View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Scholarship at UWindsor University of Windsor Scholarship at UWindsor OSSA Conference Archive OSSA 8 Jun 3rd, 9:00 AM - Jun 6th, 5:00 PM Argumentative Bluff in rE istic Discussion: An analysis and evaluation Jan Albert van Laar Groningen University Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive Part of the Philosophy Commons Jan Albert van Laar, "Argumentative Bluff in rE istic Discussion: An analysis and evaluation" (June 3, 2009). OSSA Conference Archive. Paper 100. http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA8/papersandcommentaries/100 This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences at Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized administrator of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Argumentative Bluff in Eristic Discussion: An analysis and evaluation JAN ALBERT VAN LAAR Faculty of Philosophy Groningen University Oude Boteringestraat 52 9712 GL Groningen The Netherlands [email protected] ABSTRACT: How does the evaluation of argumentation depend on the dialogue type in which the argumentation has been put forward? This paper focuses on argumentative bluff in eristic (or: polemic) discussion. Any arguer conveys the pretence that his argumentation is dialectically reasonable and, at least to some degree, rhetorically effective. Within eristic discussion, it can be profitable to bluff that these claims are correct. However, it will be defended that such bluffing is dialectically inadmissible, even within an eristic discussion. KEYWORDS: argumentative bluff, critical discussion, dialogue types, eristic discussion, fallacies 1. INTRODUCTION In order to understand and assess an argumentative discourse we need to investigate the circumstances of the discourse. Argumentation is typically put forward by a particular speaker towards a particular collection of addressees within a particular kind of situation. One component of this “situatedness” or “contextuality” is the type of dialogue in which the argumentation is located. Walton and Krabbe distinguish between six basic types of dialogue, based on more elementary distinctions pertaining to the initial situation of a dialogue, the individual aims of the participants and the collective main goal of the dialogue (1995). These six types are the persuasion dialogue, the negotiation dialogue, the eristic dialogue, the inquiry dialogue, the deliberation dialogue and the information- seeking dialogue. This paper restricts its scope to what is only a subtype of the eristic dialogue, namely eristic discussion.1 An eristic discussion (also referred to as “sophistical dialogue” by Walton 1998, p. 195) forms an highly adversarial and competitive kind of conversation where each party tries to create the impression on the part of an attending audience that it is he who is the most clever and skilful discussant, in a shared attempt to settle upon an appropriate intellectual hierarchy between the participants. What 1 The other subtype is the quarrel and is dealt with in more detail by Krabbe and Walton (Walton and Krabbe 1995; Walton 1998). Laar, J. A. van (2009). Argumentative Bluff in Eristic Discussion: An analysis and evaluation. In: J. Ritola (Ed.), Argument Cultures: Proceedings of OSSA 09, CD-ROM (pp. 1-11), Windsor, ON: OSSA. Copyright © 2009, the author. JAN ALBERT VAN LAAR consequences does an argumentation’s being situated within an eristic discussion have for its evaluation? In this paper I will first sketch the problem of evaluating argumentation in the context of an eristic discussion. Next, I will characterize the eristic discussion, elaborating on Walton’s account (1998, chapter 7). Third, I will discuss a peculiarity of offering argumentation in this kind of setting, starting from the pragma-dialectical perspective on argumentation as strategic manoeuvring between the dialectical objective of dispute resolution and the rhetorical objective of winning over the other side (Van Eemeren and Houtlosser 1999; 2002). Fourth, I will defend that eristic argumentation can be judged by the standards of a critical discussion and show that it is nevertheless useful to take the eristic dialogue context into account when evaluating argumentation. 2. THE PROBLEM OF EVALUATING ERISTIC ARGUMENTATION Walton proposes to deal with models of types of dialogue as descriptions of kinds of dialogue in which we can be engaged, but also as normative models. In his view, argumentation that is situated within a particular dialogue type must be evaluated by determining to what extent the argumentation serves this dialogue type’s main goal. [W]hen an argument is used it is a good argument (or a successful or correct argument) to the extent that it contributes to the goal of the dialogue. But there can be different goals because there can be different types of dialogue in which the same argument can be used. Thus in the new dialectical method of evaluating arguments, an argument is correct or reasonable if it is used at some stage in a dialogue to contribute the overall goal of that type of dialogue by fulfilling the requirements for the kind of move an argument is supposed to be at that stage. (Walton 1998, p. 30) For example, Walton and Krabbe state that “[i]n the eristic discussion, an outrageous fallacy may be the best and most successful technique to persuade your audience” (1995, p. 79), suggesting that the eristic context makes an otherwise fallacious move non- fallacious. In the course of section 5, I will offer two reasons for adopting an alternative view, according to which we ought not to adopt different argumentative norms for different dialogue types, and so for the view that we should not adopt a more liberal perspective when evaluating reasoning used for polemic purposes.2 But then, in what other way could the argumentation’s being localized in a particular dialogue type be relevant for our assessment of the argumentation? Van Eemeren and Houtlosser defend that argumentation must always be evaluated by determining to what extent it serves or hinders the goal of a genuine critical discussion, that is, the resolution of a difference of opinion, taking into account the merits of both sides. Nevertheless, they hold that the evaluation of argumentation can be improved by taking the so-called argumentative activity type into account. First, knowledge of the argumentative activity can be used in order to reconstruct the discourse adequately, for example by enabling us to unearth the commitments of those involved (Van Eemeren et al., forthcoming). For example, it is because we know what role a prosecutor is supposed play that we know that his question must be reconstructed as part of an argument. Second, the activity type can provide us with context sensitive criteria 2 See Krabbe and van Laar (2007) for an account of the functions of reasoning. 2 ARGUMENTATIVE BLUFF IN ERISTIC DISCUSSIONS with which it can be decided whether a discussion move complies with a general rule for critical discussion (van Eemeren et al., forthcoming). The application of the general norms for critical discussion can depend on the features of an activity type. For example, the rules for critical discussion allow a discussant to employ the so-called pragmatic argumentation scheme. When using this scheme, the discussant argues in favour of a course of action by pointing at desirable consequence of the course of action. If the discussion is part of a parliamentary debate the desirability most plausibly pertains to the interests of the public at large and if the discussion is part of a mediation session between parents on the verge of a divorce, the desirability most plausibly pertains to the interests of the child. So, the context can provide a criterion with which to determine whether a consequence counts as desirable or not. To my mind, these criteria can be reconstructed as contextual specifications of the norms for critical discussion that the participants can agree upon in the opening stage of a critical discussion. By entering a particular argumentative activity type, a person implicitly commits himself to this outcome of the (implicit) opening stage. Krabbe (forthcoming) holds that the normative model for critical discussion prescribes a high level of cooperation between the participants, while at the same time allowing the parties some level of competitiveness. Various dialogue types can be seen as forcing the participants to raise the level of cooperation beyond the level prescribed by a resolution oriented critical discussion.3 For example, an inquiry or a deliberation dialogue requires participants to work more closely together in a shared attempt to reach an outcome that either can count as shared knowledge or as an agreed upon course of action. The additional norms can be applied when evaluating the argumentation. Again, these norms can be reconstructed as implicitly agreed upon by entering the inquiry. In other words, they are additional procedural starting points that the participants have fixed in the opening stage of their discussion. So, both Krabbe and van Eemeren et al. assign a direct evaluative role for the argumentative activity type in letting the (material or procedural) commitments of the participants be partly determined by the argumentative activity type. When evaluating argumentative discourse we can, then, determine