Donations push candidates to the middle Zillante 2011 [Arthur, “An Experimental Study of Alternative Campaign Finance Systems: Donations, Elections and Policy Choices,” NBER Working Paper No. 17384. Accessed at: http://economics.sas.upenn.edu/~hfang/WorkingPaper/campaignfinance/w17384.pdf.] //DNP We experimentally study the effect of alternative campaign finance systems – as characterized by different information structure about donors – on donations, election outcomes, political candidates' policy choices, and welfare. Three alternative campaign finance systems are considered: a full anonymity (FA) system in which neither the politicians nor the voters are informed about the donors' ideal policies or levels of donations; a partial anonymity (PA) system in which only the politicians, but not the voters, are informed about the donors' ideal policies and donations; and finally a no anonymity (NA) system in which both the politicians and the voters are informed about the donors' ideal policies and donations. We find that donors contribute less in the FA system than in the PA and NA system, and candidates are less likely to deviate from their ideal policies under FA than under the PA and NA systems. The effect of donations on the candidate's policy deviations differs in FA from that in PA and NA. Specifically, in the FA system larger donations lead to smaller deviations from the candidate's ideal policy; but in the NA and PA systems, larger donations lead to larger deviations. As a result we observe that the donations lead to a centrist bias in the candidate's policy choices, i.e., donations are more likely to make extreme candidate move to the center than to make centrist candidate move to the right. This centrist bias is present more robustly in FA treatments. Finally, we find that donors greatly benefit from the possibility of donations regardless of the finance system. Voter welfare remains virtually unchanged under the PA and NA systems, especially when there is competition among the donors. Our findings provide the first experimental evidence supportive of Ayres and Ackerman's (2002) campaign finance reform proposal. [...] The estimated coefficients on the candidate’s ideal location 푐1 are negative and significant in all three treatments. Recall that a larger 푐1 means that the human candidate has a larger initial probability of being elected. Thus this result means that, holding the donation amount and other factors constant, candidates who are more likely to be elected to start with are less likely to deviate from their preferred policy. Furthermore, it means that extreme candidates’ deviations are larger than those of centrist candidates. This together with our observation from Table 4 implies that donations are more likely to make extreme candidate more moderate and less likely to make centrist candidate less centrist. The intuition behind the result is straightforward. When the candidate has a relatively high chance to win elections without the donations (in our model it’s centrist candidates) then they value donations less and are less inclined to reciprocate. On the other hand, candidates with a lower election chance may desire campaign contributions more and may be more willing to reward donors. The coefficient estimates indicate that the effect of this centrist bias varies across treatments: it is strongest under FA and is approximately the same in NA and PA with PA being the weakest. This finding that candidate’s policy deviations, when influenced by donations, are biased towards the center is beneficial for voters’ welfare, an issue discussed more in Section 5.4. Democrats are pro free trade unless it doesn’t have good regulations Democrats.org, 2016 [, "2016 Party Platform," https://www.democrats.org/party-platform] MJS 4-30-2017 While we believe that openness to the world economy is an important source of American leadership and dynamism, we will oppose trade agreements that do not support good American jobs, raise wages, and improve our national security. We believe any new trade agreements must include strong and enforceable labor and environmental standards in their core text with streamlined and effective enforcement mechanisms. Trade agreements should crack down on the unfair and illegal subsidies other countries grant their businesses at the expense of ours. It should promote innovation of and access to lifesaving medicines. And it should protect a free and open internet. We should never enter into a trade agreement that prevents our government, or other governments, from putting in place rules that protect the environment, food safety, or the health of American citizens or others around the world. These are the standards Democrats believe must be applied to all trade agreements, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). A2: Steel initiative - Ben Goodrich furthers, the steel initiative would have harmed Florida, a swing state, therefore the Electoral College couldn’t be the reason for its implementation. Steel Policy: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly/ Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Ben Goodrich/ International Economics Policy Briefs/ January 2003/ http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb03-1.pdf As soon as President Bush announced the steel tariffs, domestic steel consumers and foreign steel exporters complained that they were being forced to pay for Bush’s gift to the steel industry. Leading the charge, the European Union and Japan publicly threatened to retaliate against hallmark US exports from politically sensitive congressional districts—such as textiles from Southeast states and citrus products from Florida—in advance of the November 2002 mid-term elections. New swing states coming - and they are super diverse David F. Damore, 1-26-2012 ["The Impact of Density and Diversity on Reapportionment and Redistricting in the Mountain West," Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-impact- of-density-and-diversity-on-reapportionment-and-redistricting-in-the-mountain-west/] MJS 4-30- 2017 During the first decade of the 21st century the six states of the Mountain West — Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah — experienced unprecedented political and demographic changes. Population growth in all six states exceeded the national average and the region is home to the four states that underwent the largest population gains between 2000 and 2010. As a consequence, the region is now home to some of the most demographically diverse and geographically concentrated states in the country— factors that helped to transform the Mountain West from a Republican stronghold into America’s new swing region. This paper examines the impact that increased diversity and density are exerting on reapportionment and redistricting in each Mountain West state and assesses the implications that redistricting outcomes will exert both nationally and within each state in the coming decade. Nationally, the region’s clout will increase due to the addition of three seats in the House of Representatives (one each in Arizona, Nevada, and Utah) and electoral contexts in Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, and New Mexico that will result in competitive presidential and senate elections throughout the decade. At the state level, the combination of term limits, demographic change, and the reapportionment of state legislative seats from rural to urban areas will alter the composition of these states’ legislatures and should facilitate the realignment of policy outcomes that traditionally benefitted rural interests at the expense of urban needs. [...] In addition to further urbanizing the region, the prior decade’s growth continued to transform the region’s demographics as all six Mountain West states are now more ethnically diverse as compared to a decade ago.[iii] The largest changes occurred in Nevada where the minority population increased by over 11 percent and now better than 45 percent of Nevadans are classified as non-white. While the bulk of this growth was among Hispanics, whose share of the population increased by 7 percent and are now 26.5 percent of all Nevadans, the Silver State also recorded large increases among Asian and Pacific Islanders. Arizona experienced similar increases as that state’s minority population mushroomed from 36.2 percent to 42.2 percent with Hispanics now constituting 30 percent of the population. In Colorado, the minority population increased by 3.5 percent to 30 percent. Nearly all of this change was caused by an increase in Hispanics, who now constitute 20.7 percent of the state’s population. New Mexico continues to be the Mountain West’s most diverse state as nearly three out of five New Mexicans are minorities and the state contains the region’s largest Hispanic population (46 percent). And while Idaho and Utah remain overwhelmingly white, both states’ non-white populations grew at levels similar to Colorado. Idaho is now 16 percent non-white (including a Hispanic population of 11.2 percent) and nearly one in five Utahans is a minority. Between 2000 and 2010, Hispanics increased by 4 percent to constitute 13 percent of Utah’s population. Politically, these changes helped to create competitive electoral contexts across the region. Indeed, with the obvious exceptions of Idaho and Utah, the Mountain West is now more hospitable to the Democratic Party than it was in 2000. In particular, Democrats were able to make significant gains in Colorado, Nevada, and New Mexico and effectively flipped those states from Republican leaning in 2000 to Democratic leaning in 2010. In Arizona, the Democratic performance