Burns, Ewan John (2020) Conservatism: toward a traditionalist normative epistemology. PhD thesis. https://theses.gla.ac.uk/41827/ Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the author The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the author When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given Enlighten: Theses https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ [email protected] Conservatism: Toward a Traditionalist Normative Epistemology Ewan John Burns B.Mus. (Hons.), M.Litt. Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Philosophy School of Humanities College of Arts University of Glasgow June 2020 2 Abstract Conservatism’s core claim is that traditions play an important, if not essential, role in the acquisition of normative knowledge. However, that thesis has never been adequately defended. Three things are missing from conservative political thought: a traditionalist account of propositional normative knowledge, an explicit and sustained positive argument for traditions’ role in the acquisition of normative knowledge, and deference to relevant work in other areas of philosophy, especially epistemology. In this thesis, I provide an argument for conservatism which remedies each of these defects. I call it the Social Knowledge Argument. According to the Social Knowledge Argument, some beliefs formed out of deference to the traditions of one’s society constitute normative knowledge, since deference to the traditions of one’s society is a reliable process for normative belief formation in some societies. Deference to the traditions of one’s society is reliable in some societies because traditions are the outputs of cultural evolution and the latter tends to produce traditions that capture the demands of normative domains such as morality. The Social Knowledge Argument constitutes a traditionalist account of propositional normative knowledge, is an explicit argument for traditions’ epistemic role, and utilises intellectual resources unavailable to previous generations of conservative writers. Specifically, the Social Knowledge Argument assumes a process reliabilist theory of knowledge, and these are of recent provenance, and while conservatives have always appealed to cultural evolution (consider Burke’s claim that society develops organically or Smith’s invisible hand analogy), I am able to draw on fully-fledged scientific accounts of cultural evolution which were unavailable to or neglected by previous conservative writers. 3 Table of Contents Abstract 2 Acknowledgements 6 Introduction 8 Chapter One: What Is Conservatism? 27 1.1. Why Is It Necessary to Define Conservatism? 28 1.2. Overview of the Argument 29 1.3. Theories of Conservatism 36 1.3.1. Psychological Theories 36 1.3.2. Institutional Theories 42 1.3.3. Principled Theories 50 1.4. Conclusions 62 Chapter Two: Conservatism and Political Theory 63 2.1. Why Is It Necessary to Refute Anti-Theory Arguments? 65 2.2. Psychological and Ideological Anti-Theory Arguments 68 2.3. Three Principled Anti-Theory Arguments 71 2.3.1. The Anti-Rationalist Argument 72 2.3.2. The Anti-Ideology Argument 80 2.3.3. The Anti-Theory-Theory Argument 88 2.4. Conclusions 94 Chapter Three: What Are Traditions? 96 3.1. Traditions as Objects of Transmission 99 3.1.1. Rule-Governed Social Practices 99 3.1.2. Unreflectiveness, Longevity, Evolution 107 3.1.3. Traditions and other Practices 114 3.2. Traditions as Processes of Transmission 119 4 3.2.1. Testimony or Osmosis? 119 3.2.2. Traditions’ Epistemic Role 130 3.3. Conclusions 138 Chapter Four: The Social Knowledge Argument 140 4.1. The Explanation of The Social Knowledge Argument 141 4.1.1. Deference to the Traditions of one’s Society 142 4.1.2. Reliability, Normative Beliefs, Traditional Beliefs 149 4.1.3. Normative Knowledge 151 4.2. The Social Knowledge Argument’s Contribution to the Literature 158 4.3. Conclusions 160 Chapter Five: The Social Knowledge Argument’s Reliability Claim 161 5.1. The Explanation of the Argument for the Reliability Claim 161 5.2. The First Premise of the Argument for the Reliability Claim 173 5.2.1. The Argument for the First Premise of the Argument for the Reliability Claim 173 5.2.2. Objection: Bad Traditions 180 5.3. The Argument for the Second Premise of the Argument for the Reliability Claim 203 5.4. Conclusions 205 Chapter Six: The Social Knowledge Argument’s Anti-Luck Claim 206 6.1. Sensitive Traditional Beliefs 207 6.2. Safe Traditional Beliefs 218 6.2.1. The Argument for Safe Traditional Beliefs 218 6.2.2. Safe Traditional Beliefs and Bad Traditions 227 6.2.3. Objection: Multiculturalism and Safe Traditional Beliefs 234 6.3. Conclusions 240 5 Chapter Seven: Prospects for a Conservative Virtue Epistemology 242 7.1. Virtue Epistemology 243 7.2. Deference to the Traditions of one’s Society as an Intellectual Virtue 245 7.2.1. Greco’s Virtue Epistemology and Deference to the Traditions of one’s Society 245 7.2.2. Zagzebski’s Virtue Epistemology and Deference to the Traditions of one’s Society 249 7.3. The Unusualness of Deference as a Virtue 256 7.3.1. Hills’s Rejection of Deference 257 7.3.2. Howell’s Rejection of Deference 262 7.4. Conclusions 269 Conclusions 271 Reference List 278 6 Acknowledgements I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisors, Professor Ben Colburn and Dr Robert Cowan, for their unfailing generosity with their time, patience, and encouragement during my years as a PhD student. This thesis simply would not have been possible without them. I also owe a debt of gratitude to everyone in Philosophy at the University of Glasgow. There are more lecturers and fellow students than I could possibly name whose comments and questions made this thesis significantly better than it otherwise would have been. I am very grateful too to my family and friends, and most especially to my mother and late father, for their unconditional support during my time as a PhD student and the years of study preceding it. Finally, I would like to acknowledge financial support. The University of Glasgow is due my gratitude for awarding me the Arthur Jones Memorial Prize in Citizenship, which supported me in the academic year 2015-2016, and the Alexander Ogilvie Scholarship in Moral Philosophy, which supported my studies in 2018-2019. My thanks are also due, of course, to the donors of these prizes and the staff who recommended that I receive them. The Royal Institute of Philosophy, which awarded me a Jacobsen Studentship for the academic year 2017-2018, is also deserving of my appreciation. 7 Author’s Declaration I declare that, except where explicit reference is made to the contribution of others, this thesis is the result of my own work and has not been submitted for any other degree at the University of Glasgow or any other institution. Ewan J. Burns 11th November 2019 8 Introduction Conservatism first came to exist as an articulate political doctrine with the publication of Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France (Hamilton 2016; Kirk 1982: 4-6; O’Hear 1998a; O’Sullivan 1976: 9-10; Sigmund 2015). Its central claims have remained essentially unchanged since then. Conservatism stresses the moral imperfection of human beings, the limits of human reason, the importance of conserving, transmitting, and complying with societal traditions, the unforeseen bad consequences that can result from any social reform, however well-intentioned, the complex, organic nature of society, and the impossibility of effective large-scale social planning. The practical conclusion that conservatives draw from these theses is that there is a (defeasible) presumption in favour of the social and political status quo. The burden of proof is on the proponents of innovations, especially those innovations that threaten a society’s basic structure.1 The most important of conservatism’s commitments is the principle that traditions ought to be complied with. There are two arguments for that principle, both of which are epistemological. The first is that any proposed social innovation can have bad unforeseen consequences, since the limits of human reason entail the impossibility of accurately predicting the results of change. The second is that traditions play an important, if not essential, role in the acquisition of normative knowledge, where normative knowledge is any knowledge that is pertinent to some area of life in which certain acts are required or forbidden. We can call such areas of life ‘normative domains’. Morality, prudence, aesthetics, etiquette and epistemology are all normative domains. There are, therefore, two distinct types of conservatism. The first was originally defended by Burke but has roots in Plato (Marquez 2016: 406-407; O'Hear 1998a). 1 For a short overview of conservatism’s main commitments, see Hamilton (2016), Muller (1997), O’Gorman (1986), O’Hear (1998a), Sigmund (2015), and White (1950). Scruton’s (2001) book- length study is a classic longer overview of conservatism and his (2017) introduction is also highly useful. 9 It claims that wholesale or radical changes to the basic structure of society are almost never justified and there is a weighty presumption in favour of conserving existing institutions, customs and traditions (Brennan & Hamlin 2004; Brennan & Hamlin 2006; Brennan & Hamlin 2016b; Burke 2004; Marquez 2016: 405-406; Minogue 2012: 274-275; O'Hara 2011: 52-55, 86-87; O’Hara 2016; O'Sullivan 1976: 9-31; Rescher 2015; Stove 2003: 171-178).2 The reason for this is that we lack knowledge of the complexities of society (O'Hara 2011: 49-51).