View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Calhoun, Institutional Archive of the Naval Postgraduate School Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 2013-09 The submersible threat to maritime homeland security Davis, Donald B. Monterey California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/37609 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS THE SUBMERSIBLE THREAT TO MARITIME HOMELAND SECURITY by Donald B. Davis September 2013 Thesis Advisor: Rodrigo Nieto-Gomez Second Reader: Alan Tubbs Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED September 2013 Master’s Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS THE SUBMERSIBLE THREAT TO MARITIME HOMELAND SECURITY 6. AUTHOR(S) Donald B. Davis 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School REPORT NUMBER Monterey, CA 93943-5000 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING N/A AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited A 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) Small submersible vessels have been used for years by nation states, terrorist groups, and criminal organizations to achieve operational objectives. These entities have sought to capitalize on the overriding tactical advantage of submersible technology which is stealth. For example, drug trafficking organizations in Central and South America have been routinely using self-propelled semi-submersible vessels to clandestinely transport large quantities of illicit drugs to North America. Small submersible vessels can also be nefariously used in the maritime domain to transport persons or weapons or they could be used as waterborne improvised explosive devices. Terrorists and criminals are complex adaptive adversaries and are driven to innovate when confronted with threats to their operational effectiveness. Innovation and adaption are driving these foes to leverage disruptive technology towards the development or acquisition of fully-submersible vessels. Furthermore, there is a growing population of privately owned submersibles within the U.S. that policymakers have little visibility of. Homeland security policymakers lack adequate situational awareness regarding the vulnerabilities, threats, and consequences to the maritime transportation system from the malicious use of submersibles. The core challenge for the maritime homeland security enterprise with regards to submersibles is developing effective strategies to mitigate their potential risk. 14. SUBJECT TERMS Department of Homeland Security, disruptive technology, drug trafficking 15. NUMBER OF organization, maritime domain awareness, maritime homeland security, self-propelled fully- PAGES submersible (SPFS), self-propelled semi-submersible (SPSS), small vessel security strategy (SVSS), 93 strategic risk, submarines, terrorism, United States Coast Guard, waterborne improvised explosive 16. PRICE CODE device (WBIED) 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UU NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THE SUBMERSIBLE THREAT TO MARITIME HOMELAND SECURITY Donald B. Davis Lieutenant, United States Coast Guard Reserve, Port Clinton, Ohio B.S.B.A., University of Central Florida, 1990 M.S.M., Florida Institute of Technology, 1995 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE) from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL September 2013 Author: Donald B. Davis Approved by: Rodrigo Nieto-Gomez Thesis Advisor Alan Tubbs Second Reader Mohammed Hafez, PhD Chair, Department of National Security Studies iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT Small submersible vessels have been used for years by nation states, terrorist groups, and criminal organizations to achieve operational objectives. These entities have sought to capitalize on the overriding tactical advantage of submersible technology which is stealth. For example, drug trafficking organizations in Central and South America have been routinely using self-propelled semi-submersible vessels to clandestinely transport large quantities of illicit drugs to North America. Small submersible vessels can also be nefariously used in the maritime domain to transport persons or weapons or they could be used as waterborne improvised explosive devices. Terrorists and criminals are complex adaptive adversaries and are driven to innovate when confronted with threats to their operational effectiveness. Innovation and adaption are driving these foes to leverage disruptive technology towards the development or acquisition of fully-submersible vessels. Furthermore, there is a growing population of privately owned submersibles within the U.S. that policymakers have little visibility of. Homeland security policymakers lack adequate situational awareness regarding the vulnerabilities, threats, and consequences to the maritime transportation system from the malicious use of submersibles. The core challenge for the maritime homeland security enterprise with regards to submersibles is developing effective strategies to mitigate their potential risk. v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 A. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM .............................................................1 B. BACKGROUND AND NEED ........................................................................1 C. RESEARCH QUESTION AND METHODOLOGY ...................................4 D. SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FIELD.................................................................4 E. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................5 F. LIMITATIONS ................................................................................................8 II. HISTORICAL USE OF SMALL SUBMERSIBLE VESSELS AS WEAPONS ....9 A. NATION STATE USE OF SUBMERSIBLES ..............................................9 1. Confederate States of America (CSA)................................................9 2. Japan ...................................................................................................10 3. Germany and the Battle of the Atlantic ...........................................12 4. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) ...........................................14 5. North Korea ........................................................................................15 6. Iran ......................................................................................................18 B. TERRORIST AND INSURGENT USE OF SUBMERSIBLES ................19 1. American War of Independence .......................................................19 2. Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) ..........................................20 3. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) .......................21 4. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) ......................................22 C. DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATION’S (DTO’S) USE OF SUBMERSIBLES ..........................................................................................22 III. PRIVATELY OWNED AND OPERATED SUBMERSIBLES ............................27 A. THE PRIVATE SUBMARINE COMMUNITY .........................................27 B. REMOTELY OPERATED VEHICLE (ROV) TECHNOLOGY .............29 C. UNREGULATED VS. REGULATED VESSELS ......................................30 D. MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS (MDA) ..........................................32 E. PRICE AND AVAILABILITY .....................................................................33 IV. RISK: VULNERABILITIES, THREATS, & CONSEQUENCES .......................39 A. RISK ................................................................................................................40 B. VULNERABILITIES ....................................................................................41 C. THREAT .........................................................................................................41