Solidarity and the Fall of Communism Europejskie Centrum Solidarności Introduction Twenty years have passed since the 4th of June 1989, when the first non- fraudulent elections took place in the People’s Republic of Poland. Those ground-breaking elections were the starting point of the dismantling of the Communist system in Central and Eastern Europe and led to profound social and economic changes. The distinguished personalities of public life, scholars and most importantly, the heroes of those times, now congregate in Warszawa and Gdańsk to evaluate the last 20 years from historical, social and political perspectives. This auspicious assembly is also an opportunity to identify future challenges and find possible answers, using past experiences, of how to approach them. The events of 1989 were of great importance. Not only was it an unarmed fight but also the civic opposition had turned it into a peaceful revolution. Seldom in world history did the revolutions renounce violence bringing radical changes by peaceful means of accord and dialog. Peace and revolution, those usually contrasting words, in 1989 and through the following years described in the most suitable way, the unique changes of those times. The revolution commenced in August 1980. In Central Europe, separated from the rest of the world by the Iron Curtain, workers of the Gdansk Shipyard, paradoxically named after Lenin, supported by students, intellectuals, priests and journalists, utterly opposed the regime. They were followed by ten million Polish people who created a social movement with the symbolic name Solidarnosc. This solidarity led Poland to freedom. The same path was shortly followed by other nations. The story of Solidarnosc has not finished. Not only did lead to the collapse of totalitarian regimes in our continent but also it remains a source of inspiration and a challenge for others. The peaceful revolution still goes on and should never end. We all need this revolution today as we did during those historic times. Moreover, it is possible. The nations who regained their liberty 20 years ago, as well as those who have enjoyed their freedom for much longer than the last two decades, are facing a massive task. They must jointly use the gift of freedom to ensure unity throughout Europe. Maciej Zięba OP Director of the European Solidarity Centre 1989 – Changing the Course of history Prof. Andrzej Paczkowski Poland The world around the Round Table Prof. Andrzej Paczkowski (born 1938) A Polish historian, a member of the Board of the Institute of the National Remembrance, a publicist and an alpinist. Andrzej studied history at Warsaw University. In 1966 he received a PhD and in 1975 a habilitation followed by a professorship in 1991. Furthermore, he is a director of Modern History Studies at the Political Institute of Polish Academy of Sciences and a professor in Collegium Civitas. From 1974 to 1995 he was the president of the Polish Alpinists Association. In the 1980’s he worked closely with the Solidarity movement and was a member of the Social Comittee of Science It is generally accepted that the process paving the way for the negotiations which created the foundation for the demolition of the communist regime in Poland, usually called the Round Table negotiations, as well as the course and results of these talks were to a large extent set by the internal dynamics of events. The endogenous factors underlying this phenomenon have already been indicated a number of times, tracing their origins to national tradition often dating as far back as the Bar Federation or the Kosciusko Uprising. However, the more cautious commentators have limited the roots of the 1989 events to the Poznan revolt of June 1956, the changes that took place in October of the same year or the strikes on the Coast in December 1970. Minimalists refer to the emergence of a democratic opposition in 1976 or the election of a Pole to the highest office in the Holy See two years later. It is worth pointing out that although it was not the Polish votes that decided on the conclave’s results, this memorable event is treated as the Polish people’s “own” piece of history. Nonetheless, wherever the origins of the changes may be sought, everyone agrees that the key event opening the cycle which lasted until 1989 and which adopted, to speak perhaps over emphatically and not precisely, the form of a “cold civil war”, became the strikes of August 1980. Of key importance was the way the strikes were conducted without the use of force and concluded through the so-called social agreements. Equally important, or perhaps even the most important, was the fact that one of the parties in that conflict deemed precisely this way as fundamental for the fight which it assumed. Despite all that transpired, Solidarity, the party in question, remained faithful to its chosen way, naturally not without lesser or bigger transgressions. Many believed at the time, and continue to do so now, that Solidarity was too loyal to this idea, which was to condemn it to carrying away only a qualified success. The other party, let’s call it the “power- wielding” or “Communist” party, did not exercise similar restraint. Although it would be an exaggeration to state that the other party considered force and dictatorship as the only remedies, it could be confidently said that at the slightest failure of other means, or when confronted with effects it wasn’t sure of, the party resorted to “forceful solutions”. It did that not with hesitation but with full conviction based on the remains of ideological prejudice, group interest and its own peculiar understanding of defensive patriotism. The tension between these two ways of viewing social conflict was one of the main propellants of the dynamic of the events. They led from one “lesser evil”, namely consent for the creation of a social organisation independent of the authority (Edward Gierek’s formulation from 29th August 1980), through the second, namely the imposition of martial law, to the final “lesser evil”, namely the signature of the “contract of the century”, as some have cynically called the agreement concluded at the Round Table twenty years ago. All these (although I hope with the exception of the federation era and national uprisings) will be discussed by our eminent panel speakers. It is not my intention to “direct” or pre-empt them, to ask to a higher or lesser extent inappropriate questions. However, what I would like to do is present, inevitably in a summary format, only the specific aspect of the road to the Round Table which can be called an exogenous factor. What I mean are two sets of issues. The first one is more obvious and it is the influence of international factors, which are usually (and justly) restricted to the stance of the two then superpowers: the Soviet Union and the United States. Although Washington had several important allies (Germany, Great Britain and foremost France) I shall omit them here so as not to complicate the argument. In a similar fashion, I shall omit the party and nationalist activeness of Poland’s Warsaw Pact comrades. For undoubtedly, it was the two superpowers and the rivalry between them which acted as an exogenous factor in the strict sense, namely they bore a direct influence on Poland. The second set of issues is rarely raised in reflections on the Round Table and it concerns the state of affairs in other communist states in this part of Europe. It is commonly accepted that it did not exert direct influence on the events in Poland. However, it seems to me that verification whether Poland was truly an isolated island, as it is commonly thought, might not be of great relevance but could certainly prove interesting. Let’s start with the first set of issues. The introduction of martial law significantly impacted on Soviet as well as American policy vis-à-vis Poland and more strictly speaking General Jaruzelski’s government which gained decisive, although not complete success by forcefully breaking up strikes, the legal structures of Solidarity and also by isolating a large part of the most active union and opposition activists. This success meant that the pressure on the PZPR [Polish United Workers’ Party] leadership exerted by the Kremlin with lesser or greater brutality and more or less publicly became superfluous to liquidate the counter- revolution. Although grumbles could still be heard about “Poland’s deviations” – such as the Church’s independence and power or individual farming practices – or that the crackdown on the opponent is not radical enough, the Soviets were “stuck” with Jaruzelski who was their only alternative. In comparison to the period prior to 13th of December, the Soviet policy towards Poland became, for want of a better word, passive. Moscow had no reasons and also not enough resources to actively interfere in Polish matters. Such approach was almost the exact opposite in the case of the Americans. Until the introduction of martial law, Washington sympathised with Solidarity, was “glad” about the problems the turmoil in Poland caused the Soviets and counted on gradual “softening” of the system (at least over the Vistula River). Yet in reality, it did not possess a defined line of action nor the tools to interfere in Polish matters, which it was continually suspected of by the communist propaganda from Berlin to Vladivostok, including (or more likely led by) Warsaw. By imposing martial law in a particularly brutal manner as manifested by deaths amongst civilians, General Jaruzelski’s government in a way forced the Americans to develop a “Polish policy” and find the necessary tools for its implementation.