paper is to determine the plausibility of moral nativism by examining and analyzing three main components of moral nativism, the poverty of moral stimulus argument, which is the first part of the Linguistic Analogy, moral dumbfounding, which is intertwined with, but separate from, the Linguistic Analogy, and the second part of the Linguistic Analogy, the Principles and Parameters approach. After analyzing the arguments in favour of moral nativism, I argue that these three components of moral nativism are problematic and lack support. I argue that if moral acquisition can be adequately explained by a nonnativist account, then there are grounds for rejecting both moral nativism and the proposal that there are universal moral domains that guide moral decision-making. This paper aims to point out the problems associated with moral nativism that many nativists overlook, do not address in their work, or do not consider problematic for their position, and argues that the inability to prove that nonnativist theories are inadequate or insufficient in accounting for moral acquisition and moral decision­ making weakens the nativist position. In an attempt to dismiss moral nativism as implausible, I provide three alternative nonnativist accounts of moral decision-making that plausibly account for moral acquisition and variation in moral decision-making across cultures and within cultures, as well as the emergence, maintenance, and transmission of moral norms. iii Acknowledgements I would like to begin by thanking Dr. Andrew Brook for supervising my thesis and for all of his support. Having Dr. Brook as a supervisor and working with him on this project has been a delightful experience, and I am grateful to Dr. Brook for all of his advice, comments, and time that was put into this project. Many thanks, Dr. Brook. I would also like to thank Dr. Heidi Maibom, and Dr. Christopher Burn for agreeing to be on my defense committee. I would especially like to thank Dr. David Matheson for all of his insightful comments, support, and guidance throughout the duration of this project. Lastly, I would like to thank my parents who have been supportive and encouraging throughout the entirety of this project. Thank you for always pushing me to do the best that I can and for supporting me throughout this project. Without your love and support, this project would not have been possible. iv Contents Abstract ii Acknowledgements iii Introduction 1 Chapter 1 - An Introduction to Moral Nativism 10 Chapter 2 - Problems with Moral Nativism 49 Chapter 3 - Alternatives to Moral Nativism 85 Conclusion 116 Bibliography 118 1 Introduction Questions pertaining to the nature of moral judgments are long standing in the field of philosophy, and although philosophy has progressed significantly throughout the years, these questions remain debated among philosophers. In fact, new questions have been raised in an attempt to understand the nature of moral judgments. This paper is concerned with analyzing the following question: are humans innately equipped with moral principles that account for moral acquisition and moral decision-making, or is morality acquired solely through environmental factors? Those who favour the view that humans are equipped with moral principles that account for moral acquisition argue that certain moral principles are innate, and cultures vary in moral decision-making depending on how the social environment shapes these principles. This view is known as the theory of moral nativism, where nativism is the term used for an innate endowment. Those arguing in favour of moral nativism tend to liken innate moral principles to innate language principles, where universal grammar is innate, but which language we speak is dependent upon which society we are raised in. These arguments take the position of Rawls's Linguistic Analogy, where he argued in ,4 Theory of Justice (1971) that we have a moral grammar that is analogous to Chomsky's Principles and Parameters theory in language. Those arguing in favour of the view that moral acquisition is acquired through sociocultural and environmental factors hold a nonnativist view of morality. Proponents of this theory do not contest the fact that humans have a capacity to act in a moral manner or to think morally. Rather, they take issue with the claim that a moral faculty or a universal moral grammar is needed to explain moral acquisition. It is important to note that nativism is simply another term for innatism. While it seems more commonsensical to use the term innatism when speaking of an innate endowment, 2 nativism, at least in the literature of moral psychology, has become the common term for innatism. Thus, I use the term nativism throughout this paper to refer to innatism, and use the terms interchangeably. There are a significant number of scholars who have contributed, and continue to contribute, to this area in moral psychology. Biologist Marc Hauser, philosopher Susan Dwyer, and psychologist Jonathan Haidt are moral nativists who provide stimulating and persuasive arguments in favour of moral nativism. Philosophers Jesse Prinz, Chandra Sripada, and Daniel Dennett1 are advocates of nonnativist theories of morality, and provide accounts of moral acquisition that rely heavily on sociocultural and environmental factors. While there are many scholars who have contributed to this debate, this paper will focus mainly on the works of the scholars mentioned. The aim of this paper is to determine the plausibility of moral nativism by examining and analyzing three main components of moral nativism, the poverty of moral stimulus argument, which is the first part of the Linguistic Analogy, moral dumbfounding, which is intertwined with, but separate from, the Linguistic Analogy, and the second part of the Linguistic Analogy (LA hereafter), the Principles and Parameters approach. After analyzing the arguments in favour of moral nativism, I argue that these three components of moral nativism are problematic and lack support. I argue that if moral acquisition can be adequately explained by a nonnativist account, then there are grounds for rejecting both moral nativism and the proposal that there are universal moral domains that guide moral decision-making. This paper aims to point out the problems associated with moral nativism that many nativists overlook, do not address in their work, or do not consider problematic for their position, and argues that the inability to prove that nonnativist theories are inadequate or insufficient in accounting for moral acquisition and moral decision- 3 making weakens the nativist position. In an attempt to dismiss moral nativism as implausible, I provide three alternative nonnativist accounts of moral decision-making that plausibly account for moral acquisition and variation in moral decision-making across cultures and within cultures, as well as the emergence, maintenance, and transmission of moral norms. In order to defend the claim that moral nativism is problematic, I begin Chapter I with an explication of moral nativist theories, where I provide a detailed account of what moral nativism consists of and introduce the theories put forth by Hauser, Dwyer, and Haidt. In particular, the poverty of moral stimulus argument, moral