A joint publication for U.S. Artillery professionals September - October 2019 Achieving joint, multinational interoperability Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Headquarters,http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin Department of the Army. PB 644-19-5 • 1 CONTENTS 3 Manuever Air and Missile Defense in multi- 32 The King of Battle and the defeat of the ISIS domain operations Caliphate Col. Gary Beard Lessons learned from Operation Inherent Resolve 18-19 Capt. Mathew J. Sullivan 6 Allied Fires training network 36 E-62 THAAD Soldiers return home after Lt. Col. Matthew R. Arrol crucial role in FTG-11 1st Lt. Anthony Ross 10 5-7th ADA executes Panther Shield to 38 Firebase Saham A day in the life of joint-artillerymen securing the Iraqi evaluate total readiness border 1st Lt. Josef J. Danczuk Capt. Jason Welch 41 Lessons learned from CAESAR deployment 13 Globally integrated Fires in Iraq Capt. Natasha Fultz-Castro Col. Olivier Fort 45 Theater Security Cooperation Week 14 Innovative thinking Patriot battalion forges bonds with UAE air defenders Looking behind to look ahead 1st Lt. Jessica Beatty Maj. Timothy Heck 47 Multinational Fires in a multi-domain 18 Warfighter 19.2 environment Targeting in America’s tank division JAGIC chief in Joint Warfighting Assessment 19 Maj. Joshua Herzog and Chief Warrant Officer 4 Steven Lt. Col. Nicolas Konieczny Fernandez 51 Bold developments in the Field Artillery Why Exercise Dynamic Front (DF) and Artillery Systems 23 The fire support dilemma in cavalry and Cooperation Activities (ASCA) matter! armor units Robert Keith Gunther ‘A way’ to conduct company-level fire support without forward observers 59 Toward understanding Fires on near-peer Capt. Ellen Loran battlefield 26 Aggressive counterfire with ground moving Steven Yeadon target indicator in large-scale combat 64 FA hosts ADA at Redleg CTE for first time operations By Mitch Meador Chief Warrant Officer 2 Timothy J. Porritt and Maj. Calvin 67 AMCOM’s display Patriot relocates to home P. Roe II of Air Defense Artillery 28 Kasserine Pass lessons for the reemergence By Gina Baltrusch of SHORAD 68 In the next issue of Fires Capt. Joshua Urness and Capt. Abigail Carter Editor: Jamie Southerland unsolicited material. By order of Mark A. standing of the power, limitations and Art Director: Rick Paape, Jr. Milley, General, United States Army, Chief application of joint Fires, both lethal and Assistant Art Direction: Judy Oman of Staff. Official: nonlethal; fosters joint Fires interdepen- Assistant Editor: Monica Wood dency among the armed services; and The Fires staff can be reached by promotes the understanding of and in- email at usarmy.sill.fcoe.mbx.fires-bul- teroperability between the branches, all of [email protected] or by phone at Gerald B. O’Keefe (580) 442-5121. Administrative Assistant to the which contribute to the good of the Army, Disclaimer Secretary of the Army, Auth. 1513304 joint and combined forces and our nation. Fires, a professional bulletin, is pub- Fires is pleased to grant permission to re- lished bimonthly by Headquarters, De- print; please credit Fires, the author(s) and partment of the Army under the auspices photographers. of the Fires Center of Excellence, 455 Mc- Wilson A. Shoffner Cover: Staff Sgt. Brandon Laureano, a Nair Ave., Fort Sill, OK 73503. The views Major General, United States Army launcher chief assigned to 1st Battalion, 14th expressed within are those of the authors Commanding General, Fort Sill, Okla. Field Artillery Brigade, 75th Field Artillery and not the Department of Defense or its Purpose Brigade, Fort Sill, Okla., ground guides an elements. The content contained within Originally founded as the Field Artil- M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Sys- Fires does not necessarily reflect the U.S. lery Journal, Fires serves as a forum for Army’s position or supercede information the discussions of all Fires professionals, tem (HIMARS) after being flown in by an Air in other official publications. Use of new Active, Reserves and National Guard; dis- Force C-130J Super Hercules during Operation items constitutes neither affirmation of seminates professional knowledge about Phantom Flight in Fort Chaffee, Ark., on April their accuracy nor product endorsements. progress, development and best use in 12, 2019. (Sgt. Dustin D. Biven/75th Field Ar- Fires assumes no responsibility for any campaigns; cultivates a common under- tillery Brigade) 2 • Fires, September-October 2019, Achieving joint, multinational interoperability Maneuver Air and Missile Defense in multi-domain operations By Col. Gary Beard “The AMD force of 2028 must be many things such as agile, rapidly tailorable, scalable and able to fight multiple, complex and integrated attacks. To achieve that, we have to optimize our formations to see a mix of capabilities, integrated at all echelons.” —Lt. Gen. James Dickinson at an Association of the United States Army professional development forum Current and future and allied forces possess signifi- target detection, rapid correla- capabilities required cant offensive counter air (OCA) tion of detected targets, identifi- and defensive counter air (DCA) cation and threat decision made Joint Publication 3.0, Joint Op- capabilities as a means of defeat- by an appropriate leader and erations, defines the purpose of ing enemy air threats. In addition engagement by a designated de- AMD forces as: to OCA, the U.S. has heavily in- feat mechanism. Operations in a Countering Air and Missile vested in cyberspace operations complex anti-access/area denial Threats...integrates offensive as a means of disrupting ene- (A2/AD) environment necessitate and defensive operations my communications, command maneuver SHORAD forces with and capabilities to attain and and control networks and even the ability to operate in coordi- maintain a desired degree launch commands from control nation with adjacent AMD forces. of air superiority and force stations to platforms. These ca- However, forces must also protect protection. These operations pabilities could stop a platform associated maneuver forces if re- are planned to destroy or from launching, negating the fu- quired to operate independently negate enemy manned and ture need to deal with a threat as due to a communications-denied unmanned aircraft and mis- it never becomes active. Attack environment. siles, both before and after operations further nest with ac- launch.1 tions before launch, seeking to Interoperability and data This definition shows air and destroy enemy systems capable sharing missile defense (AMD) takes mul- of launching air threats, such as tiple forms and is required to missile launchers and unmanned AMD forces must effectively protect against all air threats an aircraft systems ground stations, share information across the force adversary can direct against the which would impact U.S. and al- and with coalition and allied part- joint force. The evolving threat lied forces. Once the threat is air- ners. No force is capable of fully requires the Army to reverse the borne, active defense provides defending the large battlefields elimination of maneuver short the greatest likelihood of defeat- U.S. forces will compete on in the range air defense (SHORAD). It is ing the threat. DCA and ground- future. As such, the ability to share critical that integration take mul- based air defense seek to destroy fire control data in a net-centric tiple forms, both technically and a threat platform, optimally prior environment is critical to protect- doctrinally. The U.S. Army must to the threat impacting U.S. forc- ing the joint force. This requires make use of the traditional pillars es. SHORAD forces to possess the ro- of active defense, passive defense Maneuver AMD forces must bust communications necessary and attack operations to ensure possess the tools required to per- to send and receive early warning protection for maneuver forces, form the full engagement se- and identification information. concepts that directly apply to quence: detection, identification Only by effectively sharing all in- current multi-domain battle doc- and engagement. This is support- formation about threats can the trine. ed by a robust communications force take coordinated action to Effective AMD requires both and data-sharing structure that enhance protection. pre- and post-launch activities enables the exchange of informa- That ability to share data must to defeat enemy air threats. U.S. tion required to ensure accurate also take place within the contest- 1 Jason Cutshaw, “Army’s Senior Air Defender Talks Future of Air, Missile Defense,” Army Online, 22 Mar 2019, https://www.army.mil/article/219177/armys_senior_air_defender_talks_fu- ture_of_air_missile_defense (Accessed 31 Mar 2019). http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 3 ed environment likely to exist in my and keep conflict off American ighting and enhance integration the future. A significant aspect of shores. Effectively fighting as part between multinational forces. A2/AD operations requires the of combined forces to achieve adversary to impact information military objectives requires the Contribution beyond AMD sharing and decision-making ability to operate alongside allies processes. While the ongoing de- and partners; and that only hap- Rossi’s comments regarding velopment of the Integrated Air pens with integration. speed and integration demon- and Missile Defense Battle Com- Integration of maneuver strate that maneuver SHORAD mand System (IBCS) is an im- SHORAD forces into U.S./joint/ units must do more than “just” be portant part of integrating AMD partner forces is about much more AMD experts. To maximize their systems into the joint force, it is than the technological capability contribution to the maneuver more important for the maneu- of passing data. True integration fight, they must do far more than ver forces likely to be the target requires complete involvement defeat air threats. Prior to 2006 of disruption attempts to share in the battlespace, including plan- when the last divisional SHORAD information across the depth and ning, entry, logistics, communi- units were inactivated, SHORAD width of the battlefield.