FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1961-1963 Volume X Cuba, 1961-1962 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington Cuba, 1961-1962 1. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State Havana, January 3, 1961, 1 a.m. //Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Cuba. Official Use Only; Niact. 2674. Reference: Embassy telegram 2667./1/ Note received from Ministry of Foreign Relations at 1:20 a.m. January 3 reading in translation as follows: /1/In telegram 2667 from Havana, January 2, Charge Daniel M. Braddock reported that Castro had just announced that his government had decided that the United States would not be allowed to have a greater number of diplomatic personnel in Cuba than Cuba maintained in the United States. Castro indicated that if all the U.S. officials remaining in Cuba decided to leave that would be "perfectly all right with us." He added that "90 percent of functionaries are spies anyway." (Ibid.) Havana, January 2, 1961, Year of Education Mr. Charge d'Affaires: I have the honor to inform you that the Revolutionary Government has decided that under present circumstances the personnel of the Embassy and Consulate of Cuba in the City of Washington, whether diplomatic, consular, or of other character, whatever their nationality, should not exceed eleven persons. Likewise it has decided that the personnel of the Embassy and Consulate of the United States in the city of Habana, whether diplomatic, consular or of other character, whatever their nationality, should likewise be limited to eleven persons. For the purpose of facilitating the departure of the persons who for this reason must abandon the national territory, a period of 48 hours has been fixed from the time of receipt of this note. I take the opportunity, Mr. Charge d'Affaires, to reiterate to you the assurance of my reciprocity of your considerations./2/ /2/Braddock assessed the Cuban note and its impact in telegram 2675 from Havana, January 3. His conclusion was that it would be impossible to maintain a useful operation at the level authorized by the Cuban Government. Braddock recommended that the United States respond by breaking relations immediately. (Ibid.) The note is also printed in Department of State Bulletin, January 23, 1961, p. 104. Signed Carlos Olivares. Braddock 2. Editorial Note On January 3, 1961, at 9 a.m., a meeting was held at the White House to consider a response to the note from the Cuban Foreign Ministry which was transmitted in telegram 2674 from Havana. (Document 1) According to notes on the meeting taken by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Lyman Lemnitzer, the participants included President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Christian Herter, Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates, Secretary of the Treasury Robert Anderson, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Gordon Gray, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, CIA Deputy Director for Plans Richard Bissell, Bissell's Assistant C. Tracy Barnes, and several officials from the Department of State, including Under Secretary Livingston Merchant and Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Mann. Herter summarized the Cuban note and read Charge Braddock's message recommending an immediate break in relations. (See footnote 2, Document 1) Mann noted that, in the event of a break in relations, the Swiss Embassy in Havana could be expected to look after U.S. interests in Cuba. The President asked how the United States would know what was happening in Cuba if relations were broken and was told that, outside of Cuban exile sources, the United States would have only limited sources of information in Cuba after relations were broken. After some discussion, it was concluded that a break in relations would not affect the treaty guaranteeing the United States the use of Guantanamo naval base. Gates and Merchant questioned the need to respond immediately to the Cuban note, but Eisenhower decided to make a clean break and directed Herter to take the steps necessary to effect the break as quickly as possible. Lemnitzer's notes conclude with the action assigned to the Joint Chiefs: "Look into ways and means of training Cuban refugees & expand the program." The program he referred to was the program developing under CIA direction to launch an invasion of Cuba with a force of Cuban exiles. (National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, Notes, Miscellaneous Meetings, 1961) Notes on the meeting were also taken by Barnes, who recorded that it was agreed that the number of Cuban exiles being trained for the invasion should be increased, possibly up to 1,500, and additional training sites would have to be developed. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 85-00664R, Box 2, Vol. III, Part IV) For another record of the meeting, see Document 3. 3. Memorandum for the Record Washington, January 3, 1961. //Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba Program, Nov 1960-Jan 20, 1961. Secret. Prepared by Barnes. According to a chronology prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency on May 24, 1961, entitled "Special Group Consideration of the Strike Force Concept," those attending the meeting included Secretary of State Herter, Secretary of Defense Gates, Secretary of the Treasury Anderson, Director of Central Intelligence Dulles, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Gray, Under Secretary of Defense James H. Douglas, Under Secretary of State Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State Mann, CIA Deputy Director for Plans Bissell, his assistant Tracy Barnes, and Brigadier General Andrew J. Goodpaster. The location of the meeting is not given. (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82-00679R, Box 3, Gen Maxwell Taylor, Green Study Group, Vol. II) The chronology covers the period November 1960 through January 1961 and is included in the Supplement. SUBJECT Outline of 3 January 1961 Meeting Points covered were: 1. A discussion of whether or not to break relations which it was quickly decided should be done. It was stated that it might be more difficult [4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. The importance of commo obviously is to know on a current basis what the situation is and what sort of treatment is being accorded to American nationals. The tone of the meeting was clearly in support of overt introduction of U.S. forces if any steps were taken by the Cubans either to harm American citizens or to attack or damage official U.S. property (e.g. Guantanamo). 2. A fairly detailed discussion followed as to when the break should be announced. The upshot of this was to favor slightly an immediate break, i.e. even prior to the expected Cuban attack in the UN on 4 January but subject to discussions by the Department with Messrs. Braddock and Wadsworth in order to obtain their views. The Department will make the final decision. 3. There was considerable discussion of the situation in Cuba with general agreement on its seriousness and on the need for action. It again was made clear that action would be taken immediately should the Cubans provoke it in any aggressive way. Even without such provocation, it was clear that the meeting felt that pretty rigorous action should be taken and obviously could successfully be taken--the danger, however, being that if it went too far it might rupture the structure of the OAS which, of course, is undesirable. 4. As to present preparations, there was some discussion about the use of U.S. soil for training. The consensus of the meeting was against this although it was agreed that efforts should be made to try and increase the number of trainees, possibly up to 1500, which if done would require additional training sites. In this connection it was felt that perhaps some additional trainees might be spread around in relatively small groups and given some training. The cover story could be that enlistment in these small cadres was the best way to keep them together, cover the language problems, provide them with some sustenance and keep them occupied. Another possibility suggested was some military training in refugee camps, some of which have already been created. The conclusion, however, was clear that preparations should proceed and that to the extent possible the size of the force should be increased. 5. There was some discussion about talking with other Latin American countries on a bi-lateral basis with a view to having them consider providing support against Cuba at an appropriate moment. This would involve breaking of relations at the proper time and possible active support such as recognition of an opposition government and the provision of material, men and conceivably a little money. In this connection it was made clear that action against Trujillo should be seriously pushed. It was urged that in all future propaganda Trujillo's name be paired with that of Castro in order to increase in people's minds the similarity between them as dictators and help overcome distinctions such as one being right and the other being left. It was suggested that possibly Venezuela would be willing to attack the DR if it could be assured of some U.S. support. This plan was thought to be worth examination particularly if it could be worked out so as to occur at the same time as an effort against Cuba. 6. There was some discussion as to when it might be advisable to recognize a provisional Cuban government. Although there was some argument that it might be well to do so fairly soon, the sense of the meeting was that it would be preferable to wait until the individuals involved were located on Cuban soil. 7. It was clearly the sense of the meeting that all possible reasonable efforts should be made now and through the immediate future to provide materiel support to opposition elements inside Cuba and to step up propaganda including leaflet missions.